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ABSTRACT
POSTMODERNISM AS THE SOCIO-CULTURAL DECONSTRUCTION
OF MODERNITY
by
Steven C. Ward
University of New Hampshire, May, 1991
This

work

theoretical

seeks
positions

to

provide
and

a

description

cultural

of

the

expressions

of

postmodernism and to provide a sociological critique of its
conclusions.

The work uses the writings of the Derrida,

Foucault,

Lyotard,

Lacan,

and

Baudrillard,

as

well

as

arguments

in neo-pop art and postmodern architecture,

as

representatives of the postmodern position on the issues of
referentiality, subjectivity, and rationality. Postmodernism
is treated as a skeptical theoretical and cultural system
which levels all ideational distinctions between belief and
knowledge and truth and rhetoric.

This work argues that a

social or constructivist epistemology can provide a different
way of approaching the issues of knowledge and truth, which
avoids postmodernism's skeptical and nihilistic conclusions.
Postmodernism

is

seen

as

making

sociological

arguments

against traditional philosophical distinctions, but drawing
idealistic conclusions about the end of all meaning.

Using

the Neo-Durkheimians orientation towards cognitive style and
the constructivist position in the sociology of scientific
ix

scientific knowledge as starting points, it is argued that
while pure philosophical distinctions between true and false
and knowledge and belief cannot be made, these distinctions
remain

strong

and

powerful

social

distinctions.

These

distinctions serve to foster group cohesion and identity.
Finally, this work examines how postmodernism can be seen as
the outcome of the social organization of specific cultureproducing

and

culture-consuming

society.

x

groups

in

contemporary

CHAPTER I
GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE CONTEMPORARY DEBATE ON
POSTMODERNISM
Postmodernism is a term that is "at once fashionable yet
irritatingly elusive to define."1 Since the early nineteeneighties, when the term first came into widespread use,

it

has been employed to describe everything from television
commercials to post-structuralist philosophy.
this eclectic,

ill-defined,

Furthermore,

and all-encompassing term has

been surrounded by a virtual sea of controversy, debate, and
confrontation.

Coalitions have formed, both for and against,

each hurling accusations against the other.

Critics see it

as announcing the end of all meaning and of collapsing all
distinctions

between

belief

and

knowledge,

science

literature, authenticity and fakery, and ultimately,
and wrong.
making

any

and

right

For these critics, postmodernism forbids us from
type

of

truth

or

validity

claim.

It

is

essentially a skeptical philosophical system which prohibits
us from saying anything definitive about the world.

For

them, the postmodern movement leads us into an inescapable
trap of cynicism and nihilism.
claim

it marks

an

end

to

On the other hand, proponents

the

hegemonic,

confining,

and

inaccurate philosophical and cultural system of modernity.
As such,

it is a liberating or inevitable movement in the

1 Mike Featherstone, "In Pursuit of the Postmodern: An
Introduction," Theory, Culture & Society, 5, 1988, p. 195
(pp. 195-215).
1

history of philosophy and culture.
With

few

exceptions,

postmodernism

have

treated

phenomenon:

They

have

postmodernism

to

the

previous
it

as

generally

broader

a

discussions
purely

failed

of

cultural

to

connect

social context.

In

this

dissertation, we seek to explore the issue of postmodernism
from a sociology of knowledge/culture perspective.
has three primary goals:

This work

(1) To provide a description of a

general postmodern position or framework.

(2) To discuss an

alternative to the idealism-based epistemological conclusions
of postmodern thought.

(3) To illustrate how postmodernism

can be seen from within the confines of the organization of
social groups.
explore

some

With regard to the first point, we seek to
of

manifestations of
"postmodern"
practical

changes

philosophy,
purpose

to

is

the

theoretical

postmodernism.
refer

to

a

We will

series

of

and
use

cultural
the

term

theoretical

and

in such diverse realms as linguistics,

history,
not

important

just

architecture,
to

and art.

provide

postmodern position or framework.

a

However,

description

of

our
the

We will also discuss what

a "social" or "constructivist" epistemology can contribute to
the often nihilistic conclusions drawn by some postmodernist
philosophers.2 The majority of discussions on postmodernism
treat it as only an issue of philosophy or epistemology.

In

2 For one definition of social epistemology, cf. Steve
Fuller,
Social Epistemoloav
(Bloomington, IN:
Indiana
University Press, 1988).
2

other words, they see postmodernism as either threatening or
enhancing our ability to ascertain and describe the "way
things really are."
this

work,

Our point of departure is different.

postmodernism

will

not

be

seen

as

In

either

a

"correct" or an "incorrect" way of perceiving the world or of
acting in the world, but as a "social construct."

As such,

it is not a matter of truth or lie, but of the ability of a
philosophical/cultural

movement

to

define

and

construct

reality, or the lack of reality in the case of postmodernism.
Finally, we seek to show how postmodernism can be viewed as
a product of social organization.

Specifically, we seek to

illustrate how postmodernism can be
social

organization

of

seen as part

knowledge producing

of the

and cultural

consuming communities.
Before turning to an outline of the chapters in this
dissertation,

it is important to explore why postmodernism

has become such an important
and

feature of the contemporary

intellectual

landscape

such

an

issue

of

debate

controversy.

To do this, we will examine some of the uses of

postmodernism in various contemporary cultural debates.

and

We

will use these discussions to clarify and delimit the type of
postmodernism we will utilize in this dissertation.

First,

we will provide a brief history of the term's use.

Secondly,

we

in social

will

theory.

examine

the debate over postmodernism

Specifically, we will briefly discuss the dialogue

between Daniel Bell, Juergen Habermas, Jean-Francois Lyotard,
3

and Michel Foucault on modernity and postmodernity.
we

will

discuss

the

debate

between

Thirdly,

modernists

and

postmodernists over aesthetic style in architecture and art.
Next, we will explore how the assaults on modernity extend
into

the

popular

discourse

on

political

foundations.

Finally, we use the insights gained from these debates to
provide a general definition of cultural
postmodernism.

and theoretical

These introductory treatments are intended to

illustrate the different uses of postmodernism in different
fields

and

to

"set

the

stage”

for

the

more

detailed

theoretical and sociological treatment to follow, that is, in
the proposed chapters for this dissertation.

The Etiology of Postmodernism
One means for clarifying the ambiguity of postmodernism
is to provide a brief chronology of its use.
see,

postmodernism

redefinitions.

has

gone

through

As we shall

several

stages

and

Among the first writers to use the term was

the historian Arnold Toynbee in his voluminous A Study of
History.3

Toynbee saw the "postmodern age," in part, as a

result of a rebellion against modern rationality.
world,

with

its

emphasis

on

rationality,

The modern

science,

and

3
Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History. Volume IX
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 559.
There is
some disagreement on the origin of the term postmodern. For
a discussion of this see, Matei Calinescu, Five Faces of
Modernity;
Modernism.
Avant-Garde.
Decadence. KltSgh..
Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987), pp.
267-68.
4

technological development, had culminated in the two world
wars.4
War

Toynbee believed that humanity at the end of World

II

was

beginning

modernization.

to

question

the

outcomes

of

For Toynbee, this questioning of technology

and modern existence signaled the beginning of an age of
decline

in

the

irrationality
attitude,

Western

and

(i.e.,

relativism).

This

a

movement
emerging

towards
cultural

described by Toynbee, towards modernity was not

particularly a new one.
earlier

world

pointed

modernity.

out

Nietzsche, Weber,

many

of

the

problems

and others had
intrinsic

to

What was perhaps new at the end of World War II

was that the issues were being received by a larger and a
more trans-Euro-American audience.
Toynbee's identification of the coming of the postmodern
age did not have much of an impact in the field of history or
in the conventional social sciences.

However, many poets and

writers, while not specifically using the term postmodern or
Toynbee's

prognosis,

began

exploring

possibilities

of

"overcoming" the problems of cultural and societal modernism
(e.g. the "new" poetry of the 1950's; writers such as Jack
Kerouac; and composer John Cage).

This era is what Andreas

Huyssen refers to as the "first phase" of postmodernism in

4 We find a similar anti-Hegelian sensibility in other
writings of this period. For example, T. Adorno writes, "No
universal history leads from savagery to humanitarianism, but
there is one leading from the slingshot to the megaton bomb."
Negative Dialectics (New York: Seabury Press, 1973), p. 320.
5

the United States.5

During this period,

postmodernism is

taken to refer to a "tenacious trope of tendencies" occurring
in the humanities.6
protest

by

younger

It is marked by a loosely-articulated
artists

and

critics

against

the

bureaucratic confinement of social modernity and the now
institutionalized cultural canons of high modernism (e.g.,
cubism, expressionism, modern literature).
A
1960's.

second

phase

of

postmodernism

began

in

the

late

Here, postmodernism began to turn from its praxis-

oriented or "creative" rebellion against modernity to a more
theoretical position.

It is marked by the introduction of

French poststructuralism into the cultural discourse spawned
by the creative rebellion of the early anti-modernists.

The

deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida, the psychoanalysis of
Jacques Lacan, and the genealogy of Hichel Foucault, as well
as renewed attention given to German critical theory and the
emergence of feminist theory, gave postmodernism a broader
intellectual appeal.

All these theoretical approaches shared

5
Andreas Huyssen, "From Counter-Culture to NeoConservatism and Beyond: Stages of the Postmodern." Social
Science Information, 23, 1984, p. 617.
While helpful in
orientation,
Huyssen's
classifications
are
somewhat
simplistic and perhaps misleading. The division between the
political right and left are often blurred in postmodern
thought. Cf. Linda Hutcheon's discussion of the politically
"double coded" characteristic of postmodernism in A Poetics
Fiction
(New York:
flf Postmodernism:__ History. Theory.
Routledge, 1988), pp. 201-221.
6 Ihab Hassan and Sally Hassan, Innovation/Renovation:
New Perspectives in the Humanities (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1983), p. 6.

an attack on modern epistemology and the role of the modern
subject within traditional philosophy and politics.

Each

approach provided a theoretical "direction" to the growing
rebellion against cultural and societal modernity.

It was

during this period that term postmodern began to move from
describing an aesthetic movement to describing a broad and
diversified cultural and theoretical movement.
The

current phase

of postmodernism

(post-1960's)

is

marked by the emergence of three theoretical and political
camps.

"First,

the emergence of postmodernism's alliance

with neo-conservatism."7
nature

of

modern

This position sees the fragmented

culture

as

being

responsible

for

the

decaying moral and economic fabric of modern life.8 The neo
conservatives usually call for some type of totalizing system
of

thought

orientation),
Catholicism,

(i.e.,

an

perhaps
to

repair

all-encompassing
something
the

similar

damage

fragmentation of value spheres.

explanation

done

to
by

and

Medieval
modernity's

For this group, history is

a source of inspiration and valorization (i.e., the "past as
utopia").

The neo-conservatives see the past as a model for

repairing

contemporary

society.

Secondly, we can identify what may be called a

culture

and

consequently

modern

7 Huyssen, "From Counter-Culture to Neo-Conservatism and
Beyond," 1984, p. 621.
8 For an example of this type of approach see,
Christopher Lash, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its
Critics (New York: Norton, 1990).

"postmodernism

of

resistance."9

The

resistance

position

shares an attack on the principles of modernity with the neo
conservative position, yet it does not valorize history nor
call for a totalizing system of thought.

This position seeks

to

the

utilize

the

space

created

by

emergence

of

postmodernism to render a critique of the "status quo and
historical origins,
can

identify

the

not a return to them."10
emergence

of

"postmodernism of acceptance."

what

might

Thirdly,
be

we

called

a

The acceptance position is

aware of the theoretical and societal problems associated
with modernity,

yet

it accepts

these problems

and

often

celebrates them.

The postmodernism of acceptance feels it is

impossible to draw distinctions between "high" and "low" art
or between commodification (i.e., as objects of exchange) and
authenticity.

The acceptance position adheres to the socio

political status quo for lack of a better alternative or
because new social orders only usher in a different form of
social control.
This

history

provides

us

"evolution" of the term; however,

with

an

account

of

the

it tells us little about

the specific arguments of postmodernists.

In the next three

sections,

specific debates

we

will

turn

to

some

of

the

between modernists and postmodernists in order to further
9
Hal Foster (ed.), The Anti-Aesthetic; Essavs on
Postmodern Culture (Port Townsend, Washington: Bay Press,
1983), p. xii.
10 Ibid., p. xii.

I

clarify the issues at stake.

The Debate in Social Theory
While the

"problem of modernity" has been a central

theme in social theory since the writings of Marx, Weber,
Toennies, and Simmel, it was only in the early and mid-1970's
that the issues of postmodernism and postmodernity appeared
in

the

discourse

sporadically).

on

social

thought

(and

et

only

In the early 1970's, postmodernism was seen

as either a romantic form of anti-modernity
Berger,

here

al.)

or

as

a

further

outcome

(e.g.,

of

Peter

modernism's

fragmentation of culture.11
Daniel

Bell,

in his

influential

book,

The

Cultural

Contradictions of Capitalism, takes the latter position.12
Bell

sees postmodernism as a movement

carries modernism

to

its

furthest

of

thought

reaches."13

"which

In Bell's

view, modernism, and its extension postmodernism, has ushered
in an age of fragmentation.

Culture, the system of precepts

and predispositions for guiding and interpreting life, has
become separated and antagonistic to the social structure.
Modernism's

and

postmodernism's

reliance

on

continual

11 Peter Berger, et al., The Homeless Mind: Modernization
and Consciousness (New York: Vintage Books, 1973), p. 174.
12 Daniel Bell, The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism
(New York: Basic Books, 1976).
13 Ibid., p. 51. As is evident, Bell views postmodernism
as an extension and intensification of the modernistic ethos.
9

individual

innovation is in direct contradiction with the

discipline needed for a stable social and economic order.
Bell believes that modernism's and postmodernism's emphasis
on consumerism and hedonism has destroyed the work ethic and
has contributed to the erosion of the rational order required
for economic production in a capitalist economy.

In Bell's

words, postmodernism "demands that what was previously played
out in fantasy and imagination must be acted out in life as
well."u

It seeks to replace the Protestant Ethic with the

psychedelic bazaar.
a totalizing
damage.

In this scenario of fragmentation only

system of theory

and praxis can

repair the

In this respect, pell calls for a "return in Western

Society of some conception of religion" to repair the damage
done by the culture of separation.15
Bell's position on modernity and postmodernity marks one
of the important stances in the debate.

Bell is certainly an

anti-modernist as well as an anti-postmodernist.
the

fragmentation

caused

consciousness in modernity.

by

the

He laments

privatization

of

The "cure” in Bell's view is to

return to a totalizing value system associated with pre
modernity.

Here,

society

can

once

again

foundation for deciding the merits of morals,
philosophical positions.
problem of moral

find

a

values,

firm
and

This, he believes, will solve the

and theoretical

14 Ibid., p. 54.
15 Ibid., p. 29.
10

relativism which haunts

modernity.
In Europe the modernity/postmodernity debate has pitted
Juergen Habermas, a defender of the Enlightenment principles
of

modernity,

against

Michel

Foucault

and

Jean-Francois

Lyotard, two of modernity's harshest critics.16 This debate
began in the late 1970's and has been described as "one of
the most important debates of this decade,
century."17

Habermas,

if not of this

in a paper delivered in Frankfurt in

1980, compared the French poststructuralists with the young
conservatives

(Jungkonservativen)

of Weimar-era Germany.18

Habermas was placed on the defensive with the publication of
Lyotard's La Condition Postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir in
1979.19

In the book, Lyotard claims that the metanarratives

of modernity,

that

positions which

is the discourses or meta-theoretical

support

the modern era,

have

lost their

credibility through changes in science, technology, and art
in the twentieth century.

These supporting narratives of

modernity, such as the belief in human emancipation and the

16 There are other important figures in this debate,
including Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty.
I have chosen
Foucault and Lyotard only as examples.
17 Ehrhard Bahr, "In Defense of the Enlightenment:
Foucault and Habermas." German Studies Review, 11, 1988, p.
97.
18 Jurgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity." New
German Critique 22, 1981, pp 3-14.
19 The Postmodern Condition:_A Report
trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi
University of Minnesota Press, 1984).
11

<?n Enpwledgg/
(Minneapolis:

ability

to

achieve

accurate

and

totalizing

or

complete

knowledge systems, are no longer possible given changes in
science and society.

Social change has "opened new ways of

life (which) reveal a truth about our basic condition that
has been covered over by comforting stories about the cosmos
or

about

history."20

New

knowledge

and

technology

have

created a world in which we no longer feel the comfort of
fixed laws or of mastery over our technological creations.
For Lyotard, our current condition prohibits us from finding
a

transcendent

discourse

incommensurability
Consequently,
serve

as

a

of

no discourse
foundation

or

theory

competing

which

can

language

can gain enough
for

avoid

timeless

the

games.

legitimacy to
and

universal

authority.21
In Habermas' earlier work, Knowledge and Human Interests
(1972) , he had sought to ground authority in an "ideal speech
situation."22

Habermas agreed that we can no longer accept

the modern correspondence theory of truth (i.e., a direct,
non-distorted relation between theory and reality) . However,
even

without

the

correspondence

theory

of

truth,

the

20 David Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel.
Heidegger, and After (Chicago: University of Chicago Press),
p. 258.
21 Cf.
Christopher Norris,
Contest of Faculties:
Philosophy and Theory After Deconstruction (London: Methuen
& Co., 1985), p. 140.
22 Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,
trans. by Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972).
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elimination of power, self-interest, and ignorance remain the
socially (lifeworld) defined goals of any communicative act
or

discourse.

For

Habermas,

truth

is

derived

from

a

consensus obtained in a forum of open and free communication.
From

this

perspective,

knowledge

obtains

its

validity

"because it is intersubjectively recognized to be rationally
justified in processes of argumentative criticism."23

This

move on Habermas' part allows him to replace one exhausted
principle of modernity, the correspondence theory of truth,
with another of its central precepts, that of reason (i.e.,
the theory of communicative action).
Lyotard responded to Habermas' proposals by questioning
the ability of any strategy to overcome the heterogeneous
nature of contemporary discourses.

Lyotard writes:

My question is to determine what sort of unity
Habermas has in mind.
Is the aim of the project of
modernity the constitution of sociocultural unity
within which all the elements of daily life and of
thought would take their places as in an organic
whole? Or does the passage that has to be chartered
between heterogeneous language games— those of
cognition, of ethics of politics— belong to a
different order from that?24
Lyotard contends that Habermas' ideal speech situation is but
another example of Western society's quest for totality and
certainty.
forms

However,

existing

the proliferation of competing life

within

contemporary

society

makes

it

23 Stephan Fuchs, "The Social Organization of Scientific
Knowledge.” Sociological Theory, 4, 1986, p. 128.
24 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. 72-73.
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impossible for the ideal speech situation to overcome the
multiple voicing of competing language games.

In this case,

it becomes just another "fairy tale" of modernity— another
metanarrative that no longer works (We will return to this
point in Chapter 6).
Habermas'
modernity,

attack

Hichel

particular work.

on

Foucault,

another
was

important

not

critic

precipitated

by

of
one

It primarily was sparked by what Habermas

felt was a failure on Foucault's part to outline a legitimate
form

of

power

liberation
society.
period

to

from

or

a

the

proposal

contemporary

For Foucault,
modernity

for

discursive
political

or

social

condition

of

the transition from the classical

represented

a

shift

of

epistemes.2S

Nowhere in Foucault's work does he provide a manifesto for
overcoming the preponderance of power in modern society.

As

one critic argued:
He argues we create delinquents and a criminal milieu
with our prisons and our paroles; he tells us that,
from the Catholic confessional to the psychiatrist's
couch, we have produced ourselves as beings with a
sexuality that must be explored and managed.... but
he does not tell us what we should do. He does not
tell us how we could liberate ourselves or what sort of
society we should have instead....What kind of power
would be legitimate; on what basis can we distinguish

25 Epistemes are defined by Foucault as "the total set
of relations that united, at a given period, the discursive
practices that give rise to epistemological
figures,
sciences,
and
possibly
formalized
systems..."
Michel
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. by A.M.
Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper Colophon, 1972), p. 191.
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between acceptable and unacceptable forms of power?26
Foucault does not outline a legitimate form of power because
he thinks that is a paradox.

In his view, the movement from

pre-modernity to modernity does not mean the acquisition of
a timeless,

universal,

and

non-power

laden

discourse

matters of sexuality, crime, or any other issue.

on

Modernity

represents a change in epistemes and the acquisition of new
discourses (and the elimination or exclusion of others) to
articulate

these

Enlightenment's,

epistemes.

In

as

Habermas',

well

as

Foucault's

scheme,

most

the

important

concepts of rationality and universality become rhetorical
strategies

of

linguistic

and

social

domination

(i.e.,

rationality is power).
It is easy to see why a person raised on critical theory
would

find

Lyotard's

and

Foucault's

work

objectionable.

Habermas believes Foucault and Lyotard take a Nietzschean
turn,

thereby negating any

including their own.27

firm foundation

for critique,

By equating power and knowledge, in

what Habermas believes to be a totalizing manner, Lyotard and
Foucault ignore the possible legitimacy inherent in everyday
26 Keith Gandal, "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Works and
Politics." Telos, 67, 1986, p. 121.
27 Habermas
refers
to
this
as
a
"performative
contradiction." Cf. the discussion of Habermas in Chapter 6.
Habermas also laments what he considers to be the Nietzschean
turn
of Adorno
and Horkheimer
in the
Dialectic of
Enlightenment (New York: Continuum Books, 1972). Cf. Nancy
S. Love, "Epistemology and Exchange: Marx, Nietzsche, and
Critical Theory." New German Critique, 41, 1987, pp. 71-94
for a discussion of this.
15

communicative

action.

distinguishing

between

This
the

prohibits

intrusion

of

them

power

from

in modern

social systems and the functioning of everyday speech acts.
By viewing power

and communicative

distortion

in such

a

manner, postmodernists such as Lyotard and Foucault do not
provide an avenue for any meaningful
discourse to occur.

(non-power distorted)

Habermas contends that the Enlightenment

project (i.e., the principles of modernity) of emancipation
and the overcoming of prejudice have not failed.
only incomplete.

They are

He feels it is his mission to salvage the

enlightenment from both Bell's anti-modern return to religion
and Lyotard's and Foucault's postmodern abandonment of the
project altogether.
As we shall see in the next section some of the issues
of debate in social theory can also be founded in the debate
over modern aesthetic form.

The Debate Over Aesthetic Form in Architecture
and Art
In the early 1980's the Polish Movement "Solidarity"
released

a

statement

on

modern

architecture.

In

the

statement, the union condemned modern architecure for being,
in

their

words,

"the

product

of

bureaucracy and totalitarianism."28
"journalistic

novelist,"

Tom Wolfe,

an

alliance

between

In a similar vein, the
commenting on modern

28 Paolo Portoghesi, Postmodern: The Architecture of the
Postindustrial Citv (New York: Rizzoli, 1983), p. 8.
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architecture in his 1981 book From Bauhaus to Our House,
laments Nthe whiteness & lightness & leanness & cleanness &
bareness

&

spareness

of

it

all."29

From

both

of

these

perspectives, the drive of modern architects to create clean
and pure space have resulted in the negation of community and
history.
a

Modern architecture has not succeeded in producing

livable

environment,

but

has

instead

left

humanity

"surrounded by a sea of endless monotony," filled with "the
simplest
has

functionalism."30

become

a

cultural

bureaucratization

In social
symbol

of

terms,
the

and rationalization

of

architecture

ever-increasing
society and

the

lifeworld, as well as the continual demise of community.
In the realm of art this distrust of modernistic style
can also be found.

Postmodern art incorporates many of the

anti-modern theoretical perspectives that are found in the
disdain for modern architecture.
art

as

"entails

proclaiming
that

originality,

a

an

"auratic"

cultural

uniqueness,

Postmodernists see modern

object

and

superiority.31
proclaims

singularity"

29 Tom Wolfe, From Bauhaus to Our
Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1981), p. 4.

House

Aura

its

own

through

the

(New York:

30 Heinrich Koltz (ed.), Postmodern Visions: Drawings.
Paintings, and Models of Contemporary Architects (New York:
Abbeville Press, 1985), p. 7.
31 This term is from Walter Benjamin's, "The Work of Art
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed.
by H. Arendt (London: Fontana/Collins, 1973), pp. 219-54.
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socially

unrestrained

action

of

artistic

creativity.32

Postmodern critics argue that this modern attribute confines
art to consumption within the realm of high culture, since
the only one capable of achieving the auratic qualities are
those with the proper level of cultural capital.

Postmodern

art attempts to undermine the auratic quality and social
function of modern art by deliberately allying itself with
various

forms

of

mechanical

and

electronic

reproduction

(e.g., Andy Warhol, Roy Lichtenstein, Barbara Kruger).
alliance

or

manifestation

has

the

effect

of

This

denying

a

privileged position to the work of art, its producer, or to
its consumer.

By showing that art can be constructed from

the commodified artifacts of everyday life, as pop and neo
pop art do,

and by denying the distinction between high

culture and pop culture, the postmodernists hope to show that
the modern orientation is out-dated and confining and that
art needs new, post-modern forms of "expression."
If we explore the above positions on modern architecture
and art further we find something more than a disenchantment
with a particular aesthetic style.
critiques

We find embedded in these

a disillusionment with many of the theoretical

principles and institutional characteristics of the modern
world.

For the postmodernists, modernity, as well as modern

architecture

and

art,

were

built

on

the

theoretical

32
Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized
Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p.
286.
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principles

of universality,

on

a break with history

and

tradition, and on the centrality of the autonomous creative
subject.

For

critics,

these

ideational

principles

are

closely related to the often devastating social processes of
modernity:

progressive rationalization, differentiation and

fragmentation

of

the

social

world,

industrialization,

urbanization, and the development and expansion of organized
capitalism.

For

the

postmodernists,

the

theoretical

principles, institutional processes, and cultural products of
modernity

have

century.

The

become

problematic

theoretical

in

the

principles

late

on

twentieth

which

modern

architecture and art were developed no longer seem adequate
for describing the style of the contemporary social world.
Modern style no longer seem to capture the experience of the
so called post-industrial

age or the contemporary social

processes we encounter in everyday life.

Therefore,

new

forms of aesthetic expression are required that more closely
adhere to the contemporary social and cultural situation.

The Search for Political Foundations
The debate between modernists and postmodernists also
extend to the contemporary debate over political foundations.
Some,

often

using

Bell

as

a

point

Enlightenment-based liberalism and
responsible

for

the

decline

happiness and political virtue.
19

of

of

reference,

see

individualism as being
traditional

notions

of

This group sees the return

of a firm socio-political foundation as the only alternative
to modern fragmentation and the subsequent loss of meaning.
On the other hand,

some argue that we need a new type of

political consciousness rather than simply a return to a
romantically-perceived past utopia.
For both groups,

there

is no more evidence

of the

exhaustion of modern political foundations than the decline
of

the

notion

modernity's
convincing,

of

grand

progress.

In

concept

progress

of

the

American
seems

context,

no

longer

especially as seen in the after-light of the

Vietnam War or the growing environmental

crisis.

Robert

Wallace has written:
Even the advocates of nuclear power, the builders of
the latest McDonald's, and the investigators of
recombinant DNA, thought they may still occasionally
apply the word "progress" to these projects, define
them not as being themselves beneficial but merely
as generating jobs, or ultimately as being
"inevitable" ”
Progress

and the

optimistic,

future-oriented

attitude

of

modernity no longer seem adequate for defining our experience
of the contemporary socio-political situation.
progress,

The idea of

like foundational truth for Lyotard,

has become

another metanarrative of modernity, one that no longer seems
to encompass our current social and political condition.
For the German critic Peter Sloterdijk, the fading of
the

political

metanarratives

of

modernity

is

akin

to

33 Robert
Wallace,
"Progress,
Secularization
and
Modernity:
The Lowith-Blumenberg Debate." The New German
Critique, 22, 1981, p. 63.
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Nietzsche's description of the void created by the death of
God

(and man)— we have succumbed to nihilism.

Sloterdijk

sees this political fading as resulting in the rise of the
cynic as the modal personality of contemporary society.34
As the master cynic Diogenes refused to accept the principles
of Platonic thought or the "virtues" of Athenian politics,
the modern cynic no longer accepts the absolute promises of
science or the liberation possibilities offered by Marxism or
the New Social Movements.

Sloterdijk describes our current

state as "enlightened false consciousness:'1
It is that modernized, unhappy consciousness, on which
enlightenment has labored both successfully and
unsuccessfully.
It has learned its lessons in
enlightenment, but it has not, and probably was not
able to, put them into practice. Well-off and
miserable at the same time, this consciousness no
longer feels affected by any critique of ideology;
its falseness is already reflexively buffered.35
Sloterdijk is describing a social and academic environment
where ideas and theories are immediately deconstructed and
dismissed.

Any

program

for

liberation

or

perhaps

even

amelioration becomes susceptible to the "blank stare” of the
cynic who has heard these promises before.

Sloterdijk goes

on to provide a very apt description of the manifestation of
enlightened false consciousness in everyday life:
We do our work and say to ourselves, it would be
better to get really involved. We live from day to
day, from vacation to vacation, from news show to news
34 Peter Sloterdijk,
Critique
of
Cvnical
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).
35 Ibid., p. 5.
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Reason

show, from problem to problem, from orgasm to orgasm,
in private turbulence and medium-term affairs, tense,
relaxed. With some things we feel dismay, but with
most things we can't really give a damn.3*
The key to understanding this statement is the word can't.
Modern political consciousness is numb.
promises of Marxism turn

It has seen the

into the Soviet Gulag,

the New

Social Movements turn into state-directed political action
committees,

the

counter

culture

being

absorbed

into

the

culture industry, and Enlightenment rationality turn into the
iron cage.

In such a social environment, the only avenue

which seems open is a protective cynical retreat into our
private orbits.

Sloterdijk believes that the only type of

left politics that is possible is one based on a anarchistic
cynicism.

We must somehow forge a new micro politics of

resistance.
The theme of modernistic "homelessness" is also echoed
in a recent work by Robert Bellah, et al., on individualism
in middle-class American life.37
the

isolation

brought

on

individualism is similar
cynicism.

by

Bellah's description of

ontological

and

utilitarian

in some respect to Sloterdijk's

Bellah's individual has pulled inward, trying to

36 Ibid., p. 98-99.
37
Robert Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart:
Individualism and Commitment in American Life (New York:
Harper and Row, 1985). There are important differences
between Bellah's and Sloterdijk's positions on modernity.
Sloterdijk's position is a Weberian-inspired account which
sees modern life as being too bureaucratic and confining.
Bellah's description is a conservative-inspired view which
sees modern life as being too individualistic.
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find meaning through material success or ontological escape.
Bellah, et al., write:
The inner tensions of American individualism add
up to a classic case of ambivalence. We deeply feel
the emptiness of a life without sustaining social
c o m m itm e n ts.
Yet we are hesitant to articulate our
sense that we need one another as much as we need to
stand alone, for fear that if we did we would lose our
independence altogether.38
In Bellah's view, the excesses of modern individualism make
it difficult for us to come to terms with social problems or
our general social condition.

Instead of confronting our

problems as a group, we seek refuge in our private orbits.
The "first language" of American individualism,

focused on

asserting independence, further complicates the situation by
limiting our ability to express our feelings of commitment or
desire

to

engage

in

a

discourse

on

our

socio-political

direction.
What we find in Sloterdijk's and Bellah's descriptions
are attempts to extend

some of the

approaches

in social

theory to the larger political conditions in Europe and the
United

States.

Bellah's approach

is a

diagnosis of modernity and Habermas'

fusion of

Bell's

treatment plan.

He

wants Americans to recognize the depth of their differences
but still manage to draw from old cultural orientations and
engage

in a political

common goals.
resembles

discourse to reach a consensus on

Bellah's solution to the problems of modernity

what

was

referred

to

earlier

38 Ibid., pp. 150-151, emphasis added.
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as

the

"neo

conservative development" in the critique of modernity.
solution

rests

consciousness

on

to

the

repair

creation
modern

of

a

society.39

interpreted as a somewhat tempered call
system of thought.

"social

His

ecology"

This

can

be

for a totalizing

Sloterdijk, with his roots in the German

Green Party, would not see this as a possibility, given the
fragmented

nature

of

competing

association between knowledge,

language

discourse,

games

and

and power.

the
His

position is an example of the "postmodernism of resistance,"
described earlier (p. 8).
seems to

rest

politics— that

Sloterdijk's political solution

on a

non-romantic

is

politics

a

form of

that

micro or

cynically

local

resists

the

status quo, centralization, and individualism.

The Postmodern Framework
The proceeding discussion of some of the debates between
modernists and postmodernists perhaps confuses the situation
more than it clarifies it.

As we can see,

postmodernism

means different things to different people. All the groups we
discussed see postmodernism as a rebellion against social and
cultural

modernity.

However,

from

this

agreement

the

discussions tends to go in a variety of different directions.
In this section, we will present our "working definition" of
postmodernism.

This will be the version of postmodernism

39 Bellah borrows this idea and many of his ideas on
postmodernism from Stephen Toulmin's, The Return to Cosmology
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
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that we will develop and utilize throughout this work
First, we begin with some of the central ideas of modern
thought.
at

The modern perspective can be seen as encompassing

least

three

universality.
principles

overlapping

egocentrism.

serve,

not

philosophical

and

only as

principles;

Ipgggentriaa.*0

the

foundation

These

for modern

science and philosophy, but also for modern aesthetics and
modern agency.

Universality refers, in part, to the attempt

to construct timeless and cross-cultural laws of natural or
human

action

based

on

a

timeless

and

universal

method.

Embedded within this idea of universality is a belief in the
progress of knowledge or "scientific accumulation."
position

sees

rational

individuals

Egocentrism

accurate

refers

knowledge

and

to

as

self-evident

is thus universally

locating

the

source

of

This
to

all

applicable.
knowledge,

imagination, or practical agency in the condition of human
subjectivity.
be

a

product

subjectivity.
find a

Here, rationality and creativity is thought to
of

some

inherent

condition

of

human

Finally, logocentrism refers to the quest to

foundational truth

(the

logos,

the

"Word").

The

modern discourse has continually sought to develop the one
correct theory or method that was capable of apprehending the
world as it really exists.

It sought the "final word" on

matters of truth, justice, and knowledge.
40 Richard Kearney, The Wake of Imagination: Toward a
Postmodern Culture (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1988), p. 161.
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At a general level, we see postmodernism as a position
which

seeks

to

deconstruct

modern theoretical
illustrate

how

(i.e.,

break down

and cultural principles.

these

modern

theoretical

or

expose)

It seeks to
principles

are

culturally and historically constructed within the confines
of a power dynamic and how practitioners act as if these
principles were reflective of reality.

To accomplish this,

postmodern thought tends to highlight modernity's paradoxical
or self-defeating qualities.
the

hidden

or

philosophical

overt

principles

Postmodernism often focuses on

metaphors

on

which

rests.

This

is

the

often

modern
done

by

pointing out modernity's disregard or avoidance of problems,
such as language or the negation of the excluded

"other"

(e.g.,

issues such as non-rationality and power or social

groups

such

World).

as

The

foundations

of

Women,

the

"mentally

deconstruction

process

the philosophical

ill,"
thus

discourse

or

the

Third

undermines

the

of modernity,

leaving it as a contingent form of rhetoric.

The modern

narrative becomes just one narrative among others and not the
foundation for all narratives.

In other words, the modern

discourse has no privileged access to truth.
The above discussion aids us in making a distinction,
not

only

between

modernism

and

postmodernism,

between postmodernism and anti-modernism.

but

also

Anti-modernist are

critical of the Enlightenment based ideology of modernity,
yet they seek a new totality to recover the loss of meaning.
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Postmodernists do not make that move.

They agree that the

Enlightenment is exhausted, but that do not think that any
new

or

old

system

can

replace

it.

We

must

accept

the

incommensurability of various life forms and language games
(and the subsequent leveling of meaning) . We cannot hold out
hope for a position to repair fragmented value spheres.

We

must live with fragmentation and undecidability.
Consequently,

we may conclude that postmodernism,

in

both theory and cultural production, can be seen as a selfconscious

skepticism— a

disbelief

metanarratives of modernity.

in

the

supporting

The modern attempt to ground

its thought and action in a universal and subject-centered
method is revealed as having a mythical, fictional, or merely
rhetorical quality.

In such a questioning environment, the

modern theoretical distinctions between subject and object,
rationality

and

non-rationality,

speech

and

writing,

or

between "high" and "low" culture become insupportable.
Now

that

we

have

some

conceptualization

of

what

postmodernism is about, or at least our version, we can turn
to the outline of the chapters to follow.

Plan of the Chapters
This work

is concerned with

underlying themes and

identifying some of the

issues which unite the

"postmodern

turn" in theory and culture and how these issues may be seen
sociologically.

In this connection, it is perhaps helpful to
27

see this dissertation as having three sections.

The first

section is concerned with both discussing the Enlightenment
philosophical
nineteenth
position.

foundations

of

modernity

and

the

and early twentieth-century critiques

late

of this

The second section seeks to identify the cultural

and theoretical positions of postmodernism (i.e., to develop
a postmodern framework).

In addition to discussions of the

theoretical views of Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, and others,
this sections contains an examination of neo-pop art and
postmodern architecture to further illustrate how the ideas
of

postmodern

theory

are

incorporated

into

production of the late twentieth century.

the

cultural

Our final section

is concerned with discussing what a sociology of knowledge
position can contribute to an understanding of postmodernism.
This

sections

contains

constructivist

both

an

epistemology

relationship

between

organization

of

consumption.

discussion

and

an

postmodernism

knowledge

Below,

will

social

examination
and

production

we

of

discuss

of

the

or
the

social

and

cultural

the

specific

organization of the chapters.
In order to examine postmodernism as a cultural process,
we first must develop a theoretical view of modernity.
second

chapter

dissertation

by

seeks

to

provide

exploring

some

characteristics of modernity.
through

an

examination

of

the
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a

foundation

of

central

for

The
this

ideational

This will be accomplished
writings

of

the

French

Enlightenment,
Rousseau.
of

specifically,

Condillac,

Condorcet,

and

These figures exemplify some of the dominant ideas

modernity,

such

as

the

optimistic

attitude

towards

rationality, knowledge accumulation, societal progress, and
emancipation.
In chapter three, we turn to late nineteenth and early
twentieth century critiques of modernity.

This period, it is

argued, is a key for understanding the rise of postmodernism
as an intellectual and cultural movement.

In this chapter,

we will focus on the ideas of modernist movements in art and
the

writings

critiques

of

Nietzsche,

certainly

cultural

and

social

do

not

Weber,

and

Simmel.

exhaust

the

complexities

modernity,

but

they

do

Their

provide

of
an

interpretation of its paradoxes— one which has influenced
many postmodern writers.
In chapter four, we begin a discussion and elaboration
of the postmodern
general

framework.

postmodern

Here,

orientation

we will

towards

explore the

language

and

referentiality (i.e., the "linguistic turn"). Linguistics is
the area where many of the original
postmodernism
internal

were

forged.

We

are

ideas of theoretical
concerned

transformation of the linguistic model

structuralism

of

poststructuralism
modernists

was

Ferdinand
of Jacques

seen

as

an

de
Derrida.

Saussure
Language

unproblematic

communicating the social and physical world.
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with

the

from the
to
to

instrument

the
many
for

The modernists

saw the world as a "fixed object of analysis quite separate
from the forms of discourse by which men speak of it and by
which

they

represent

their

thoughts."41

For

the

postmodernists, this modern position ignores the way in which
language

itself

structures

or

shapes

reality.42

This

sensibility towards language as a definer of thought marks
one of the most important distinctions between modern and
postmodern discourse.

We will specifically explore how this

critique of language fits into the overall reexamination of
modern correspondence or referential epistemology.
In chapter five, we discuss the attack on the timeless
and universal humanist ego in thought.43

Here we consider

the writings of Foucault and Jacques Lacan where the "de
centering" of the subject (i.e., removing the subject as the
center of knowledge) is an important theme.

Following in the

line of Nietzsche, these writers seek to illustrate that the
"subject is not something given, it is something added and

41 Timothy Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 24.
42 F. Mauthner has stated, "If Aristotle had spoken
Chinese or Dakotan he would have had to adopt an entirely
different logic." Quoted in Peter Burke and Roy Porter
(eds.), The Social History of Language (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1987), p. 14.
43 Fredric Jameson has referred to this as the attack
on the pretensions of the Cartesian cogito.
Cf. Fredric
Jameson, The Prison-House of Language: A Critical Account of
Structuralism and Russian Formalism (Princeton, N J : Princeton
University Press, 1972), p. 135.
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invented and projected behind what there is."44

Foucault

maintained that "man is an invention of recent date....and
one perhaps nearing an end."45

We will examine in detail

the meaning of this statement for both social thought and
culture-at-large.

Also,

this

chapter

seeks

to

link the

decentering of the subject with the death of the notion of
the "creative artist"

in postmodern art.

Chapter

the

six

examines

rationality,
typically

saw

progress,
the

past

postmodern

and

orientation

emancipation.

as

a

continuous

irrationality, myth, barbarisms, etc..44

towards

Modernists
overcoming

of

Traditional views

of the social and physical world were to be replaced with
modern

"scientific"

and

rational

ones.

However,

recent

works, which can be labelled as postmodern, take a different
orientations toward the past.

The past is something which is

discontinuous and can't be willfully overcome.

We can never

escape the structural characteristics which mark the history
of our language or the historical situation of our existence.
In other words, we can never gain a timeless "God's eye view"
of ourselves or the social world.
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. by Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 267.
45 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archeology
of the Human Sciences (New York: Pantheon, 1970), p. 387.
44 An example of this would be William Robertson's, The
Progress of Society in Europe: A Historical Outline from the
Subversions of the Roman Empire to the Beginning of the
Sixteenth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1972
(1769)).
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In chapter 7, we begin the explication of a sociological
approach to postmodernism.

Specifically, we will explore the

challenges posed by postmodern philosophy for contemporary
social science.

As part of our explication, we will discuss

the recent work of Jean Baudrillard and his
social thesis."
of

American

"end of the

Finally, we will use Durkheim's discussion
pragmatism

as

a

collapse

of

meaning

postmodernism's

means

for
and

rethinking
leveling

of

discursive formations.
In chapter 8, we will
social

epistemological

further elaborate upon on the

framework

by

examining

recent

developments in the sociology of knowledge, specifically the
so-called strong program and the constructivist thesis in the
sociology

of

scientific

knowledge.

We

will

use

these

developments as examples of how a sociology of knowledge
framework can respond to the often epistemological nihilism
of postmodernism.
In Chapter 9, we will use our previous discussions of
social epistemology and the sociology of knowledge to examine
postmodernism.

Specifically, we will utilize the Durkheimian

and Neo-Durkheimian description of the social organization of
groups.

We

structure

and

seek

to

relate

cognitive

consuming collectivities.
Douglas,

Richard Whitley,

postmodernism

style

of

culture

to

the

group

producing

and

Borrowing from the work of Mary
Pierre Bourdieu,

and others,

we

will explore how group organization may be responsible for
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the dissemination and reception of postmodern culture.47
Finally, we will end our discussion in chapter ten with
an overview of the central points of the dissertation and an
explication of some of the

important

issues and problems

raised by this work.

47 Cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique
of the Judgement of Taste (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1984).

CHAPTER II
THE DOMINANT DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY
In this chapter, we will examine some of the classical
statements of modern thought as presented by its leading
proponents; the eighteenth century French Philosphes.
writings

of the

French

Philosphes

we

find

not

only

origins of much of modern philosophical thought,
many

of

the

ideas

representative

of

cultural

In the
the

but also

modernity.

Specifically in this chapter, we will explore the writings of
Etienne de Condillac,
Jacques Rousseau.
general

modern

the Marquis de Condorcet,

and Jean-

We will use their writings to construct a
philosohical

framework.

In

order

to

accomplish this, we will focus upon three important modern
ideas;

1) the relation between language and knowledge and

their role in obtaining and perfecting reason (Condillac), 2)
the evolutionary unfolding of history (Condorcet) , and 3) the
role of the universal, inner directed "self" in making moral
and political decisions (Rousseau).

The eighteenth century

Enlightenment philosophers were not, unlike their seventeenth
century

predecessors,

content

abstract systems of knowledge.

with

the

construction

of

Enlightenment philosophers

sought to connect theory and practice in order to provide a
means

for

criticizing

institutions.
merely

an

conventional

standards

and

Their philosophy "attributes to thought not

imitative

function
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but

the power

and

task of

shaping

life

Condorcet,

itself."1

and

The

treatments

are

intended

Rousseau

of
to

Condillac,
provide

a

paradigmatic background for the modern way of perceiving the
world and humans'
order

to

build

role within it.

a

framework

It is also provided in

for understanding

postmodern

theory's ''deconstruction" of these basic premises.

First,

however, a discussion of the social conditions that set the
stage for modern philosophical discourse.

Modern Thought and Social Change
The term modern is derived from the Latin word "modo,"
meaning "just now" or "in this time." However, the term has
produced another widely held definition.

Since the earlv

nineteenth century, modernity is a term that has been used to
encapsulate the social and cultural entirety of a historical
period of time.
societies,

The modern world, perhaps above all previous

recognized

itself

to

be

"new"

and

unique.

Modernity, defined within its own terms, claimed a radical
break with

traditional

acting in the world.

ways

of perceiving the world and

In general terms, modernity saw itself

as a period built on the foundations of rationality (i.e., a
belief

in the ability of humans

universality

(i.e.,

the

to ascertain the

construction

of

real),

ahistorical

and

cross-cultural laws), progress (i.e., scientific accumulation
1 Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment,
trans. by F. Koelln and J.P. Pettegrove (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1951), p. viii.
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and telelogical social change), and the enlightened control
of nature and society (i.e., the harnessing of nature and the
societal betterment). At the center of these foundations was
a thinking and acting Cartesian subject capable of accurately
comprehending the world and purposefully acting on the world.
The dogmas of religious authority and traditional lifeways,
as well as the canons of antiquity, were open to rigorous
rational scrutiny, reevaluation, and often rejection.

The

modern human being did not need the traditional authority
embodied in a church or a monarch to make the appropriate
political, economic, philosophical, or aesthetic decisions.
Decisions

could

be

made

on

the

basis

of

a

rational

methodological comparison of means and ends performed by the
thinking and acting subject.
While our primary concern in this chapter is with the
ideational features of modernity, it would be a mistake to
view it only in these terms.

Modernity entails more than a

specific nexus or mode of thought and culture.

Modernity

also encompasses a "historically specific series of complex
social

forms

institutions,
catagories

and

institutions.”2

social

forms,

and processes are often collapsed under the

of

industrial

societal differentiation,
urbanization,

These

capitalism,

the

(forced)

rationalization,
division of labor,

and the development of the modern state,

2
John Rundell,
Origins of Modernity
University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), p. 1.
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to

(Madison:

name but a few.

These social forms and processes both draw

their legitimation from the modern nexus of thought and give
this nexus

of thought

its meaning.

These

institutional

characteristics have produced a society markedly different
from those of the past.

Traditional economic and political

arrangements had given way to new institutional
social organizations:

forms and

Industrial capitalism dramatically

differed from feudalism in its distribution of resources, its
class system, and its power relations.

The differentiated

society of modernity was in direct contrast to the unified
society of Medieval Europe.

These social forms provide the

backdrop for the discussion on the Enlightenment origins of
cultural modernity that follow.

Condillac:

Reason and the Problem of Language

The writings of Etienne de Condillac (1715-1780) were
directed towards refining, synthesizing, and revising major
positions

of

seventeenth

century philosophy and

science.

Condillac thought that the rational spirit of seventeenth
century

thought,

expressed

most

poignantly

by

Descartes

(1596-1650), had overemphasized the role of deductive reason
performed by an innately rational subject.

In Condillac's

view, the rationalists had ignored the induction of empirical
experience

and

empiricism

as

observation.
an

important

With

the

philosophical

development
and

of

scientific

movement, represented in part by the writings of John Locke
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(1632-1704), the importance of the empirical in guiding the
acguisition of knowledge could no longer be dismissed.3

In

addition, the advent of Newtonian physics and its subseguent
success

in building predictable systems of knowledge had

forever

altered

any

purely

non-empirical

or

speculative

acquisition of knowledge, a point that was later advanced by
Kant.
However,

Condillac,

like

many

of

his

Enlightenment

counterparts, did not want to completely dismiss the central
role of a thinking and acting subject in the construction of
knowledge.

Condillac simply wanted to make the subject a

recipient of knowledge rather than a producer.
it was Condillac's goal

Specifically,

to unite the analytical

synthetic in the manner of Newton.

and the

Condillac recognized that

"Newton's general law of attraction was not the exclusive
result

of

observation

theorizing
unguided

nor
by

of

sporadic

theory..."4

experimentation
Newtonian

or

science

represented a perfect balance between the rational and the
empirical.

It was a model of how to build valid and reliable

systems of knowledge.
rationalism with

By synthesizing elements of Cartesian

Lockian

empiricism,

Condillac wanted

to

provide and reinforce a method capable of gaining access to
3
Cf.
John
Locke,
An
Essav
Concerning
Human
Understanding. ed. by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1975).
4 Irving Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development ef
Sociological Theory (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1981), p. 6.
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all realms of the unknown.

He sought to prove that empirical

"facts" and human rationality were compatible and necessary
elements for the acquisition of universal knowledge, as long
as empirical facts were given a primary role.
For Condillac, the new reliance on empirical facts would
enable knowledge to accumulate and progress.

This progress

first required a rejection of the abstract system-building
rationalism of seventeenth-century thought.

In its place we

must substitute a method which gives primary value to well
established facts.

For Condillac this meant returning to the

origin of empirical experience.

Condillac writes,

The more the mind appears to make progress,
the more it goes astray, and errors accumulate from
generation to generation. When things have come to
this point, there is only one means for putting
order back into thought; that is to forget everything
we have learned and take our ideas back to their
origin, to follow the generation of them, and to
remake them...*
By returning to the simple sensations of experience, a method
of inquiry could be developed and extended which was capable
of providing timeless and universal knowledge.

Ultimately,

this would allow the advancement of science and philosophy to
accelerate greatly.
There was,

however,

a problem haunting the ultimate

fulfillment of the perfection and expansion of knowledge; the
problem

of

language.

Condillac

once

described

his

5 Etienne de Condillac quoted in Charles Frankel, The
Faith q£ Reagpn; xhs Idea <?t Progress in the French
Enliahtenment (New York: Octagon Books, 1969), p. 47.
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philosophical mission as "unraveling the chaos into which the
abuses and vices
metaphysical

of language have plunged the moral

sciences."6

For

Condillac,

language

central problem for all systems of knowledge,

and

was

a

specifically

the seventeenth-century rationalism of Descartes of which he
was so critical.
previous

In specific terms, the ordinary language of

metaphysical

systems

lacked

precision.

In

Condillac's view, if knowledge was to progress the impasse
caused by the inappropriate use of language must be overcome.
This

was

to

be

accomplished

by

developing

a

direct

relationship between the signified (idea, concept, object)
and

the

signifier

(symbols,

verbal

utterances).

Since

ordinary language is an historical given and consequently
poorly composed and imprecise, it is not capable of providing
a simple, direct relation between signified and signifier.
Condillac writes,
(We) think according to the habits which
languages cause us to acquire. We think by means
of them: as rules of our judgments, they
produce our knowledge, our opinions and our
prejudices; in a word, they produce all that
is good and bad in our judgments.7
What was needed was a way around this impasse in the progress
of knowledge.
Condillac's mission was both to explore the weaknesses
of

ordinary

language

and

develop

a

symbolic

code

which

6 Quoted in Etienne de Condillac, Logic (New York: Abaris
Books, Inc., 1980), p. 16.
7 Ibid., p. 22.
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connected the signifier with the signified.
to

be

found

in

the

"well

made" and

The solution was

simple

language of

algebra.
Algebra is very striking proof that the progress
of the sciences depends solely upon the progress of
their languages; and that well-made languages alone
could give to analysis the degree of simplicity and
precision of which it is capable in each area of our
studies. Well-made languages could do this, I say:
for in the art of reasoning as in the art of
calculating, everything is reduced to compositions
and decompositions; and it must not be thought that
these are two different arts.8
Algebra's symbolic code held out the possibility of avoiding
the

errors

of

common

langauge-based,

human

reasoning.

"Reasoning is perfected only to the extent that languages are
themselves

perfected."9

Ultimately,

the

perfection

of

language allows us to have "empire over our imagination."10
In other words,

the imprecise nature of ordinary language

causes a flight of imagination.
and

faulty

knowledge.

This flight results in error

Consequently,

for

knowledge

to

progress language must give way to the timeless and universal
logic of mathematics.
With this movement towards a "perfect" language,

all

realms of inquiry, both natural and social, are open to the
advancement of reason.

As Condillac maintains in the above

8 Ibid., p. 305.
9 Ibid., p. 303.
10 Condillac quoted in Charles Taylor, Sources of the
Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 198.
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quotation, the advancement of reason unleashed by empiricism
and

the

perfection

of

language

means

no

realm

of

understanding is out of the reach of human comprehension and
understanding.

Once methodologically foundational reason has

become a dominant mode of understanding, its domain expands
into

social

considerations.

In

the

social

realm

the

institutional and social attributes of traditional society
become

open to

scrutiny and

rejection.

Describing

this

process Ernst Cassirer wrote,
As soon as the power of thought awakens in man, it
advances irresistibly against this (social) form of
reality, summoning it before the tribunal of thought
and challenging its legal titles to truth and validity.
And society must submit to being treated like physical
reality under investigation.11
While Condillac was not particularly concerned with bringing
objective knowledge to politics and society, his views would
be influential for others seeking to develop a science of
society or history (e.g., the "social physics" of A. Comte
and the "scientific history" of Leopold von Ranke).
Condillac

must

be

seen

as

a

central

figure

in the

Enlightenment's attempt to bring all forms of knowledge under
the control of pure reason, logic, and empirical experience.
While he does reject, in part, the rationalism of Descartes,
he

nonetheless

wants

to

refine

a

method

capable

of

constructing reliable knowledge of the social and natural
world that includes a role for human intellectual activity.
11
p. 18.

Cassirer, The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. 1951,

In order for this method to be effective, it must return to
the basic sensations of experience.

Knowledge can accumulate

only if we dispense with the purely rational or speculative
construction of knowledge and turn to empirically pure data.
This

process

also

requires

a

refinement

of

language.

Language, as a carrier of tradition, is a major obstacle in
the development of systematic knowledge.

Once all ideas have

been reduced to algebra, all forms of knowledge can finally
progress beyond the confines of tradition.12

Condorcet and the Progress of the Human Spirit
Marquis de Condorcet's (1743-94) L^sauisse d'un tableau
historioue des proares de 1'esprit humain. published in 1795,
remains today a manifesto of modernity.13

Its optimistic

attitude towards the growth of rationality, the linearity of
history,

and

the

capacity

of

humans

to

control

the

"uncertainties" of the natural and social world influenced
many

early

nineteenth

century

thinkers,

including

founders of social science Saint-Simon and A. Comte.

the
It is

ironic that this optimistic work of the enlightenment was
written at the height of the "reign of terror" and while

12 For a postmodern treatment of Condillac see, Jacques
Derrida, The Archeology of the Frivolous: Reading Condillac,
trans, by John P. Leavey, Jr. (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne
University Press, 1980).
13 Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical Picture
of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. by J. Barraclough
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955).
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Condorcet himself was in hiding from Robespierre and other
Jacobins who wanted him dead.
Condorcet's plan in The Progress was to, "show by appeal
to

reason

and

fact that

nature

has

set

no

term

to

the

perfection of human faculties; that the perfectibility of man
is

truly

indefinite...".14

Echoing

Condillac,

Condorcet

believed that the discoveries made possible by the Newtonian
method was capable of affecting every domain of inquiry.

As

we continue to accumulate facts we move closer and closer to
ultimate understanding.
As the number of known facts increase, the human mind
learns to classify them and to subsume them under more
general facts, and, at the same time, the instruments
and methods employed in their observation and their
exact measurement acquire a new precision....the
language that fixes and determines ideas will acquire
greater breadth and precision...the methods that lead
genius to the discovery of truth increase at once
the force and the speed of its operation.15
For Condorcet, the scientific method had unchained the human
mind from the dogma of tradition.

Now, the acquisition and

accumulation of knowledge did not have to rely on untested
speculative philosophies.

Hence,

it was only a matter of

time until everyone becomes "enlightened."

Condorcet's

aim in The Progress was to transfer the optimism
progress

of

the

natural

history and society.

sciences

into

in the

considerations

He related the unfolding of what he

considered to be the natural law of historical progress.
14

on

Ibid., p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 185.
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The

I
idea of underlying laws of history, would lead Condorcet to
proclaim

the

control

their

perfection.16

ever

growing

world

and

capacity
to

for

human

ultimately

beings

obtain

to

moral

For Condorcet, humanity had evolved through

nine stages of development and was on the verge of the tenth
and ultimate stage.

These stages could be viewed as steps,

leaps, and temporary steps backward towards the inevitable
goal of the fulfillment of the human spirit.

Condorcet's ten

stages were marked by,
1. The union of humans in tribes.
2. The rise of agricultural societies.
3. The invention of the alphabet.
4

The Greek division of the sciences.

5. The decline of Greek science.
6. The restoration of knowledge with the Crusades.
7. The early progress of science and the invention of
printing.
8. Science's revolution against traditional authority.
9. The progress of knowledge from Descartes to the
French Republic.
10. The future progress of the human mind.
The "progress of the human spirit" had begun with the
uniting of people into tribes.

It had culminated with the

rise of science and the French Republic.

Condorcet felt that

humanity, at the time of his writing, stood before the final

16 Condorcet's views on progress were influenced by early
writers including Voltaire and Turgot.
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stage of historical evolution.
the destiny

With the method of Newton and

of history as guides,

the modern

individual

finally could obtain the before elusive "moral perfection."
With moral perfection, history would effectively end, since
it would reach a plateau where it would not longer be moving
toward fulfillment.

Condorcet rhetorically asks,

If man can, with almost complete assurance, predict
phenomena when he knows their laws, and if, even
when he does not, he can still, with great
expectation of success, forecast the future on the
basis of his experience of the past, why, then, should
it be regarded as a fantastic understanding to sketch,
with some pretence to truth, the future destiny of man
on the basis of his history?17
Just as Newton had described the laws of nature based on
observation and reason,
Newtonian method
effect

in the

and

humankind could,

reason,

processes

of

with the aid of

learn to discern
history.

This

cause

would

and

enable

humankind to harness the laws of history in a manner similar
to

the

harnessing

harnessing,

the

"perfected."

of

the

world

has

natural
the

world.

potential

In this new rational society,

have less work to do, will produce more,

With
of

this

becoming

"everyone will
and satisfy his

wants more fully."18
It

is

evident

that

for

history was not a chaotic flux.
natural

17

world,

succumbed

to

Ibid., p. 173.

18 Ibid., p. 188.
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Condorcet

the

unfolding

of

History, like the Newtonian
certain

underlying

laws

of

progress.
harness

Humans,

and

with

control

their

these

laws

ability
in

to

order

reason,
to

could

improve

and

ultimately perfect society.
The time will come when the sun will shine only on
free men who know no master but their reason...
How consoling for the philosopher who laments the
errors, the crimes, the injustice which still
pollute the earth and of which he is often the
victim, is this view of the human race, emancipated
from its shackles, released from the empire of fate
and from that of the enemies of progress, advancing
with a firm and sure step along the path of truth,
virtue and happiness.19
Once humanity had been "released from the empire of fate," it
could

create

a

world

based

on

reason.

The

dogmas

and

injustices of contemporary institutions would fall aside as
reason progressed and created a new and just social order.
Condorcet

felt

that

"nature

realization of our hopes.,,2°

has

set

no

limit

to

Humanity had within

the

it the

capacity for perfecting the individual and society.
Condorcet,
philosophers,
rationality,

perhaps
exudes

progress,

beyond

all

other

Enlightenment

an

extraordinary

confidence

in

and

control.

injustices

and

The

superstitions of existing society were to be swept away as
humanity

reached

the

plateau

of

reason.

His

and

other

similar views of time and history would become extremely
important in the justification of scientific and historical

19 Marquis de Condorcet quoted in W.T. Jones, Kant and
the Nineteenth Century (New York: Norton, 1952), p. 2-3.
20 Condorcet, The Progress of the Human Mind. 1955, p.
175.
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change.
the

When these components of progress were coupled with

ideology

of

the

emerging

bourgeoisie,

one

of

most

enduring ideas of modernity was born.
Another important figure in Enlightenment discourse is
Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

As we shall see, Rousseau provides us

with an understanding of another important aspect of the
dominant discourse of modernity— the reflexive self.

Rousseau;

Modernity and the Self

In the work of Rousseau (1712-78) we find a "two-edged"
reaction to the processes of modernization.

On the one hand,

Rousseau, like his Enlightenment counterparts, is a champion
of an optimistic attitude toward the "natural goodness" or
"perfectability" of humankind.
Rousseau's

work

the

seeds

Enlightenment discourse.

of

However,
a

we also find in

romantic

or

counter-

This discourse questions the very

idea of a linear "advancement of civilization"21

Rousseau

was at once a champion of the Enlightenment spirit and one of
its greatest detractors.
For Rousseau, human beings naturally are capable of good
and limitless personal growth.
corrupts this
humankind.

It is

civilization which

inner goodness and marks the regression of

In the opening to Emile. Rousseau writes,

Everything is good as it leaves the hands of the
author of things; everything degenerates in the
21 Cf. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1982 (1932)). pp. 178-79.
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hands of man. He forces one soil to nourish the
products of another, one tree to bear the fruit of
another....He wants nothing as nature made it, not
even man; for him, man must be trained like a school
horse; man must fashioned in keeping with his fancy
like a tree in the garden.22
Modern civilization is marked by an acute disdain for the
natural

aspects

everyone

be

of humanity.

transformed

obedient social beings.

from

Civilization

demands

that

their natural

state

into

In this demand,

civilization is

perceived as being the corruptor of the naturally occurring
inner moral goodness of humanity.

Part of Rousseau's mission

is to undermine this ideology of social training.
negative

consequencesof civilization require

search for redemptionfrom within.

The

Rousseau to

In doing this, Rousseau

rediscovers the inner nature of the "self," which was somehow
lost

or

masked

in

the civilizing

process.

In

this

connection, much of Rousseau's intellectual project can be
seen as an attempt to defend this inner experience or the
"self” from the onslaught of modernization.
While it is true that contemplations on the individual
have held a special place in the history of Western thought,
premodern views, such as Plato's idea of "self mastery” and
St. Augustine's "tortured soul," are significantly different
from

the

modernity.
of

conception

of

the

self

and

individuality

in

The modern self, which can be traced to the work

Descartes

in the

seventeenth

century,

emphasized

the

22 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans.
by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), p. 37.
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innate rationality of human beings.

Humans were endowed with

an innate or God-given ability to discover the essential
workings of the world around them.

Humans' internal capacity

for disengaged rationality would enable humankind to discover
the true nature of things-in-themselves.
in

raising

objectivity.

inner

experience

to

the

Descartes succeeded
level

of

universal

Later, with the work of John Locke, the modern

self begins to lose its inner directed rationality.

As an

empiricist, Locke conceives the self to be but the result of
life-long sensate experiences.
With Rousseau, there is a movement beyond the rational
self of Descartes and the empirical self of Locke.
the discovery of a deeper and more complex self.
self

is

rational,

like

Descartes';

however,

There is
Rousseau's

it

is

also

"expressive, projecting into the world and the future."23 .
The inner, expressive self is counterpoised to an outer self
(i.e.,
history.

empirical)

faceted

and

corrupted

by

society

and

In this regard, Kant wrote of Rousseau,

As Newton was the first to discern order and
regularity in the nature...Rousseau was the first
to discover beneath the varying forms human nature
assumes, the deeply concealed essence of man and the
hidden law in accordance with which providence is
justified by his observation.24
23 Robert C. Solomon, Continental Philosophy since 1750;
The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1988), p. 18.
24 Immanuel Kant quoted from Ernst Cassirer, Rousseau.
Kant. and Goethe. trans. by J. Gutmann, P.O. Kristeller, and
J.H. Randall, Jr (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1963), p. 18.
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Beneath the masks of the social existence lies the universal
essence of humankind.

As Kant points out, this essence is

perceived as being "deeply concealed" underneath the "forms
of human nature." Through self reflection this inner essence
could be revealed for all of humankind.
essence

was

available,

not

through

Furthermore, this

Cartesian

logic,

but

through emotion, feeling, and intuition.
In The Confessions. Rousseau comments on how his version
of the self came to him while walking in the woods near
Saint-Germain.
Deep in the heart of the forest I sought and found
vision of those primeval ages whose history I bravely
sketched.
I denied myself all the easy deceits to
which men are prone.
I dared to unveil human nature
and look upon it in its nakedness, to trace the
course of times and of events to which have
disfigured human nature. And while comparing
conventional man with natural man, I pointed out the
the true source of our misery in our pretended
perfection.25
What Rousseau
simply

his

"discovered" walking in the

own

inner,

subjective

objective essence of humanity itself.

forest was not

experience,

but

the

Beneath the corrupting

affects of society, the essential goodness of humanity awaits
release. By reflecting inward at the nakedness of our being,
humanity can find an escape from the hegemonic confines of
civilization.
Oh man, draw your existence up within yourself, and
you will no longer be miserable. Remain in the place
which nature assigns to you in the chain of being...
Your freedom and your power extend only as far as your
25 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Ibid., p. 19.
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natural strength, and not beyond. All the rest is
slavery, illusion, and deception.26
Self reflection becomes both a means of salvation from the
influence of society and a method for discovering the true
meaning of existence. "All that was needed was for the inner
voice to cut loose from its yoke-fellow and declare its full
moral competence."27
From Rousseau we obtain two modern ideas of the self:
"first,

the remarkable inner richness and expanse of the

self; and secondly, the consequent right to project from the
subjective structures of one's own mind, and ascertain the
nature of humanity as such."28 Rousseau deepens and expands
the purely rational self of seventeenth century rationalism.
He inaugurates a particular version of the modern self— a
self that is both rational and expressive.

Rousseau is the

point of origin of "the philosophies of self-exploration, as
well as of the creed which make self-determining freedom the
key

to

virtue."29

This

view

would

be

particulary

influential for subsequent philosophers and artists.
inner self

of Rousseau would,

provide a means and a language

in the century

to

The

follow,

for resisting the purely

rational and instrumental drives of philosophy, science, and
26 Rousseau, Emile. 1979, p. 83.
27 Taylor, Sources o f the Self. 1989, p. 362.
2.

28 Solomon, Continental Philosophy Since 1750. 1988, p.
29 Taylor, Sources of the Self. 1989, pp. 262-63.
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society that come from outside.

For the romantic poets, as

well as many today, the Rousseauian self was a haven from the
ravages

of modernity.

writers

the

For Rousseau

rational/expressive

and many

self

subsequent

was

a

"truer"

representation of what it was to be human.

Summary: Janus-Faced Modernity
As alluded to in the early part of this chapter, modernity
must be seen as a complex array of forms of knowledge and
social

institutions.

In some

instances

these

forms

and

institutions are (or appear to be) in direct contradiction
with one another.
problems
arises.

with

the

classification

of

cultural

modernity

For instance, how is one to reconcile the rational,

"progressive"
expressive,
answer

Often this Janus-faced aspect is where

this

tempting

ideas

of

Condillac

and

Condorcet with

"degenerative" ideas of Rousseau?
question,

strategy

to

we

first

collapse

must

To begin to

dispense

aspects

of

the

a

with

society

the
or

historical period into one set of organizing categories, as
defined by its political, economic, or cultural attributes.
It

is

perhaps

more

productive
have

to

recognize

contradictory

that

all

tendencies

and

historical

periods

discourses.

Secondly, it is also important to recognize that

these discourses often compete with one another for power,
influence, and domination in society.
not necessarily rise to the top.
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The "better idea" does

Condillac, Condorcet, and Rousseau's views on humanity
are all modern.

The optimism of Condillac and Condorcet

would be influential in shaping a discourse which would have
its

most

crucial

impact

analytical philosophy.
be

influential

in

the

realms

of

science

and

This discourse of optimism would also

in establishing the class

ideology of the

eighteenth-century bourgeoisie and later the orientations of
certain modern professions and groups.

It would spawn series

of discussions encompassing such topics as; the unfolding of
the human spirit, the positive effects of industrialization,
the progress of science,
inequality.

The

and the socially managed end to

Rousseauian

view would

related but distinct discourse.

inspire

another

This discourse would have

its most important impact upon artists, poets, continental
philosophers,

"mandarin

intellectuals,"

and

in

an

"alternative science" (i.e., the "gay science" of Nietzsche
in the late nineteenth century and the "anarchistic science"
of Paul

Feyerabend

in the

late twentieth century) .

The

Rousseauian discourse would inspire discussion of the loss of
meaning

in

the

instrumentalization

world,
of

the

society,

fragmentation

the

commodification

and
of

everyday life, and so forth.
We must

recognize

that

these

rational

and

romantic

discourses are both aspects of the modern sensibility.
have held sway over the modern imagination.

Both

Both have been

used as ideologies to justify social institutions and certain
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sets of social practices.

By accepting the contradictory

faces of modernity, we can gain a better understanding of
both modernity and postmodernism.
In the chapter to follow, we will examine how these
ideas of the French Enlightenment fared approximately
one-hundred

years

rationality

and

Enlightenment

later.

By this

progress

philosophers

time

the

expressed

by

most

had

to

fade

begun

intellectual circles, particularly in Germany.
high

modernism

in

art

optimism

and

literature

and

of
in

in
the

many

The period of
the

age

of

Nietzsche, Weber, and Simmel in philosophy and social theory
experienced new problems about what came to be called the
"fate of modernity." In their encounter with modernity, we
find

an

avenue

for

understanding

the

development

postmodern discourse in philosophy and social thought.
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CHAPTER III
MODERNITY AND ITS CENTRAL PARADOXES
In the previous chapter, we discussed the contributions
of

the

French Philosophes

modernity.

to

the

dominant

discourse of

By the late nineteenth century this optimistic

discourse had begun to fade somewhat.

Various commentators

began to question the Enlightenment's enthusiastic linkage of
rational and expressive selfhood with societal progress and
emancipation.
movements,

Some

not

beganto

as

a

see

recent

culimation

of

philosophical
a

trend

towards

perfectability, but merely as a different historical period.
Furthermore, these commentators began to conclude that this
historical period was as problematic as those of the past.
In

this

chapter,

we

will

attempt

to

gain an

understanding of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century
focusing

critiques
on

commentators

of

modernity.This

several
who

sought

artistic

will

be

movements

either to take

done
and

by
social

advantage

of the

"crisis" created by modernity or explore the "dangers" of
being modern.

These various movements and writers do not

agree on the causes of the crisis, but they all experienced
the maelstrom of modernity and felt compelled to render an
explanation and in some cases a diagnosis.
this

chapter

we

will

identify

some

Specifically, in
of

the

emerging

philosophical and social paradoxes which accompany the modern
era.

These paradoxes, it will be argued, provide an avenue
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into postmodern culture and society.

We will begin with a

discussion of the early understanding of modernity.

This

will be followed by an examination of the Western "cultural
attitude" which prevailed in many intellectual and artistic
circles before World War I.

Specifically, we will examine

the positions on art and modernity of the Italian Futurists
and the German Expressionists.

Afterward, we will begin a

selective discussion of the work of Nietzsche, Weber,
Simmel.
their

and

These individuals, perhaps more than any others of

time,

sought

to

explain

the

meaning

and

problems

associated with being "modern."

The Recognition of Modernity
Marshall
modernity

in

Berman
the

has

late

rather

nineteenth

poetically

described

and

twentieth

early

centuries as "a mode of vital experience— experience of space
and time,

of self and others, of life's possibilities and

perils."1

However for Berman, the dominant feature of this

vital

experience,

historical

and

one which

experiences,

is

separates

modernity's

it

from other

"maelstrom

of

perpetual disintegration and renewal."2 The development and
expansion of industrial capitalism, the division of labor,
the break-up of traditional unities, and the rationalization
1 Marshall Berman, All That is Solid Melts Into Air: The
Experience of Modernity (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p.
15.
2 Ibid., p. 15.
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process

had

promises

all

of

contributed
the

to

a

society-in-flux.

The

philosophers,

the

Enlightenment

accomplishments of science, and developments in the arts had
spawned

a

culture

which

prized

continuous

individual

innovation.3 Together these societal and cultural processes
fused into a paradoxical period of continuous upheaval and
change.

This period, where "all that is solid melts into

air, all that is holy is profaned," has come to represent the
zenith of modernity.4
various

ideational

sixteenth

century

By the mid nineteenth century the
and

material

and

finding

changes
their

dating
most

to

the

systematic

expression in eighteenth century Enlightenment philosophy
(e.g.,

rationalism,

progress,

the

rise

of

industrial

capitalism, urbanization, etc.) began to become recognizable
as

an

important

movement

historical moment.

of

society

and

as

a

distinct

This recognition spawned a series of

cultural and societal writings that sought to analyze and
explain what was happening in and to Europe.

The German

writer Henerick Heine first used the word "Modernitat" to
capture the essence of this movement of society and culture
in

his

1826

Modernitat

work,

with

Reisebilder.

the

"victory

Here,
of

the

3 Cf. J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress
Greenwood Press, 1982), p 198-79.

Heine

equates

British"

and

(Westport,

CT:

4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels,
"The Communist
Manifesto," in The Marx-Enaels Reader, ed. by R.C. Tucker
(Boston: Norton, 1978), p. 338.
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industrialism.
belief,

In Heine's view, modernity had "dispossessed

rendered

Romantic

inwardness

impossible,

and

extinguished the great traditions."5 Heine's perspective is
negative and romantic.
Enlightenment

discourse

It is part of a developing counter
of modernity,

which would become

particularly important in the late nineteenth century.

This

counter-modern sensibility, first encountered with Rousseau,
was shared by many social commentators and writers of his
period ranging from the Utopian Socialist to the Romantic
poets.

Modernity had spawned a crisis that left many longing

for a more stable moment from the past.
Others, however, sought to take advantage of a sense of
excitement created by the dissolution of tradition.

This

approach is perhaps best exemplified in Charles Baudelaire's
1863

essay,

the

"Painter

of

Modern

Life."

through his discussion of Monsieur G.
sought

to

artists.

Baudelaire,

(Constantin Guys),

identify the challenge posed by modernity

for

Baudelaire described modernity as "the ephemeral,

the fugitive, the contingent."6 Monsieur G. was Baudelaire's
example of an individual who was courageous enough to attempt
the transfer of the maelstrom of modernity onto the canvas.

5 Albrecht Betz, "Commodity and Modernity in Heine and
Benjamin." New German Critique, 33, 1984, pp. 181-82.
6 Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern Life and
Other Essavs. trans. and ed. by Jonathan Mayne (London:
Phaidon Press, 1964), p. 13.
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In the next section we will consider how the reconition
of

this

new

historical

period

served

to

spawn

a

new

sensibility in the content and meaning of art and literature.

December. 1910
According to Virginia Woolf, "on or about December, 1910
human

character

changed..."7

The

historical

processes

described earlier by Heine and Baudelaire were heard in the
early part of the twentieth century as "the sound of breaking
and falling, crashing and destruction.”8 Throughout the West
traditional forms of social life were crumbling as the forces
of rapid social change associated with modernity began to
increase in intensity and to incorporate more aspects of
everyday

life.

For many

intellectuals

the

crumbling

of

traditional forms of life signaled a renewed commitment to
innovation.

This commitment was supported by new discoveries

in

(i.e.,

science

philosophy

(i.e.,

Einstein,

Bohr,

and

Bergson, Whitehead,

dramatic social change

Mach) , by

and Ortega),

a

new

and by

(i.e., the influence of industrial

capitalism and the emerging bureaucratic order).9 Together,
these

social

and

cultural

changes

meant

that

art

and

7 Virginia Woolf, The Captain's Death Bead and Other
Essavs (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950), p. 96.
8 Ibid., p. 96.
9 Ricardo J. Quinones, Mapping Literary Modernism: Time
and Development (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1985), p. 120.
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literature no longer had to adhere to canons of the past nor
did they have to accept the previous
escapism."
science

Art,

and

which was

rationality,

removed
now

label

of

"romantic

from center stage by

could

resume

its

former

intellectual status.
In describing the sense of rebellion which was felt by
modern consciousness in the early twentieth century, Mabel
Dodge wrote in 1913:
Nearly every thinking person nowadays is in revolt
against something, because the craving of the
individual is for further consciousness, and because
consciousness is expanding and bursting through the
molds that held it up to now.10
The

revolt

described by

Dodge

signals

aesthetic modernism as a cultural force.

the maturation

of

The period from the

late nineteenth century until after World War I teemed with
cultural movements which in one way or another sought to take
advantage of the "crisis” created by modernity.

Most of

these movements wanted to use the crisis of modernity to
regenerate society.

Some of these movements were "nostalgic"

in their outlook while others were "imaginative."11
The

"nostalgic"

movements

thinking about modernity.

followed

Heine's

line

of

They longed for a return to what

10 Mabel Dodge, Camera Work (June 1913): 7.
Cited in
Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1913
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 182.
11 Cf. Allan Megill, Prophets of Extremity; Nietzsche.
Heidegger.
Foucault.
Derrida
(Berkeley:
University of
California Press, 1985), pp. 114-115.
This is a somewhat
simplistic, but useful dichotomy.
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they saw as the pristine state of premodern society.

The

nostalgic position can be seen in wide array of movements, as
far ranging

as the

Boy Scouts

of America

and

the

"high

romantics."

T.S. Eliot "with his idealization of the past

utopia represented by royalism and Catholicism" is perhaps
representative of the nostalgic type of thought.12
However, most cultural movements of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were "imaginative."
such as the Italian Futurists,
Cubists,

welcomed

the

Groups

German Expressionists,

disintegration

enthusiastically embraced the "new."

of

tradition

and

while

The Futurists provide

an especially vivid example of one particular mode of this
modern "imaginative" sensibility.

The Futurists announced

their formation in 1909 publication entitled, "The Founding
and

Manifesto

Of

Futurism."13

The

futurists

sought

develop art and literature in the image of the machine.

to

They

wanted to transfer the power and speed of technology into the
aesthetic
literature

realm.
in

Their
society

vision
is

of

captured

the
in

role

of

their

art

and

original

manifesto.
1. We intend to sing the love of danger, the habit of
energy and fearlessness.
2. Courage, audacity and revolt will be essential
elements of our poetry.
12 Ibid., p. 114.
13 Charles Russell, Poets. Prophets, and Revolutionaries:
The Literary Avant-Garde From Rimbaud Thought Postmodernism
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 87.
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3. Up to now literature has exalted a pensive
immobility, ecstacy, and sleep. We exalt
aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the
racer's stride, the mortal leap, the punch
and the slap.
4. We affirm the world's magnificence has been enriched
by a new beauty: the beauty of speed. A racing car
whose hood is adorned with great pipes, like
serpents of explosive breath— a roaring car that
seems to ride on graeshot is more beutiful than
the Victory of Samothrace.
10. We will destroy the museums, libraries, academies of
every kind, will fight moralism, feminism, every
opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice.14
The Futurists presented a particular pro-modern sensibility
towards art and society.

They saw the machine as the model

for transforming both art and society.

They deplored any

individual or movement which continued to cling to the past
and which therefore did not accept the vitality of their
artistic experiment.

Any institution, such as the museums,

libraries, and academia, which was perceived as clinging to
past modes of thought and action were targets of their scorn.
Charles Russell writes,
Worshippers of force in 'what ever form it occurs,' they
defined their activities in extreme forms. Their
targets, and the victims of this tirade, were
individuals or institutions which represented the
culture's ties to the pasts: the passeits, the church,
the monarchy, the bourgeoisie, the schools and art
establishments, pacifists, and women.15
For

the

Futurists,

modernity

opened

14 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
Some of
incorporated by the Italian Fascists.
15 Ibid., p. 89.
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up

a

these

new

set

ideas

of

were

possibilities for the arts and the conduct of life.

Art or

life no longer had to adhere to tradition.

The model provided

by

of

technology

allowed

for

a

rethinking

artistic experience and personal freedom.

the

nature

of

The Futurists saw

their movement to be both as artistic avant-garde and as a
political movement which would shake and eventually undermine
the confines of traditional authority.
The desire of the futurists to capture the "raw energy"
of modernity and transform it

into a social

and artistic

movement was met with both enthusiasm and skepticism.

Antonio

Gramsci wrote of the Futurists,
(They) have grasped sharply and clearly that our age,
of big industry, of the large proletarian city and of
intense and tumultuous life, was in need of new forms of
art, philosophy, behavior, and langauge....In their
field, the field of culture, the Futurists are
revolutionaries.16
Others saw Furturism, with its denial of the past and worship
of

force

and power,

experiment

which

as an extremely problematic

represented

all

that

was

artistic

negative

about

modernity.
Another important artistic movement which responded to
the conditions created by social and cultural modernity were
the German Expressionists.

The German Expressionists were a

loosely affiliated group of writers, poets, artists, and film
makers

who

sought

to

bring

emotional,

existential,

and

16 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings,
trans. William Boelhower (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1985, p. 51.
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subconscious elements of individual experience into the realm
of art.

They, like the Futurists, sought to take advantage of

the perpetual upheaval and change associated with modernity.
Writing in 1914,

the Expressionist Franz Marc wrote,

"The

world gives birth to a new age: there is only one question:
has the time yet arrived today in which the old world will be
dissolved?
anxious

Are we ready for the vita nova?

question

of

our

day."17

It

This is the most

was

clear

for

the

Expressionists that modernity marked a new era of history.
This new era required different modes for the conduct and
expression of life.
for

the

The "new life" of the modern era meant

Expressionists

new

art,

literature,

poetry,

and

existence,

the

politics.
In

forging

the

new

life

of

modern

Expressionists rejected both classicism and realism with their
models

of

wanted

art

"objective
and

perceptions"

representation."

literature

rather

than

to

The

reflect

some

Expressionists

"personal

outer

emotional

reality.18

This

orientation towards art also reflected a political vision.
exploring

and

portraying

the

depths

of

subjectivity,

By
the

Expressionists wanted to contribute to "improving the world

17 Franz Marc, quoted in Frederick Levine's, The
Apocalyptic Vision: The Art of Franz Marc as German
Expressionism (New York: Harper and Row, 1979), p. 138.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
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and the life of man within."19

The explosive nature of the

inner world of subjective experience was seen as providing the
materials

for

the

destruction

of

well-ordered

bourgeois

society and the construction of a radically new social order.
Particularly

important

for

the

Expressionists

was

the

potential of repressed sexuality to provide the means for
undermining bourgeois culture.

Gottfried Benn in his 1917

poem "Synthesis" writes,
Reticent night. Reticent house.
But I am of the stillest stars,
and I thrust out my self-made light
out into my self-made night.
I have returned home in brain
from caves, heavens, filth and beast.
Even what is still bestowed on woman
is dark and sweet onanism.20
Benn,

like

other

Expressionists,

wanted

atavistic vitalism to modern culture.

to

restore

an

The power of latent

sexuality was one means for accomplishing this goal.
In social and political terms, the Expressionists, like
many

other

individuals

subjectivity

as

uncertainty,

the

capitalism,

and

and

groups

protection
encroachment
the

sterility

of

this

against
of
of

period,

saw

epistemological

rational,
bourgeois

industrial
society.

Describing this sanctity of subjectivity in Expressionism,
Douglas Kellner writes,

19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 Gottfried Benn, "Synthesis," trans. by R. Allen in,
German Expressionist Poetry (Boston: Twayne, 1979).
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Expressionism arose in a period in which analyses of
the alienation, reification, and dehumanization of the
individual, and the fragmentation of the human
personality, had become widespread. As a reaction to
the crisis of subjectivity, Expressionism contained
passionate reaffirmations of individuality.21
The Expressionists, like Rousseau and the romantics, thought
that

inner experience had

the potential

of providing

modern individual with a haven in a rationalized world.

the
This

haven also had the capacity for a radical social renewal.
The
represent

Italian
but

Futurist

and

the

German

two artistic movements which

advantage of the crisis of modernity.

Expressionist
tried to

take

The disintegration of

traditional society and authority meant the cultural slate had
been wiped clean.

Intellectuals and other culture producers,

in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, felt the
time was right for the creation of a new culture.

However, as

will be seen in the following discussion, these movements and
the

general

intellectual

mood,

were

to

face

several

unresolvable paradoxes which would eventually mark the end of
cultural modernism.

Nietzsche. Nihilism, and Modernity
The critique of modernity rendered by Frederick Nietzsche
must be considered one of the most important and influential
attempts

to

establish

an

anti-modern

(and

postmodern)

21 Douglas Kellner, "Expressionism and Rebellion,” in
Stephen Bronner and Douglas Kellner (eds.), Passion and
Rebellion: The Expressionist Heritage (London: Croom Helm
Ltd., 1983), p. 13.
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discourse in the wake of the Enlightenment.

Nietzsche's self

stated goal was to "philosophize with a hammer."
as

will

be

seen,

was

aimed

at

Enlightenment and modern thinkers.

This hammer,

everything

valued

by

However, Nietzsche wanted

to be more than a critic of Occidental culture and its latest
historical

form:

modernity.

He also wanted to develop a

means to solve the problems of modern existence.

However,

Nietzsche, like the other writers discussed in this chapter,
finds modernity and any attempt to correct its mistakes to be
extremely paradoxical.
Much of Nietzsche's critique of modernity focuses upon
the advent of nihilism in European society.
note

assembled

at

the

beginning

of

the

In a prophetic
Will

to

Power.

Nietzsche states:
What I relate is the history of the next two centuries.
I describe what is coming, what can no longer come
differently: the advent of nihilism...For some time
now, our whole European culture has been moving
as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension
that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly,
violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach
the end, that no longer reflects, that is afraid to
reflect.22
Nihilism, for Nietzsche, is more than the result of the death
of God and the demise of Christianity in the West.
marks

a historical

devalued.

period when the highest

Nihilism

values

God and religion certainly are dead,

become

"but also

everything that, in rapid succession, has tried to takes its
22 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by W.
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1968), p. 3.
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place— e.g., the ideal, consciousness, reason, the certainty
of progress,

the happiness of the masses,

culture,

etc."23

Nihilism then is a historical moment marking a turning point
in Western history.

It is a time when the foundations of

European society, were they theological or scientific,
revealed as myths.

are

Myths which, for Nietzsche, ultimately are

connected with an unsatiable "will to power."

Nihilism,

is

the result of a series of "unmaskings" set in motion by the
enlightenment

ideals

of

science

and

rationality

and

culminating in a final unmasking of these very ideals.
Nietzsche's
Enlightenment

primary

is

to

strategy

attack

one

for
of

undermining

its

principles— that of a foundational truth.

most

the

cherished

In his essay "On

Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense"(1873) and in Human All
Too Human (1878), Nietzsche seeks to find a way out of modern
thought

through

a

"radicalization

of

its own

innate

tendencies." Nietzsche concludes that the modern desire to
uncover the nature of "things in themselves"
truth)

inevitably

leads

to

the

discovery

(the will to

that

truth

is

constructed through the use of metaphors and anthropomorphisms
which do not correspond to "reality,” but merely reflect the
dynamics of social relations.
truth?'

associated

rational conclusion

with

modern

In other words, the "will to
rationality

leads

te

the

that truth is an illusion. Rationality

23 Maurice
Blanchot,
"The
Limits
of
Experience:
Nihilism," in DavidB. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche. 1986,
p. 121.
69

taken to its radical conclusion undermine its own premises.
In an often quoted excerpt, Nietzsche writes,
What, then, is truth? a mobile army of metaphors,
metonyms, and anthropomorphisms— in short, a sum of
human relations, which have been enhanced, transposed,
and embellished poetically and rhetorically....truths
are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is
what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without
sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and
now matter only as metal, no longer as coin. 4
The coin analogy is particularly revealing.

The historical

origin of truth in the domain of power and social relations
has worn away and been forgotten.

However,

the canons of

epistemology continued to dominate the discourse on truth.
These canons matter now only because they have come to be
historically recognized to be true.

In other words,

makes

true

these

epistemological

canons

is

not

what
their

correspondence to some external truth, but because they have
been designated and embellished by the power brokers and power
configurations to be "great works."
With this realization, the idea of truth, as well as the
distinction between truth and lie, become diluted.

Truth, for

Nietzsche, is not something awaiting discovery by philosophers
and

metaphysicians,

but

a

reflection

configurations of human relations.

of

the

power

Beneath the masks of the

Enlightenment's foundational truth, Nietzsche finds the ever
present elements of rhetoric and power.

The collapse of truth

24 Frederick Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lie in an ExtraMoral Sense" in W. Kaufmann (ed.), The Portable Nietzsche
(New York; Penguin Press, 1976), pp. 46-47.
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as a cultural goal provides an arena for escaping from the
confines of Enlightenment rationality and its ceaseless search
for the illustrious foundational truth.25
One

of

Nietzsche's

goals

in

attacking

Enlightenment

reason is to provide an avenue for the birth of a new culture.
Through the

realization that the truth portrayed by Greek

philosophy or the Enlightenment is merely a reflection of the
art of rhetoric and the will to power, we are freed from the
illusion of truth.

We need no longer feel the compulsion to

find the mysterious underlying truth awaiting discovery.

We

can become willing nihilists, capable of forging a new culture
built on mythical narrative!
Once the cultural goal of a foundational truth, either in
theology or philosophy, has been destroyed or merely withers
away, we enter the historical stage of nihilism.

At points in

Nietzsche's writing he approaches the advent of nihilism with
a sense of apprehension.

He, like many of his contemporaries,

was somewhat fearful of the sense of loss which begins with
nihilism's

appearance.

For

instance,

when

writing

about

modern institutions, particularly marriage, Nietzsche laments,
"Our institutions are no longer fit for anything: everyone is
unanimous about that...but the fault lies not in them but in
25 This is related to the position of Hans Vaihinger's
"philosophy of the as if.” Vaihinger, like Nietzsche, claims
that man creates illusions and calls them facts; he/she
treats them as if they had physical existence of their own.
Humans forget that these are merely ideational constructs.
Vaihinger, Die Philosophie des Als Ob (Tuebingen University,
1912) .
71

us.26

However, overall Nietzsche approaches nihilism with a

heightened sense of enthusiasm.27 Nietzsche sees nihilism as
an opportunity for creating a new set of values and a new
culture.

In The Gav Science (1882) Nietzsche writes,

Indeed, we philosophers and "free spirits" feel, when we
hear the news that "the old god is dead," as if a new
dawn shone on us; our heart overflows with gratitude,
amazement, premonitions, expectations. At long last the
horizon appears free to us again once more...our ships
venture out again, venture out to face any danger...
perhaps there has never yet been such an "open sea."28
For Nietzsche, the death of the old god allows us a sense of
freedom, play, and gaiety.

The "open sea" of nihilism allows

us the freedom to become accomplished nihilists or "supermen,"
capable of welcoming and celebrating the devaluation of the
highest values.
Nietzsche's celebration of the death of the old god and
foundational truth is one he shared with many other modernist
writers.

However, part of Nietzsche's work suggests that the

desire expressed by many modern individuals and movements to
transcend the modern value system and escape from nihilism may
be a problematic enterprises.

The nature of this problem

involves modernity's complex attitude towards and relationship
with the past.

This "problem of history," as it has been

called,

issue

is

the

Nietzsche

treats

in

several

of

his

26 Frederick Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. by
R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1968) p. 93.
27 Ibid., p. 121.
28 Frederick Nietzsche, The Gav Science, translated by
Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1974), p. 280.
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I
important works, particularly his 1874 essay, "On the Uses and
Disadvantages
Nietzsche,

of

History

for

Life."29

In

this

essay

like some of his modernist counterparts,

views

history as a burden that prohibits modern individuals from
creating their own history.

The past is like a ball and chain

which continuously limits the freedom of humankind.
"historical

sickness"

can

be

cured,

in Nietzsche's

This
view,

through the suprahistorical elements of myth, art and music.
These elements provide an avenue for the

(re)discovery and

projection of truly new culture— free from the burdens of
tradition.30
However, there is a problem in trying to find a cure for
the "historical sickness" of modern culture in suprahistorical
myth.

Modern culture is also haunted by the legacy of lineal

historical change (e.g., a belief that historical change is
the unfolding of some set of underlying evolutionary laws).
The belief in lineal historical change is a result of the
emphasis placed on progress and "overcoming" by industrialists
and

enlightenment

philosophers,

particularly

Condorcet's

29
Frederick Nietzsche, "On the Use and Abuse of
History" in The Philosophy of Nietzsche, trans. by Geoffrey
Clive (New York: Mentor Books, 1965), pp. 218-238.
30 This is a particularly modern position on culture.
These statements have helped fuel the debate on the
classification of Nietzsche as a modernist or postmodernist.
For a discussion of this see, Robert Gooding-Williams,
"Nietzsche's Pursuit of Modernism," New German Critique,
1987, 41, pp. 95-108.
It can also be added that American
culture has a strong emphasis on escape from the past and
celebration of the present and the future, or a new beginning
for the mobile and the rootless.
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historiography
poses

and Hegelian metaphysics.

a paradox

paradox

for those

involves

modernity.

the

Thus,

seeking to overcome

inability

to

escape

or

modernity
it.

This

"overcome"

Modernity itself is an era typified by "progress"

and the perpetual "overcoming" of tradition.

Thus, each new

theoretical or cultural innovation which seeks to overcome
modernity is simply a repeat of the transcendent element of
modernity

and

consequently

remains

modern

in

character.31

Any individual or movement which self-consciously seeks to
change society is but part of the form of modern thinking and
action.
Nietzsche's strategy to combat progressive thinking is
the

concept

of

Zarathustra.32
Nietzsche

as

the

"eternal

The

idea

a

narrative

return"

of an

eternal

weapon

progress and linear evolution

found

in Thus

return

against

in history.

the

Spoke

serves

for

notions

of

By seeing the

movement of time as the repeat of the ever same, history loses
its

evolutionary

quality.

In

the

voice

of

Zarathustra,

Nietzsche writes:
Behold this moment!
From this gateway, moment,
a long, eternal lane leads backward: behind us lies
an eternity. Must not whatever can walk have walked
on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen
31 Cf. Gianni Vattimo, The End of Modernity: Nihilism
and Hermeneutics in Postmodern Culture, trans. by Jon Snyder
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp.
164-181.
32 Frederich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book
for Everyone and No One, trans. by R.J. Hollingdale (New
York: Penguin Books, 1969).
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have happened, have been done, have passed by before?
....And are not all things knotted together so firmly
that this moment draws after it all that is to come?
Nietzsche recognized that the narrative of eternal return was
as much myth as the narrative of progress.

However, it has

the advantage of undermining Occidental culture's reliance
upon teleological history, such as Condorcet's evolutionary
historical progress.

Just as the accomplished nihilist has

discarded the illusion of truth, we also need no longer feel
the need to "progress." For progress too is an illusion.

The

myth of eternal return forces us to treasure the here-and-now,
rather

than

projecting

ultimate perfection.

ourselves

towards

some

state

of

The demise of progress, Nietzsche hopes,

will put us in the position to now forge our own values and
systems of mythically-based knowledge, free from the confines
of the Occidental heritage and modernity.
Nietzsche

provides

us

with

an

understanding

complexities and paradoxes of modernity.

of

the

Nietzsche wants to

rid culture from the entire legacy of Western thought and its
most

systematic

Enlightenment.

expression

in

To accomplish this,

eighteenth-century
Nietzsche attacks the

Enlightenment's sacred desire to find a foundational truth.
Once this project

is underway,

he turns his attention to

constructing a vitally new culture.
the

problem

of

history

emerges

It is at this stage that
(i.e.,

history

as

linear

progress). Nietzsche wants to lift the burdens of history and
progress from humanity, but he realizes that any attempt to
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overcome history is merely part of the spirit of modernity.
Nietzsche's recognition of the inadequacies of this type of
progressive thinking "designated the moment of the birth of
post-modernity

in

philosophy."33

The

inadequacies

of

Enlightenment notions of progress forces him, and the line of
thinkers which lead from Heidegger to Derrida, into devising
a new

strategy

for

finding a

"way out"

of modernity

and

nihilism.

Weber;

Modernitv-as-Rationalization

Max Weber's organizing concept of rationalization has,
perhaps beyond all others, come to be the word most often used
to describe the process of modernization.
of

our

times

is

characterized

by

For Weber "the fate
rationalization

and

intellectualization and, above all by the *disenchantment of
the world.'"34
both

a

In Weber's view,

universal

systematization

process

embodied

in

rationalization
of

all

involved

demystification
world

religions

and
and

a

particular form represented by Protestantism and the modern
bureaucratic organization in Occidental culture.35

33 Vattimo, The End of Modernity. 1988., p. 167.
34 Max Weber, "Science as Vocation," in H. Gerth and C.
Wright Mills, From Max Weber; Essavs in Sociology (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 155.
35 Cf. Mark Shields, "Rationalization, Differentiation,
and Universalism: Weber, Parsons, and Habermas on Modernity."
Unpublished work presented at the 1989 meeting of the
American Sociological Association, San Francisco.
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The appearance of rationalization in Western culture was
identifiable in the ascetic attitude towards life found in
early Calvinism.36

Specifically,

Calvinism contained three

ascetic constructs:

(1) "The interpretation of the world as

merely creaturely,"

(2) "The idea of the world as object of

fulfillment of duty through rational control," and (3) "The
compulsion to develop an ethically integrated personality, a
compulsion that also demands an ethical commitment."37

Since

the world was seen as "creaturely," it was perceived as being
void

of

spiritual

or

"Godly"

influence.

Initially,

this

results in a devaluation of the world and a (re)turn to the
spiritual.

However, once acted upon by individuals, the world

becomes an exclusively human realm.
becomes profane.

It becomes a realm exclusively open to human

activity and manipulation.
with

the

Consequently, the world

demand

for

a

When this profane realm is coupled
self-controlled

sense

"calling," the modern sensibility is forged.
in

stripping

replacing

the

world

it with

of

spirituality

a worldly

ethos

or

of

duty

or

Calvinism aided
mysticism

emphasizing

and

individual

commitment and action.
These aspects of Calvinistic doctrine, specifically as
manifested

in

the

doctrine

of

predestination

and

the

36 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism, translated by Talcott Parsons (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1958).
37 Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, Max Weber's
Vision of History; Ethics and Methods (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1979), p. 42.
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importance of a "calling," inevitably led to self-denial and
an emphasis on a controlled, rational mastery of the world.
Calvinism succeeded in linking value or ethical rationality
with instrumental rationality in such a way as to "deeply and
intensely penetrate so many areas of life for believers.1,38
Calvinism, as a religious movement, had the effect of bringing
together individual rationality with the forces of societal
rationalization imbedded in early capitalism.
combined with the

Calvinism, when

force of early capitalism,

succeeded in

making rational, calculative thinking a norm of thought and
action in the modern world.
The rationalization process, however, did not limit its
impact to the spheres of religion or the economy.
compatibility

of

Calvinism with

early

Due to the

capitalism

and

the

emerging bureaucratic state, the ascetic attitude towards life
became

embedded

in the

conduct

of

everyday

life

and

organizational structure of all modern institutions.

the

"When

asceticism was carried out of the monastic cells into everyday
life, and began to dominate worldly morality, it did its part
in building the
order."39

tremendous

cosmos

of the modern

economic

However as we will discuss below, Weber believed

that the cost for this transformation was very high, that is,

38 Shields,
"Rationalization,
Differentiation,
and
Universalism: Weber, Parsons, and Habermas on Modernity,"
1989, p. 2.
39 Weber,
Protestant
Capitalism. 1958, p. 181.
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in the loss of meaning.
By the end of the nineteenth century the ascetic way of
life, manifested in the vocational ethos, had become separated
from its religious

foundations.

However,

it continued to

prowl "about in our lives like the ghost of dead religious
beliefs."40 This situation produced an unresolvable paradox
in modern culture.
life,

but

the

Formal religion was losing its sway over

residue

of

religious

influence our thought and action.
moorings,

meaningless.

mode

for

the

Nonetheless,
conduct

continued

to

Removed from its religious

the ascetic attitude was without

consequently
necessary

beliefs

of

life

foundation and
it
in

remained
the

a

world.

Asceticism had become an institutionalized standard for the
conduct of life, yet it lacked any ideational foundation to
give it meaning.

Describing this situation in the case of the

meaningless pursuit of wealth in the United States,

Weber

writes,
In the field of its highest development, in the United
States, the pursuit of wealth, stripped of its
religious and ethical meaning, tends to become
associated with purely mundane passions, which often
actually give it the character of sport. 1
Weber believed the stripping of action from religious belief
produced "mundane passions."

We become "specialists without

spirit, sensualists without heart" trapped in the meaningless

40 Ibid., p. 182.
41 Ibid., p. 182.
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"iron

cage"

of

instrumental

rationality.42

It

was

this

situation which was the "fate" and the unresolved paradox of
modern culture.
The

paradox

of

modern

culture

resulting

from

the

secularization of asceticism and the resulting penetration of
the

life-world

individual
individual,

in

by
a

the

state

rationalization
of

ethical

process

confusion.

left

the

The modern

in Weber's view, was forced to choose between

"life abnegation" or "world affirmation" as possibilities for
the conduct of life.43

In a 1908 letter to Robert Michels,

Weber distinguishes the two possibilities,
There are two possibilities; either 'my kingdom is not
of this world' (Tolstoy, or syndicalism thought to its
conclusion, which is nothing more than the sentence
'the goal means nothing to me, the movement everything*
....) or affirmation of culture (that is, objective
culture, expressing itself in technical and other
'achievements') through adaptation to the sociological
conditions of all technique, whether it be economic,
political, or whatever else.44
By choosing life abnegation the individual "must be prepared
to live with 'fictions' in order to achieve ethical unity of
belief." In choosing life affirmation one must be willing to
"live with

'antinomies'

or

'tensions'

in order to achieve

42 Ibid., p. 182.
43 Lawrence

Pel ities,

Scaff,

ansi Modernity

Fleeing

in

the

ths

Iron

Thought

Cage:__Culture,

of

Mass wefear

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 98.
This discussion of the ethical dilemmas of modern life is
inspired by Scaff's discussion.
44 Quoted in Scaff, p. 97.
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clarity about the world as it 'is.'"45
modern

individual

is

between

utopian

fictive

world-view,

placed

narratives
or

in

the

which

accepting

Weber believes the

position

provide
the

a

of

choosing

unified,

contradictions

but
of

everyday life, which is void of the promise of ethical unity.
The choice between life abnegation and life affirmation also
leaves the

individual

value spheres.

in the position of choosing between

The individual is forced into accepting an

ethics of brotherliness, which seeks to end domination, or an
ethics which is supportive of the socio-political status quo.
The individual and cultural dichotomy between abnegation
and affirmation was employed by Weber to understand both the
ethical

dilemma

of the modern

social movements of his day.

individual

and

In Weber's view,

the various
the modern

individual either retreats into the realm of the subjective,
where life itself becomes a point of contemplation, or s/he
seeks

to

promises

find

ethical

liberation,

contradictions,

unity
or

in a utopian

s/he

accepts

movement
the

which

monotony,

and meaninglessness of everyday life.

The

rationalization process has produced both social and ethical
over-differentiation in modern culture.

Ethically there is no

longer one set of unitary guidelines for the conduct of life.
Ethical life, like society has been differentiated into many
irreconcilable realms.

45 Ibid., p. 98.
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These

insights on the ethical dilemmas

facing modern

individuals were used by Weber to understand the attempts to
alter collectively the fate of modernity and humanity.

The

late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were marked by
a series of social movements which abnegated the world (i.e.,
those movement that sought to turn away from the world-as-is
towards some type of idealized goal).

These movements, such

as syndicalism, pacifism, and socialism, created the hope of
an ideal society, void of the problematics of modernity.

The

fragmentation, meaningless, and dislocation of modernity were
to

be

being."

corrected

by

movements which

promised

a

"unity

of

However, the incongruities between the "ideals" of

the movement and the

"realities"

of contemporary politics

produced a deep sense of ambiguity in the movement and its
members.46
Weber can be seen as among the first social commentators
to link systematically rationality with repression.
of reason affecting the liberation of humankind,
the bars of the iron cage.

Instead

it becomes

This "dark side" of rationality

calls into question the optimistic attitude represented by the
Enlightenment philosophers (e.g., Condillac and Condorcet) and
post-Enlightenment

(e.g., Comte and Marx).

Weber saw the

"rosy blush" of the Enlightenment as "irretrievably fading"

46 This parallels the experience of left intellectuals
in France after the failure of the 1968 attempt at
revolution.
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from modern life.47

The ideology of the Enlightenment was

being usurped by its own devices.
opportunities

opened

up

by

Its praise of the unlimited

rationality

for

the

moral,

economic, and political perfectability of humankind were being
undermined bv rationality's intrusion into and domination of
every domain of social existence.
In the next section,
modernity by

one

we will explore the reaction to

of Weber's

students,

Georg

Simmel.

In

Simmel, we find a particularly acute sensibility towards the
effects of modern culture.

Simmel and "The Conflict in Modern Culture"
Perhaps

more

than

any

other

theorist

of

the

late

nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was Georg Simmel
who sought systematically to explore the contradictions of
modern life and the cultural meaning of the various modernist
intellectual and artistic movements of his time.

Simmel's

explorations of the contradictions encountered in modern life
and by

the various

modernist cultural

movements

led

him,

particularly in his later work, to a position which strongly
resembles the contemporary postmodern position on culture.
Simmel's attitude towards modernity is first encountered
in his most famous work, The Philosophy of Money, particularly

47 Weber,

The

Protestant

Capitalism, 1958 , p. i82.
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in the concluding chapter.48

In the work, Simmel argues that

money— which he calls "fluid property"— has, in part, enhanced
personal

liberation.

The

depersonalization

of

social

relations which accompany the use of money weakens the bonds
of traditional
door

forms of social control.49

for the development

of trade,

Money opens the

urbanization,

formation of cosmopolitan associations.

and

However, there are

negative consequences to the advent of a money economy.
has

the

effect

of

reifying

individual experience.

and

the

rationalizing

Money

life

and

Simmel writes:

This psychological feature of our times which stands
in such decisive contrast to the more impulsive,
emotionally-determined character of earlier epochs
seems to me to stand in close causal relationship
with the money economy. The money economy enforces
the necessity of continuous mathematical operations
in our daily transactions. The lives of many people
are absorbed by such evaluating, weighing, calculating
and reducing of qualitative values to quantitative
ones.50
In

conjunction

with

the

rationalization

of

life,

fflpney

contributes to the societal tendency of objectification.

A

monied economy contributes to the separation of objects from
their

creators.

Qualitative

or

subjective

values

become

48 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money, trans. by Tom
Bottomore and David Frisby (London: Rout ledge and Kegan Paul,
1978, 1900).
49 For a more detailed analysis of this aspect of Simmel
see, Stephan Fuchs, " From Theory to Critique of Modernity:
The Development of Simmel's Sociology." Paper presented at
the 1989 meeting of the Pacific Sociological Association,
Reno, Nevada.
50 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money. 1978, p. 444.
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transformed into quantitative or objective "realities."

Money

therefore aids in the development of an "objective culture;”
separate

and

subjective
society

life

from

alienation.

distinct

from

experience.

subjective

the

individual

The

separation

experience

and
of

ultimately

his/her
objective
leads

to

It "exemplifies the tragic tendency of objective

culture to separate itself from its creators and then subject
human

life

and experience to

its abstract

and

impersonal

laws. "51
For Simmel, life is experienced as an individual, unique,
non-fragmented

totality.

However,

impersonal, banal, and fragmented.
part

of

his/her

artist's

individual

creation

leaves

objective

becomes part of an anonymous,

is

The artist creates what is

totality.

the

culture

hands

of

However,
the

once

individual

the
it

impersonal culture or style.

Simmel writes:
Style, as the manifestation or our inner feelings,
indicates that these feelings no longer immediately
gush out but take on a disguise the moment they are
revealed.
Style, as the general form of the particular,
is a veil that imposes a barrier and a distance in
relation to the recipient of the expression of these
feelings.52
This,

for

modernity.

Simmel,

is

one

of

the

central

paradoxes

of

We must create on the basis of our individual life

experiences, however the original intent of our creation loses

51 Fuchs, "From Theory to Critique of Modernity:
Development of Simmel's Sociology," 1989, p. 19.
52 Simmel, The Philosophy of Money. 1978, p. 473.
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its subjective value once it enters the realm of objective
culture or pure form.
From Simmel*s discussion of the consequences of a monied
economy

we

modernity.

gain

an

understanding

of

the

dual

nature

of

While modernity had liberated certain aspects of

individuality from the confines of tradition,

it had also

imprisoned individuals in specialized role-sets and created an
impersonal objective culture.

From this general theoretical

framework, Simmel explored the meaning of the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century cultural movements.
Simmel saw the modernist cultural movements, as well as
Post-Christian religiosity and post-metaphysical philosophy
(e.g., Lebensphilosophie and pragmatism), as attempts to break
free of the limitations of objective culture.

These movements

represented Na passionate desire for the expression of life,
for which traditional forms are inadequate, but for which no
new

forms

have

been

devised...."53

In

Simmel's

view,

modernism represented a unique turn in the ongoing conflict
between the creative endeavors of the human spirit and the
societal
there

is

forms they take.

In other words,

strong conflict between the

with modernism

attempt

at cultural

innovation and the routinized social organization which these
innovations are bound to spawn and become embedded within.

53 Georg Simmel, "The Crisis of Culture" in Peter
Lawrence's Georg Simmel: Sociologist and European (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1976), p. 257.
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Prior to the nineteenth century, Simmel argued, cultural
movements had simply replaced one another in sequence.

Each

new cultural movement "commanded obedience as an objective
imperative and then ceded to others after a struggle."54

In

other works, creative endeavors inevitably became reified into
an objective cultural form.

However, in the later part of the

nineteenth century this conflict changed.

Beginning with the

"life

Nietzsche,

philosophy"

argued,

of

"life began to

meaning."55

This

Schopenhauer
take

advent

of

itself

and
as

culture

Simmel

its own object
produced

awareness of the confining nature of forms.

an

of

acute

It marked a

unique cultural rebellion against form itself (i.e., against
social organizaton).
The rebellion against form, represented by modernism,
produced a paradoxical situation for both Simmel and modern
culture.

On the one hand, Simmel realized that the desire to

transcend all forms is an impossibility.
...The process of thinking, wishing, and forming can
only substitute one form for another.
They can never
replace the form as such by life which as such
transcends the form. All these attacks against the forms
of our culture, which align against them the
forces
of life "in itself," embody the deepest
internal
contradictions of the spirit.
Although this chronic
54 Deena Weinstein and Michael Weinstein, "Simmel and the
Theory of Postmodern Society," Paper presented at the 84th
Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association, San
Francisco, 1989, p. 11.
55 Ibid., p. 11. Also see Chapter I of Georg Simmel's,
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. by H. Loiskandl, D.
Weinstein, and M. Weinstein (Amherst, MA: University of
Massachusetts Press, 1986).
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conflict between form and life has become acute in many
historical epochs, none but ours revealed it so clearly
as its basic theme.54
However, Simmel concludes that formlessness itself may be the
most appropriate "form" for the conduct of modern life.

In a

Nietzschean tone, Simmel writes,
The bridge between the past and the future of cultural
forms seems to be demolished; we gaze into an abyss of
unformed life beneath our feet. But perhaps this
formlessness is itself the appropriate form for
contemporary life.57
Nonetheless,

formlessness remains a form.

Modern life and

culture, or any historical existence, cannot escape from form,
objectification,

or organization.

In this case,

formless

becomes the way social and cultural life becomes organized and
subjectively understood.
Simmel's

comments

reveal

the

deep

ambiguities

paradoxes that exist in modern life and culture.

and

While such

modernist movements as the Futurists and Expressionists seek
to transcend form, they remain within its grasp.

Since "life

can only enter reality....in the form of form." all the modern
intellectual

movements

professed enemy.58

remain

prisoners

of

their

self

As such, cultural modernism remains but

a romantic, Rousseauian dream of the absence of authority and
societal

confines.

A dream,

that Simmel

maintains,

will

56 Georg Simmel, The Conflict in Modern Culture and Other
Essavs. trans. by K. Peter Etzkorn (New York: Teachers
College Press, 1968), p. 25.
57 Ibid., p. 25.
58 Ibid., p. 25.
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remain forever unfullfilled.
From Simmel's discussion of the conflict in modern life
and

culture,

we

can

derive

his

general

ontological

aim.

Simmel wants to preserve individuality from the threat of the
depersonalizing forces of modernity in the form of a monied
economy and objective culture.

Like his mentor Weber, Simmel

is deeply troubled by the "fate" of modern culture.

He, like

Weber and Nietzsche, advocates a type of heroic individualism
as a partial remedy for the tragedy of modernity.
and totality were

If unity

impossible at the societal and cultural

level, they could be found in a unified subjective life— a
retreat into inner life.59

Summary
We began with a discussion of the "cultural mood" which
was dominant in many intellectual circles prior to World War
I.

The aim of these early twentieth-century movements, such

as Futurism and Expressionism, was to construct a vitally new
cultural and social order on the ruins of traditional society.
We

find similar hopes

in Nietzsche's writings.

Nietzsche

wanted to construct a new culture, free from the burdens of
Occidental

reason,

however,

he

recognized

problems of this reconstructive project.
be "overcome."

the

inherent

Modernity could not

It had to be destroyed or simply replaced from

59 The retreat into a subjective holism is reflected in
Simmel's turn to the "heroic individualism" of Goethe and
Rembrandt in his later works.
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within.

In Weber, we find a more systematic treatment of the

advent of modernity and its social and cultural consequences.
Weber is rather ambivalent about the possibilities of a new
social order.
paradoxical.

In Weber's view, modern culture is extremely
In a world stripped off its original religious

meaning, we are forced to accept the world as it is or create
idealistic movements which promise some type of cultural and
individual unity.
Simmel,

the

subjective

In Simmel, we find a similar view.

conflict

experience

in

modern

and

culture

objective

experience is continuous and holistic.
discontinuous and fragmented.

is

one

culture.

For

between

Subjective

Objective culture is

For Simmel, in modernity there

is little hope of uniting the subjective and objective into a
coherent, unitary framework.
It can be argued that Nietzsche's, Weber's, and Simmel's
critiques of modern culture point to the contradictions which
would lead to the collapse of the spirit of the Enlightenment
and

modernism

as

cultural

movements.

We

find

in

their

writings traces of a particular view of modernity and its
social and cultural paradoxes which would be influential in
forming a postmodern discourse.

Caught between the desire to

transcend form (i.e., organization) and the inability to do
so, the modernist attitude would soon give way to a postmodern
one.

The postmodern attitude, as will be seen in the coming

chapters,
failed

would accept the

mediation,

and

a

inevitability of "broken
subjectivity
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form,

decentered

by

irreconcilable motives."60
These

late

nineteenth

and

early

twentieth-century

critiques of modernity opened modern thought up to further
delineation and provided a pathway for rebelling against its
philosophical

and epistemological

positions.

In the next

three chapters, we will take up the specific ideas that have
come to represent the postmodern orientation or framework.

We

will first turn our attention towards the issues of language
and referentiality.
postmodernism

Specifically, we will examine the way

questions

the

unproblematic

modern

view

of

language as tool of rational representation.

60 Weinstein and Weinstein, "Simmel and the Theory of
Postmodern Society," 1989, p. 13.
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CHAPTER IV
LANGUAGE, REFERENTIALITY, AND POSTMODERNISM
In this chapter,

we will focus on the importance of

language in the movement from modern to postmodern thought.
Specifically,

we

will

focus

on

a

line

of

inquiry

that

originates with the linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure,
leads through the anthropology of Benjamin Lee Whorf and
Claude Levi-Strauss,
Jacques Derrida.

and culminates

This

in the philosophy of

line of thought has proven to be

instrumental in the shaping of contemporary linguistics and
philosophy.

Undoubtedly, there are other individuals that

could be included in the development of linguistic thought.
Consequently, the account to follow is admittedly partial and
incomplete.

However, for the sake of simplicity and economy

we will focus on the Saussure to Derrida connection while
down-playing the role of individuals such as C.S. Peirce, M.
Heidegger, and L. Wittgenstein.
Ernst Cassirer once wrote that "in the whole history of
science there is perhaps no more fascinating chapter than the
rise

of

concluded
compared

the

'new

that,
to

the

science'

"in
new

seventeenth-century,

its

of

linguistics."

importance

science
changed
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of
our

it may

Galileo
whole

Cassirer

very well

be

which,

in

the

concept

of

the

physical world."1
one

that

was

theorists.

This dramatic declaration by Cassirer is

shared

by

many

other

For Cassirer and others,

twentieth-century

the new science of

linguistics represented a profound change in the outlook of
philosophy and the epistemology of the human sciences.
As part of the rise of the science of linguistics in the
late nineteenth

and early

twentieth centuries,

we

see

a

profound movement from an epistemology where objects are seen
as atomistic

entities with their own true essences

to a

position where objects are viewed in relation to one another.
In the first position, objects are believed to have their own
true meaning apart from discourse and thought.

In the second

position, the supposed meaning of an object is predetermined
or shaped by

language or a relational

structure.

These

developments and others in the study of language are often
called

the

"linguistic

turn.”2

The

linguistic

turn

"signifies" the transition of humans from being the "rational
animal" of the Enlightenment to the "language animal" of the
twentieth century.3 This transition it will be argued, while
seemingly subtle, marks an important point in the development

1 Ernst Cassirer quoted in Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand
de Saussure (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), p.
147.
2 Cf., Richard Rorty (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: Recent
Eggayg is Philosophical Method (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1967).
3 Cf. Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 217.
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(New

of postmodernism.

As will be seen in the forthcoming pages,

the idea of humans as the language animal works to undermine
the description of humans as the rational
eighteenth

century.

Pure

rational

animal

in the

consciousness,

as

conceived in the Enlightenment, is incompatible with the non
rat ional effects of language.

For pure rationality to exist

it must be able to remove the influence of tradition and myth
from the accounts of the social or natural world

(cf. the

project of the logical positivists). With the development of
linguistic theory, this type of pure rationality is called
into question.

We will begin with a discussion of Saussure.

Saussure and the Arbitrary Nature of the Sian
When Saussure gave his series of lectures which would
later

become

aenerale. he

the

posthumous

encountered

a

work,
study

Cours
of

de

linouistigue

language

which

had

remained virtually unchanged for several centuries.4 Prior
to Saussure's unique and ground-breaking approach to the
study of language, three overlapping ideas were dominant in
linguistics and comparative philology,
philosophy and theory.
nomenclaturism,
and

(3)

as well

as modern

These ideas can be summarized as: (1)

(2) the separation of language and thought,

theories

independent objects.

supporting

the

idea

of

Saussure can be seen as

a

world

of

directly or

4 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics,
ed. by Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, trans. by Wade
Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959 (1915)).
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indirectly

undermining

Occidental thought.

each

one

of

these

foundations

of

He will discuss each of these ideas

separately.
First,

"nomenclaturism" can be viewed as an approach

where language is seen as an act of naming.
on language,
Plato's

In this position

either God in biblical accounts or humans in

Cratvlus

are

seen,

in

some

original

correctly linking sound with objects.5

To

state,

as

find the true

meaning of these spoken words, we must turn to what could be
called

a

"hermeneutics

of

recovery."

This

project

of

recovery will enable investigators to find the true relations
of words and ideas which was somewhere lost in historical
evolution.

The process of hermeneutical recovery will enable

humans to locate the exact relationship between sound and
referent.
Secondly,

Occidental

philosophy,

particularly

as

manifested in the Enlightenment, assumes a division between
the ideas of thought and the everyday words of language.
"Language was an activity with words

and thought was

an

activity with ideas: words depended on ideas, but ideas did
not

depend

influenced

on

words."6

by the

In

structure

this
of

view,

language.

linguist ic or pre-linguistic realm.

thought
It

is

is

not

a non

Thought is a private

5 Plato, Cratvlus. trans. by H.N. Fowler (London: Loeb
Classical Library, 1926).
6 Roy Harris, Language. Saussure and Wittgenstein: How
to Plav Games With Words (London: Routledge, 1988), p.2.
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collection of ideas internally contained and interacting in
the mind of the individual.

Language comes into play only

when we try a communicate our ideas to someone else in a
discursive situation.
and

consequently

not

Thought is a non-discursive activity
susceptible

to

the

distortion

of

interactive speech and writing (i.e., language is a neutral
medium).
This division between language and thought leads to the
third position which Saussure encountered.

In this position

another layer is added to the division between ideas and
words.

We are left with a structure which makes distinctions

between objects,

language, and thought.

Here the world is

seen as a "fixed object of analysis quite separate from the
forms of discourse by which men speak of it and by which they
represent their thoughts."7

This structure reveals a realm

of objects which is distinct from our idea of the objects and
our discourse on the objects.

Objects have their own true

essences or meanings apart from our internal ideas about the
objects and discourses on the objects.

One of the central

problems in Western philosophy has been how to capture these
objects in thought and discourse.
seen

as

a

mirror

of

reality

or

In modernity, the mind was
a

"mirror

of

nature."8

Language was seen as a tool to communicate this reality.

The

7 Timothy Reiss, The Discourse of Modernism (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 23.
8 Cf. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979).
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true nature of objects can be captured and conveyed through
extensive observation and classification as exemplified by
Newtonian science.

This view is represented by Condillac's

efforts to perfect language through the use of algebra, as
discussed
language
knowledge.

in the second chapter.
is

seen

as

We will

allowing

From this perspective,
for

the

accumulation

of

return later to a discussion of how

Saussure undermines each of these premises.

However, first

we must discuss some of Saussure's general views on language.
In order to develop and refine a scientific discipline
of linguistics, Saussure thought it was important to define
its primary realm of inquiry,
language as a system of signs.

language.

Saussure defines

The sign is defined as a

union of signifier (verbal utterances, morphemes, word) and
signified

(concept,

idea,

object).

Further defining this

union Saussure writes,
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name
but a concept and a sound-image. The latter is not
the material sound, a purely physical thing, but
the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression
it makes on our senses. The sound image is sensory...9
Here, Saussure counters nomenclaturism's claim that language
is merely the act of connecting a name to an object.

The

sign connects a mental concept and a verbal image together
into one linguistic unit.

The sign only has meaning in its

appeal to a psychologically imprinted structure.

In this

connection, signs unite concepts and sound, not an object and
9 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 66.
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its "correct" or "incorrect" name.
With

the

sign

identified

as

the

connection

of

a

signifier with a signified, Saussure introduces his "first
principle of linguistics;" the arbitrary nature of the sign.
By this, Saussure means that there is no natural link between
the signifier and the signified.

In other words, there is no

natural relationship between the verbal utterance and the
concept or idea it defines.

The utterance could be anything

as long as it is recognized and understood in a discursive
For example,

c o m m u n ity .

The idea of "sister" is not linked by any inner
relationship to the succession of sounds s-o-r
which serves as its signifier in French; that it
could be represented equally by just any other
sequence is proved by differences among languages
and by the existence of different languages.10
This is an obvious characteristic of language which,
according to Saussure,
is

"more

to

the

"no one disputes."11

arbitrary

nature

of

the

However, there
sign

than

the

arbitrary relation between signifier and signified."12 When
one engages in comparative linguistics, one quickly comes to
the conclusion that not only do signifiers vary from culture
to

culture

signifieds.

and

from

situation

to

situation,

but

also

Concepts, ideas, etc. are contingent upon the

structure of a particular language.

They vary from culture

10 Ibid., pp. 67-68.
11 Ibid., p. 68.
12 Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure. 1986, p. 30.
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to

culture

character

and

time

similar

to

to

the

time.

They

signifiers.

have

an

For

arbitrary

example,

the

process of translating from one language to another does not
entail simply the substitution of one signifier for another.
Different languages have concepts which are not immediately
translatable.

For example, "the French 'aimer' does not go

directly into English; one must choose between 'to like' and
'to love.,Nl3

In this regard, it can be concluded that each

language "articulates or organizes the world differently."14
Consequently, languages can be seen as creators of reality
rather than

instruments to convey the mind's mirror-like

reflection of reality.
If signifiers and signifieds are both arbitrary,

the

questions arise, what defines a sign and gives it meaning?
For

Saussure,

the

sign

is

defined

in

terms

of

its

relationship with other terms in a total system or structure.
Saussure writes,
When they are said to correspond to concepts, it is
understood that the concepts are purely differential
and defined not by their positive content but
negatively by their relations with the other terms
of the system. Their most precise characteristic
is being what the others are not.15
Consequently, in languages there are only differences.
Difference is what gives the sign its meaning.

Meaning,

13 Ibid., p. 31.
14 Ibid., p. 31.
15 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 117.
99

then,

is a result of a linguistic system, which organizes

signifieds based on phonetic differences.

In this respect,

different languages have different types of differentiation.
Each language can be seen as an independent system which
organizes

reality

through

unique

types

of

signified

differentiations.
For the individual, language provides a system of rules
and forms (la langue) from which we construct everyday speech
(parole).
the

La langue is a social creation.

individual

and consciousness.

It

It is prior to

is not within our

conscious will and ability to deviate from its rules.

From

the structural rules of langue, we construct our individual
parole.

The structure of langue is concrete and immutable.

It is not simply chosen by the
Saussure,

"language

individual

furnishes the best

speaker.

proof that a

For
law

accepted by a community is a thing that is tolerated and not
a rule to which all

freely consent."16

He are contained

within what Nietzsche had earlier referred to as the "prison
house" of language.
The implications of Saussure's thought are both paradigm
shattering

and

paradigm

forming.

It

has

relevance

outside the fields of linguistics or semiotics.

far

Saussure*s

work can be seen as indirectly forcing a reevaluation of much

16 Ibid., p. 71.
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of modern philosophical thought and epistemology.17

Each of

the three overlapping views of language and philosophy we
encountered in the beginning of this discussion are called
into question.
longer

viable,

First,
since

the

idea of nomenclaturism

Saussure

has

shown

that

is no

language

encompasses more than link between a sound and an image.
sign unifies a concept and a sound.
is

arbitrary.

It

makes

no

annunciated as long as the

The sound or signifier

difference

sound

The

what

sound

is recognizable

meaningful within a speech community.

and

is
is

Also, the concept or

signified is contingent, since other langues have different
concepts and because signs change may shift their meaning
across

time

and

space.

In other words,

reality

is not

immutable; it is mediated through language.
Another
important

consquence

distinction

challenged.

of

Saussure's

between

thought

work
and

is

that

discourse

the
is

By showing how la langue structures the use of

parole, the idea that thought is somehow disconnected from
language

becomes

implausible.

The

rules

of

language

structure both discourse between individuals and individual
thought.
language.

Thought cannot take place outside the confines of
This

is

an

important move

away

from private

17 This revaluation was not put forward by Saussure
himself.
Philosophers, such as Jacques Derrida, have taken
up the task of exploring and explicating the meaning of
Saussure's work for the Western theoretical heritage.
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consciousness to what can be called the public sign.18
Finally,
with

their

the idea that objects are separate entities

own

essence

is

undermined.

The

distinction

between thought, discourse, and objects become blurred.
Within the Saussurian framework, objects cannot have their
own

essences

or

independent

reality.

These

essences are provided by a community of language.
of an object

is a reflection of la

Jameson's words,

langue.

perceived
The nature
In Fredric

"You can see only as much as your model

permits you to see."19

Objects have no meaning apart from

their connection to a linguistic community which defines and
shapes their meaning.

Furthermore, the idea that the true

nature of objects can be captured through an appropriate
method,

performed

challenged.

by

a

thinking

and

acting

subject

is

Parole is structured by la langue prior to the

individual's

encounter

with

objects.

Thus,

the

classification of objects by an individual is a result of the
rules of la langue.

The thinking and acting subject is a

passive recipient of la langue and cannot escape to give some
"god's eye view” of the object.
already

determined

before

its

The object's meaning is
encounter

with

individual

consciousness.
18 Seyla Benhabib, "Epistemologies of Modernism: A
Rejoinder to Jean-Francois Lyotard," New German Critique 33,
1984, p. 110.
19 Fredric Jameson, The Prison-House of Language:__&
Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 14.
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Saussure's only published work was influential in the
development of three important theoretical movements of the
twentieth

century:

structuralism,

deconstructionism.

Two

of

these,

semiotics,

and

structuralism

and

deconstructionism, will be discussed in forthcoming sections.

Language and Anthropology; Whorf and Levi-Strauss
In the United States, the work of Benjamin Lee Whorf can
be seen as a complementary,

yet distinct,

contribution to

what was described earlier as the "linguistic turn."
who was a student of the eminent linguist,
although

unfamiliar

with

Saussure's

Whorf,

Edward Sapir,
work,

gave

anthropological support to the arbitrary nature of the sign
and

its

theoretical

ethnolinguistics.

and

epistemological

implications

in

Sapir had argued that "the 'real world' is

to a large extent built up on the language habits of the
group."20

From this insight, Sapir reached the conclusion

that

worlds

"the

in which

different

societies

live

are

distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different
labels attached"— distinct in human relations, view of the
sacred, and emotional expression.21
Working from Sapir's assumptions, Whorf's work succeeded
in providing empirical

support

for Sapir's

observations.

20 Edward Sapir, Selected Writings in Language. Culture.
and
Personalitv. ed.
by
David Mandelbaum
(Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1949), p. 162.
21 Ibid., p. 162, emphasis added.
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Whorf's insights on linguistics came, in part, from fieldwork
he conducted with the Hopi Indians of Arizona.

Through a

careful analysis of their language, Whorf concluded that the
Hopi language have no words to express the movement of time.
After long and careful study and analysis, the
Hopi language is seen to contain no words, grammatical
forms, constructions or expression that refer directly
to what we call "time," or to past, present, or future,
or to enduring or lasting, or to motion as kinematic
rather than dynamic...22
In Saussurian terms, it may be said that the Hopi language
has a different set of signs.
only a different langue,
cosmology.

No word

As a result, the Hopi have not

but a different metaphysics and

in the Hopi

language

is capable

of

expressing the Western idea of the perpetually flowing realm
of

time

Instead,

(i.e.,
the

manifesting.

a

Hopi

flow
see

of

past,

time

in

present,

terms

of

and

future).

manifested

and

Manifested includes "all that is or has been

accessible to the senses."23

Manifesting refers to what we

call future and "all that we call mental— everything that
appears

or

exists

in

the

mind."24

For

the

Hopi,

the

manifesting does not represent the flow of time from future
22 Benjamin Lee Whorf, "An American Indian Model of the
Universe,
in Language. Thought, and Reality:__ Selected
Writings of Beniamin Lee Whorf. ed. by John Carroll
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1956), p. 57. With regard to the
development of modern Western conceptualizations of time, cf .
Jerome H. Buckley, The Trlumnh of Time (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1966).
23 Whorf,
1956, p. 59.

"An American Indian Model of the Universe,"

24 Ibid., p. 59.
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into present into past.

Manifesting represents something

that is "already with us in vital and mental form."25
From

Whorf's

encounter

with

the

structure

of

Hopi

language, he concludes that "concepts of 'time' and 'matter'
are not given in substantially the same form by experience to
all

men

but

languages."26

depend
In

upon

turn,

the

nature

language

is

of

the

cultural formations of different peoples.

language

result

of

There

is

no

such

thing

as

unencumbered by the effect of language.
which

language

is

embedded

shapes

and

the

Socially produced

languages give us our particular view of space, time,
objects.

or

pure

and

experience

The community in
molds

experience.

Langauge provides the inner structure by which we experience
the world.

This view, like Saussure's, stands in complete

contrast to the Enlightenment'a view of language as a mirror
of reality.

Levi-Strauss: Language. Structure, and Myth
In a statement reminiscent of Cassirer's, Claude LeviStrauss

once

predicted

that

the

advent

of

structural

linguistics would "play the same renovating role with respect
to the social sciences that nuclear physics has played for

25 Ibid., p. 60.
26 Benjamin L. Whorf, "The Relation of Habitual Thought
and Behavior to Language," in Ibid., p. 158.
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the

physical

sciences."27

In

Levi-Strauss'

view,

the

structural linguistics inaugurated by Saussure and refined by
the Russian Formalists provided the human sciences with the
material for the construction of a rigorous new method.

This

new method was capable of revealing not only the phonetic and
syntactical makeup of various languages, but more importantly
for Levi-Strauss, the underlying structures or general laws
of culture.
together

In general, Levi-Strauss' work attempted to fuse

the

linguistic

insights

of

Saussure,

and

other

structural linguists such as N. Troubetzkoy and R. Jacobson
with the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss into
something that came to be called "structural anthropology."
With Levi-Strauss,
becomes

further

structuralism as a method expands
refined.

As

the

structural

and

method

progressed, Levi-Strauss felt it would eventually succeed in
bridging the gap between the exact and social sciences.28
Just

as

Saussure

understanding words

had

stressed

the

importance

(signifiers or morphemes)

of

in negative

relation to other words and in terms of the larger system of
language (la langue), Levi-Strauss wanted to understand the
cultural whole based on the inner relationship of a society's
elementary

parts.

These

elementary

parts

did

not

have

meaning by themselves, but only as part of larger system of

27 Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans.
by Clair Jacobson (New York: Basic Books, 1963), p. 33.
28 Cf. Ibid., p. 70.
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relations.

Particularly important in this method was the

identification of binary categories, an idea borrowed from
the Russian Formalists.
provided

the

Binary categories or oppositions

unconscious

material

on

which

constructs its understanding of the world.

a

culture

Identifying the

underlying and unconscious binary scheme would inevitably
lead to a deep understanding of the culture.

The Ntruth" of

a culture was to be found in the unconscious structure which
in turn provided the rules for everyday practice, discourse,
and ritual.
By

employing

the

structuralist

method,

a

seemly

meaningless endeavor such as comparing the cuisine of two
cultures becomes a means

for determining the unconscious

inner structure of a society.

Levi-Strauss writes,

Like language, it seems to me, the cuisine of a
society may be analyzed into constituent elements,
which in this case we can call 'gustemes,' and which
may be organized according to certain structure of
opposition and correlation. We might then distinguish
English cooking from French cooking by means of three
oppositions: endogenous/exogenous; central/peripheral;
marked/not marked.29
English and French cuisines are distinguishable by their
binary oppositions.

English cuisine emphasized staple food

with ingredients that are national and prepared in a bland
manner.
between
blurred.

Conversely

in

French

endogenous/exogenous

cuisine,

and

the

distinctions

central/peripheral

are

French culture makes a distinction between marked

29 Ibid., p. 86.
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and

non-marked

(i.e.,

those

with

and

without

particular

spices added). What is of paramount importance here is that
the unconscious constituent elements of a society's cuisine
provides a means for understanding the structure by which the
society categorizes and organizes,

not just food,

but the

world.
Much

of

the

structural

method

of

Levi-Strauss

was

directed at some of anthropology's most persistent areas of
confusion,

specifically

Understanding

the

kinship

logic

of

systems

kinship

and

systems

mythologies.
had

been

an

important methodological problem throughout the relatively
short history of anthropology.

However, using the structural

method Levi-Strauss argued,
Like phonemes, kinship terms are elements of meaning;
like phonemes, they acquire meaning only if they
are integrated into systems. Kinship systems, like
phonemic systems, are built by the mind on the level
of unconscious thought....Although they belong to
another order of reality, kinship phenomena are of
the same type as linguistic phenomena.30
From the insights of structural linguistics, kinship systems
were to be understood in relation to one another and as part
of the logic of an entire system of kinship rather than as
isolated elements.

For Levi-Strauss, this inquiry revealed

that

system

"the kinship

is

a

language."31

By

treating

kinship as a language, it was possible to uncover a deeper
logic of a culture under examination.
30 Ibid., p. 34.
31 Ibid., p. 47.

Essentially,

Levi-

Strauss concluded that when each member of a society was
placed within the context of the distinctions that make-up
kinship terminology and role distinctions, the entire logical
system of that culture could be determined.

As such, general

laws of culture could be developed.
The explanation of myth had also been a methodologically
problematic enterprise for anthropologists.

Unlike language

or kinship systems, myths seemed to lack an overall logic and
continuity.

Myths seemed to vary from myth teller to myth

teller and from situation to situation.

However, myths also

have the characteristics of being timeless and universal.
There

exists

collected

in

an

"astounding

widely

similarity

different

between

regions.”32

The

myths
seemly

arbitrary nature of myths and myth telling coupled with their
apparent universality made it extremely difficult to grasp
the meaning of myths in a cultural setting.
understand
employ

and

myths,

Levi-Strauss

transcend

langue and parole.

the

Myth,

felt

it was

Saussurian

In order to
important

distinction

like language,

to

between

has a part that

"refers to events alleged to have taken place long ago."33
However, it also "explains the present and the past as well
as

the

future."34

Myth

is

32 Ibid., p. 208.
33 Ibid., p. 209.
34 Ibid., p.209.
109

at

once

an

explanation

of

historical phenomena and a timeless philosophy of life.

This

dual nature of myth requires that it be seen as a special
case of language.

Levi-Strauss writes,

It is that double structure, altogether historical
and ahistorical, which explains how myth, while
pertaining to the realm of parole and calling for
an explanation as such, as well as to that of langue
in which it is expressed, can also be an absolute
entity on a third level which, though it remains
linguistic by nature, is nevertheless distinct from
the other two.35
From this distinction of myth, Levi-Strauss comes to the
conclusion

that

"mvth

is

language.

functioning

on

an

especially high level where meaning succeeds practically at
'taking off' from the linguistic ground on which it keeps on
rolling."36
foundation,

With

this

view

of

myth-as-language

as

a

Levi-Strauss proceeds to examine several myths

appearing in different cultures.

The myths he explores, such

as the Oedipus myth, the Zuni origin and emergence myth, and
Plains mythology reveal a deep structure of meaning.

The

structure can be found by examining the bundles of relations
within a mythology.

The bundles or mythemes can be revealed

by examining only the elements of a myth which are necessary

35 Ibid., p. 210.
36 Ibid., p. 210, emphasis added.
In some ways this
parrells Alfred Schutz's phenomenological
notion that
language is a hidden treasure, partly not even accessible to
same members of the in-group.
Denotations of words,
connotations, idioms and dialects relate at a semi-counscious
level that interlinks the historical experience of a group.
Cf., Schutz essay on the "Stranger” and the "NewComer" in
Collected Papers. Vol. 2 (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff: 1964), pp. 91-119.
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to tell the story.
than that
parole,

of

and

The mythemes reveal an even deeper code

langue.
behind

"Behind the
the

langue

individual

from

which

telling or
that

parole

derives," there exists "a kind of super-langue, which emits
a fundamental message."37

For Levi-Strauss, primary among

these mythemes is a search for the resolution of oppositions,
such as the distinction between nature and culture.
The inner structure of myth is as logical as any in
contemporary Western science.

Levi-Strauss concludes that

"the same logic processes operate in myth as in science, and
that man has always been thinking equally well...”3*
It was Levi-Strauss'

goal to show,

"not how men think in

myths, but how myths operate in men's minds without their
being

aware

of

the

structural linguists,

fact.”39

Following

the

lead

of

the

Levi-Strauss concluded that "if the

human mind appears determined in the realm of mythology, a
fortiori it must also be determined in all its spheres of
activity."40
One

of

the

founders

of

structural

linguistics,

N.

Troubetzkoy, reduced the importance of structural linguistics

37 Terence Hawkes, Structuralism and Semiotics (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1977), p. 44.
38 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology. 1963, p. 230.
39 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans.
by John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1969),
p. 12.
40 Ibid., p. 10.
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to four basic positions:
First, structural linguistics shifts from the study
of conscious linguistic phenomena to study of their
unconscious infrastructure; second, it does not treat
terms as independent entities, taking instead as its
basis of analysis the relations between terms; third,
it introduces the concept of the system.... finally,
structural linguistics aims at discovering general
lavs..
These positions, with minor revisions, also can be used to
summarize

the

importance

of

the

work

of

Levi-Strauss.

Structuralism, in all its varieties, is part of an important
shift away from emphasizing the importance of consciousness
towards that of structure.

For the structuralist the "truth"

of a language or a culture resides in the deep unconscious
structure which is prior to individual consciousness.

In

many ways the structuralists extend the project which began
with the sociological writings of Marx and Durkheim in the
nineteenth century by ellaborating the notion of structure
exterior

to

the

individual.

Marx,

Durkheim,

and

the

structuralist all seek to treat humans as part of larger
system

of

determination.

The

coherent

ego

of

the

Enlightenment, inaugurated by Cartesian rationalism, becomes
suspect.

Behind the back of this ego resides a structure

which molds its everyday speech,
action.

modes of expression,

and

The outcome is that the system or structure, whether

41 Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology. 1963, p. 33.
As we shall see in the next section, the ability to discover
"general laws" is one of the central distinguishing features
between structuralism and
poststructuralism.
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conscious or unconscious, is placed above individual elements
and the rational ego.
However, the structuralist position was not free from
critiques or revisions.
Jacques

Derrida,

in

structuralism which,

As we shall see with the work of

the

1960's

although

there

informed

arises
by

a

post

structuralism,

seeks to rethink some of structuralism's central positions on
language, such as the search for general laws of language or
culture.

This movement, it will be argued, constitutes the

most radical break with modern thought and marks the movement
into the postmodern.

Derrida:__ Language and Presence
Jacques Derrida begins one of his most important works,
the 1967 book Of Gramatologv. with the declaration that the
problem of language "has invaded the global horizon of the
most

diverse

researches

discourses."42
expressed

by

The
writers

and

so-called
such

as

the

most

"problem
Nietzsche,

heterogeneous
of

language"

Saussure,

and

Heidegger, had by the early 1960's, infiltrated almost every
domain

of

inquiry.

Few

intellectual

domains

remained

untouched by the revolutionary insights associated with the
"linguistic turn."

Particularly affected by the emphasis on

language were the areas of philosophy and literary theory.
42 Jacques Derrida, Of Gramatologv. trans. by Gayatri
Chakravory Spivak (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1976), p. 6.
113

In

Derrida,

language

in

we

encounter

the

contemporary

most

thought.

language used as a means

radical

treatment

Futhermore,

we

of

find

for reassessing the project of

philosophy and the entire Western theoretical tradition.
As discussed earlier, structural linguistics sought to
make explicit the system of relations embedded in language.
The goal was to identify the structural elements which make
speech or culture possible.

However, for Derrida this is a

highly problematic project.

In Derrida's view, Saussure and

the structuralists are guilty of presenting the signifier and
signified

as

being

linguistic sign.

clearly

distinguishable

parts

of

the

Essentially, in the structuralist's view of

the sign, there is a clear and definable distinction between
signifiers and what they signify.
or

morpheme,

while

the

The signified is a phoneme

signified

somewhere "out in the world."

refers

to

a

referent

However, according to Derrida

there exists no such clear delineation between the signified
and the signifier.
intertwined that

Signifiers and signifieds are so closely
it

is

impossible

to draw a distinction

between these two aspects of the sign.
serve

as

signifieds.

signifiers.

Likewise,

Signifiers often

signifieds

can

serve

as

Summarizing this phenomenon of the sign, Madan

Sarup writes,
Suppose you want to know the meaning of a signifier,
you can look it up in the dictionary; but all you will
find will by yet more signifiers, whose signifieds you
can in turn look up, and so on. The process is not
only infinite but somehow circular; signifiers keep
transforming into signifieds, and vice versa, and you
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never arrive at a final signified which is not
a signifier in itself.43
For Derrida, this means that language is much more unstable
and problematic than had been recognized by Saussure, and the
structural linguists and anthropologists.

The basic elements

of a language or a culture cannot be clearly defined, since
they are in continuous movement and transformation.
the

structure

foundation

for

or

basic

elements,

structuralism,

locate, "pin-down," and analyze.

which

become

serve

extremely

Thus,
as

hard

the
to

As a result, the search for

general laws of language and culture becomes suspect.
In addition, and perhaps more importantly in Derrida's
overall philosophical project, this view of language implies
that meaning is never totally present in a sign.

The sign,

which is marked solely by its difference from other signs, is
influenced by traces of these other signs which are absent
from the

original

sign.

affect the sign's meaning.

These traces,

although

absent,

The sign "is always inhabited by

other signs which do not present themselves as such; there is
always a deferral to something absent."44

For example in

ordinary language,
The sound sequence bat is a signifier because it
contrasts with pat, mat, bad, bet, etc. The noise
43 Madan Sarup,
An
Introductory guide ts PQStr.
structuralism and PggtfflPdernjgn (Athens,
Georgia:
The
University of Georgia Press, 1989), p. 35.
44 Gayatri
Spivak
quoted
in
Keith
C.
Pheby,
fchs___ Metaphysical
Sufrles.t
Interventions:___ Displacing
(Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 1988), p. 57.
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that is 'present' when one says bat is inhabited by
the traces of forms one is not uttering, and it
can function as a signifier only insofar as it
consists of such traces...what is supposedly present
is already complex and differential, marked by
difference, a product of difference.45
As a consequence of this differentiation and its traces,
"meaning is scattered or dispersed along the whole chain of
signifiers;

it cannot be easily nailed down,

it is never

fully present in any one sign..."46 Signs are composed of a
series of signifiers and signifieds which are never fully
present in the sign.

As a consequence,

fully present in a sign.

meaning is never

Describing this process,

which

Derrida refers to as differance or difference (to defer and
to differ), he writes,
This concept can be called gram or differance.
The play of differences supposes, in effect,
syntheses and referrals which forbid at any
moment, or in any sense, that a simple element
be present in and of itself, referring only to
itself....no element can function as a sign
without referring to another element which itself
is not simply present. This interweaving results
in each 'element' being constituted on the basis
of the trace within it of the other elements of
the chain or system....There are only, everywhere,
differences and traces of traces.47
Meaning can never be fully present since it is constructed
through signifiers which contain traces of other signs not
45 Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and
Criticism
after
Structuralism
(Ithaca,
N.Y.;
Cornell
University Press, 1982), p. 96.
46 Sarup, introductory Guide to Poststructuralism and
Postmodernism. 1988, p. 35.
47 Jacques Derrida, Positions, trans. by Alan
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 26.
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Bass

I
present.
The

implications

important
thought

for

in

the

of this view of the sign are very

discipline

general.

Despite

of

philosophy

the

insistence

and

Western

in

Western

thought that the true meaning of an object or a text can be
summoned

before

the

investigating

subject,

meaning,

in

Derrida's view of language, is always deferred or suspended.
Since the sign is differential and is filled with traces of
signifiers which are not immediately present, meaning can
never be fully present to consciousness.

Western thought,

particularly as manifested in the Enlightenment,

felt the

essence or true meaning of an object was graspable.

The

outcome of this position on language is an undermining of the
idea

that

objects

can be

immediately

present

and,

as

a

consequence, grasped by the ego.
With this particular understanding of language as the
play

of

backdrop,

Derrida

develops his most famous device for reading a text.

It also

becomes

deferring

a

powerful

Occidental thought.

and

differing

device

for

as

a

rereading

the

history

of

This process of reading or rereading has

come to be known as deconstructionism. Describing one of the
"steps" in the process of deconstruction, Derrida writes,
...In a classical philosophical opposition we are not
dealing with the peaceful coexistence of a vis-a-vis,
but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two
terms governs the other (axiologically, logically,
etc.), or has the upper hand. To deconstruct the
opposition, first of all, is to overturn the hierarchy
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at a given moment.48
To a large degree Western thought has been governed by binary
conceptual

oppositions

such as

rationality/irrationality,

signifier/signified, sensible/intelligible, nature/culture,
speech/writing,

subject/object, etc.

In these oppositions

one of the terms has been given a privileged position in the
conceptual

hierarchy.

However,

what

this

ignores,

in

Derrida's view, is that if the distinctions are pushed far
enough they collapse. The position of the other term relies
on the subordination of the other.

The dominant term has a

trace of the subordinate within its signification.

Without

this difference in the system of language the higher term
would not have meaning since meaning is given bv difference.
As

a

consequence

concept

loses

hierarchy.
clearly

of

its

this

deconstruction,

superior

For example,

is

in

privileged

the

conceptual

rationality does not exist as a

distinguishable

Irrationality

position

the

sign

contained

with

from
the

irrationality.
definition

of

rationality.
The goal of deconstructionism,

like semiotics,

is to

"transform concepts, to displace them, to turn them against
their

presuppositions,

to

reinscribe

them

in

other

chains...and thereby to produce new configurations."49

In

the deconstruction process the privileging of one term in a
48 Ibid., p. 41.
49 Ibid., p. 24.
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hierarchy is revealed as being a rhetorical strategy more
than a true representation of some reality "in the world.”
As an early example of deconstuctionism, one can point to one
of Derrida's intellectual predecessors, Nietzsche, and his
deconstruction of causality.
cause comes

In Nietzsche's perspective,

in a sequence after effect,

traditional view otherwise.

It is only after we discern an

effect that we look for a cause.
illustrated that effect precedes
tropological

operation

scheme of causality.

is

rather than the

it

Temporally,
cause.

reversed

it can be

Only
into

through a

the

received

"If the effect is what causes the cause

to become a cause, then the effect, not the cause, should be
treated as the origin."50

The deconstruction of causality

and the context of discovery illustrates that effect can
serve as a foundation in the same manner that cause has.
deconstruction

reveals

that

the

elevation

of

effect is a matter of rhetorical positioning.

cause

The
over

This has the

affect of "causing" the privileged term to lose its position
in the conceptual hierarchy.

"If either cause or effect can

occupy the position of origin,

then origin

is no

longer

originary; it loses its metaphysical privilege.”51

50
Jonathan Culler, On Deconstruction: Theory and
Criticism after Structuralism. 1982, p. 88, emphasis added.
The example of Nietzsche's deconstruction of causality is
taken from Culler's discussion.
51 Ibid., p. 88.
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For

Derrida,

one

of

the

most

important

binary

distinctions in the history of Western thought is the one
between

speech

and

writing.

In

the

history

of

Western

thought, speech has had the privileged position over writing.
Writing was seen as something derivative, and consequently
profane.

The

Western

tradition

has

seen

the

written

signifier as being "always technical and representative."
Unlike

speech,

writing

"has

no

constitutive

meaning."52

Speech, on the other hand, provided the most reliable means
to consciousness and truth since it has represented immediate
presence and a direct pathway from thought.

Derrida writes,

From this point of view, the voice is consciousness
itself. When I speak, not onlyam I conscious of
being present for what I think, but I am conscious
also of keeping as close as possible to my thought,
or to the 'concept,' a signifier that does not fall
into the world, a signifier that I hear as soon as I
emit it...53
In Derrida's view, this positioning of speech over writings
is

indicative

presence.
speech,

of Western thought's

Since
Western

writing has been
thought

has

search

for

immediate

seen as derivative

seen

it

as

a

place

of
for

misunderstanding, ambiguity, and ultimately the absence of
"presence to consciousness."

Conversely, speech represents

a form of communication where "the words bear a meaning and
the

listener

can

in

principle

grasp

precisely

52 Derrida, Of Gramatolocrv. 1976, p. 11.
53 Jacques Derrida, Positions. 1982, p. 22.

what

the

I

speaker has in mind."5*

However,

Derrida argues that the

privileging of speech over writing is an opposition that can
be deconstructed.
Derrida's deconstruction of the speech/writing hierarchy
is developed primarily through a reading of Saussure.

In the

Course in General Linguistics. Saussure, in keeping with the
Western tradition,

warns other linguists against treating

writing as a primary foci of inquiry of linguistics.

For

Saussure, "writing obscures language; it is not a guise for
language but a disguise."55

Furthermore, for Saussure, "the

tyranny of writing" precedes "by imposing itself upon the
masses,

spelling

influences

and

modifies

language."56

However, the irony of the position is that Saussure is forced
to present his most important concept of language, that of
the differential linguistic system, through the example of
writing.

"Thus writing, which Saussure claimed ought not to

be the object of linguistic inquiry, turns out to be the best
illustration of the nature of linguistic units."57

Saussure

54 Culler, On Deconstruction. 1982, p. 101. Today, this
orientation towards speech is represented by the work of
Jurgen Habermas, one of the most important critics of
poststructuralism. For Derrida, Habermas' notion of an "idea
speech situation" is build on the privileging of speech over
writing and is thus consistent with the Western metaphysical
heritage. C f . Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests
(Boston, 1971).
55 Saussure, Course in General Linguistics. 1959, p. 30.
56 Ibid., p. 31.
57 Culler, On Deconstruction. 1982, p. 101.
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undermines his own privileging of speech over writing.
argument brings about a reversal
speech/writing

division.

Despite

His

of his position on the
Saussure's

intentions,

speech becomes a form of writing.
Saussure position on speech and writing, Derrida argues,
is part of Western metaphysical thinking, particularly its
division or binary distinction between mind/body.
Saussure points at the inversion of the natural
relationship between speech and writing.
It is not
a simple analogy: writing, the letter, the sensible
inscription, has always been considered by Western
tradition as the body and matter external to the
spirit, to breath, to speech, and to the logos.58
However,

as

Derrida

attempts

to

show,

if

this

division

between speech and writing, as well as the division between
mind and body, are pushed far enough they fall under their
own weight.

Saussure is not able to present a description of

speech without recourse to writing.

The deconstruction of

speech/writing reveals that the hierarchy is a construction
of the Western metaphysical heritage which places supreme
value on presence rather than a reflection of any "real" or
absolute distinction.

Speech

represents

a

loaocentrism.

where the privileging of one term over another serves as a
foundation for a system of knowledge (e.g., rationality over
irrationality).
Derrida's deconstuctionism, although primarily aimed at
philosophical works, has had it most important impact in the

58 Derrida, Of Gramatologv. 1976, pp. 34-35.
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area

of

literary

criticism.

deconstructionism has
literary work.
as

the

primary

meaning."

become

In
a

literary

tool

for

criticism,

reexamining

the

It has had the effect of removing the author
vehicle

for uncovering

the

text's

"true

Likewise, it has had the effect of elevating the

critic to the same level as that of the author of a text.
This stands in complete contrast with the New Criticism of
the 1950's, which saw the author's intentions as a primary
focus of critical inquiry.
Deconstructing

a

literary

similar to the deconstuction

text

is done

in a manner

of philosophical

work.

By

showing how an established hierarchy eventually undermines
the work's initial strategy, the work's rhetorical play is
brought to the forefront.

The outcome of this, in a broad

sense, is that the interpretation rendered by a critic is as
"valid" as the author's "original intentions."59

There is

no need for the critic to engage in a search for the authors
"original meaning."
since

Original meaning is not that central,

it is no closer to the

"truth"

about a text

than

important

implications

of

critical interpretation.
One

of

the

most

deconstructionism for literary criticism and other allied
disciplines is its ability to level any privileged access to

59 This conclusion is similar to the one in Gadamerian
hermenutics.
Cf., Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method.
trans. by G. Barden and J. Cumming (New York: Crossroad,
1986).
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truth.

In other words, no individual (lay or professional)

has the ability to determine the true nature of meaning.

If

the play of difference in the sign makes it impossible for
meaning

to

philosophy
texts.

be
and

immediately
all

forms

of

present

or

"nailed

communication

down,"

simply

become

These philosophical texts are as much "fictional" as

literary works.

This prohibits the elevation of philosophy,

or for that matter social science (or any discourse), over
literature

as

a

superior

form of

discourse.

The

final

outcome of this is that the world is revealed as being a
text,

which,

unlike

must

undergo

endless interpretation from different perspectives.

Each of

these

as

perspectives

in depth

are

hermeneutics,

potentially

as

"valid"

the

other.60
For Derrida,

"there is nothing outside of the text."

This is because "beyond the text there are only more texts
and

traces

present.61

of

texts,"

where

meaning

is

never

fully

In this regard, "external reference can only be

a matter of intertextuality.w62

In other words, no form of

discourse can escape the interweaving of language to find and
60 By "potentially as valid,"
I mean that the
interpretation of text (which includes everything) is still
limited by the social credentials of the interpreter.
We
will return to the epistemological idealism of postmodernism
in chapters 7 and 8.
61 Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman, and Thomas McCarthy
(eds.), After Philosophy: End or Transformation (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1987), p. 122.
62 Ibid., p. 122.
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capture a transcendental signified.

Thus, from the Derridean

perspective, all we have are discursive formations or texts
about the transcendental (reason, truth, etc.), not the fully
present idea or concept.

Consequently, objective knowledge

about the world is impossible.
What is the outcome of all this deconstructing?
Derrida offering an alternative to the Western tradition?

Is
Or

have we, as one interviewer of Derrida once remarked, been
led into a labyrinth.63

First of all, we can conclude that

for Derrida meaning is something that is constructed rather
than something that is given.

Furthermore, the differential

structure of language means that the signifier shapes the
meaning

of

the

signified.

With

this view of the

sign,

language becomes a tool for a reconsideration or rethinking
of Western thought.

The search of Occidental thought for

immediate presence is revealed as being an impossible dream.
Language and

its system of differences will always defer

(i.e., delay) the idea of presence.

The outcome of this is

not a new system of knowledge as such.
proposing a new system of knowledge,
treasures

absence

over presence

or

Derrida

which,
writing

is not

for example,
over

speech.

Rather, he is showing that all systems of knowledge, while
they must rely on certain distinctions, are susceptible to
being undermined by the very distinctions

63 Cf. Henri Ronse's
:ions. 1981, p. 5.

remarks
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in

that make

Jacques

the

Derrida,

system

possible

hierachy

of

knowledge).

(e.g.,

rationality

science
and

reliance

upon

irrationality

or

the

binary

belief

and

Derrida illustrates "the necessity of regarding

the distinction of signifier and signified as functional and
provisional rather than substantial..."64

In other words,

the hierarchy that makes a system of knowledge possible is
perhaps necessary for the validity of the system,
cannot be grounded by some transcendental signified.
realization,

yet it
This

it can be argued, calls for a very sensitive

reappraisal of current discourses and the Western theoretical
tradition in general.

Postmodernism and the Linguistic Turn
If we can say that the modern way of knowing was built
on the distinction between objects, discourse, and thought,
then it is clear that the developments in twentieth-century
linguistics have seriously questioned these distinctions.

In

twentieth century thought, there exists a marked shift from
seeing language as a tool to capture the essence of reality
to viewing language as a means bv which that reality is pre
structured .

This movement, which began with the attempt of

Saussure to establish linguistics as a science, culminates
with Derrida's use of language to rethink the entire Western
philosophical tradition.

Language and its ability to refer

has unquestionably become, in this century, one of the most
64 Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure. 1986, p. 144.
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important topics in the human sciences and one of the primary
issues in the rebellion against cultural modernity.
In summary, we can say that the linguistic turn helped
bring

about

three

related

postmodern thought:

ideas

that

are

central

to

(1) consciousness is predetermined by

structure (a point further developed in the next chapter),
(2) thought and discourse are determined by language, and (3)
objects have no essences apart from those given by language.
In regard to the first idea, the insights of Saussure, Whorf,
Levi-Strauss,

while

certainly

diverse,

all

share

conviction that language structures consciousness.
Descartes'

claim

that

consciousness

is

the

the

Despite

center

of

knowledge, developments in linguistics point to the fact that
consciousness

is

already

Consequently,

the subject

knowledge

an

by

by

language,

is displaced

immutable

proceeds from the first.
there

can

predetermined

structure.

fey

as the
The

languagecenter

second

of

point

If consciousness is predetermined
be

no

thought

which

takes

place

without language, or some form of symbolic communication.
Thought,

unlike

its Enlightenment descriptions,

is not a

separate and unique realm.

It is a product of language and

linguistic differentiation.

Thirdly, this means that objects

do not have their own independent essences.
essence

attributed

to

objects

are

merely

Any supposed
products

of

a

particular language that arranges and describes the world in
a certain way.

When this view is taken to its extreme, as
127

with

Derrida,

there

literally can be nothing

outside

language or in Derrida's terminology, "the text."

of

The nature

of objects, societies, and the cosmos are all given by the
language.

They do not exist without the mediating effects of

language.
At this juncture it is important to discuss in more
detail what makes Derrida postmodern.

Why does his work mark

a break with the modern and a full-fledged movement into the
postmodern?

From the earlier discussion,

we can see the

influences of Saussure and Levi-Strauss upon Derrida.

What

separates Derrida from his predecessors is the degree of his
radical stance toward language.
Saussure

were

directed

at

The linguistic insights of

developing

the

sciences

of

linguistics and semiology (semiotics, i.e., the sciences of
signs).

For Saussure,

provides

the

exploration
components

as well as Levi-Strauss,

scientific
and

of

base

understanding

speech

or

or
of

culture.

basic
the

elements

language
for

the

"superstructural"

Derrida's

stance

on

langauge makes this search for the basic elements of language
or culture a highly problematic enterprise.

Derrida's view

that language defers meaning is such a radical approach that
it makes the search for basic elements or foundations an
impossibility.

The idea of presence, on which most systems

of knowledge rely, is always deferred by the characteristics
of language.

Derrida's poststructuralism also closes the

possibility of finding a point outside of language from which
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to make objective or scientific claims and construct general
laws

of

society

or culture.

Unlike

the

structuralists,

Derrida's position on language makes it impossible to have
objective

views

about

the

deconstructionist point,

world.

To

all we have are

summarize
"texts"

the

and all

knowledge producers are engaged in literary criticism.

In

Nietzsche's words, "We are prisoners of our grammar."65
In the next chapter,

we will explore another one of

postmodernism central tenants— that of the decentering of the
subject.

As we shall see, this issue is closely related to

the issue of language and referntiality.

However, we will

discuss it as a seperate and unique part of the postmodern
framework.

65

Frederick

Nietzsche,

Interventions* 1988 , p. 4 3 .
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quoted

in

Keith

Pheby,

CHAPTER V
THE DECENTERING OF THE SUBJECT IN POSTMODERN THOUGHT
In the last chapter, we discussed the postmodern
orientation towards language and referentiality.

One of

the implications of the postmodern treatment of language is
that the all-knowing or expressive subject of modernity
comes to be view as embedded within a system of
signification that structures his or her ability to know
and feel.

In other words, the subject becomes "decentered"

as the source of knowing and feeling.

In this chapter, we

will further explore the issue of the decentering of the
subject.

By "decentering" it is meant that the subject,

which served as the center piece of much of modern thought,
has been undermined or displaced as a firm foundation for
epistemology and creativity.
Specifically in the following discussion, we will
consider how the works of Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Michel
Foucault have contributed to the postmodern project of
decentering the subject.

In addition to a consideration of

these writers, we will explore how the decentering of the
subject has manifested itself in other areas of culture.
In this regard, this chapter contains an examination of
recent developments in the cultural production of what is
labeled "pop art" and "neo-pop art."

We will explore how

the phenomenon of pop art may be seen as part of
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decentering process.

First, however, we will examine the

meaning of the modern subject.

The Meaning of the Modern Subject
The grounding of knowledge and creativity in the
conditions of subjectivity has been manifested in at least
three related forms.

First, in philosophical discourse

there is a Cartesian derived notion of the subject as both
an instrument of, and condition for, the creation and
accumulation of knowledge.

Within Cartesian thinking,

rational consciousness is "the guarantor of certainty and
knowledge."1

The second form of the modern subject, is

the Rousseauian idea of the romantic or expressive self.
As discussed in Chapter 2, this Rousseauian self is thought
to be "deeper" and "truer" than the fully coherent,
rational ego of Cartesianism.

The final form of the modern

subject is manifested in the universal subject of the human
sciences.

This version of the subject can perhaps be

viewed as a combination of Cartesian and Rousseauian
formulations.

It is evident in various biological,

psychological, and sociological theories which seek to
locate a universalistic and ahistorical human nature or
essence.

The purpose of this search for a human nature is

to construct a general theory of humankind.

This search

1 Keith C. Pheby, Interventions: Displacing the
Metaphysical Subject (Washington, D.C.: Maisonneuve Press,
1988), p. 17.
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for a foundational human nature has appeared in such
diverse forms as; utilitarianism, Marx's labor theory of
human nature, the biological body, behaviorism, ego
psychology, and developmental psychology, to name but a
few.
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the modern
subject, in either its Cartesian or Rousseauian form, began
to come under considerable scrutiny, reappraisal, and in
some cases, attack.2

In part, this reassessment was

directed at what some writers believed were the pretensions
and theoretical failings of the autonomous modern subject.
Since the writings of Descartes in the seventeenth century,
philosophy had held that the conditions of subjectivity
were responsible for the acquisition of knowledge.

Other

forms of reassessment of the modern conceptualization of
the subject were the result of the unintended outcomes of
various lines of theoretical investigations found in such
disciplines as linguistics and psychoanalysis.
For Nietzsche, from whom many of the early critiques
of the subject originate, "the 'subject' is not something
given, it is something added and invented and projected
behind what there is."3

For Nietzsche, as well as

2 Some critiques predate this. Hume and G.
Lichtenberg had rendered crtiques of the self in the
e ighteenth-century.
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. by W.
Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books,
1968), p. 267.
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contemporary postmodern theorists, the Cartesian subject is
a rhetorical construct— a product of a particular cultural
and linguistic orientation.

In a fragment from The Will to

Power. Nietzsche elaborates his attach on the modern,
Cartesian subject;
'There is thinking; therefore there is something that
thinks': this is the upshot of all Descartes'
argumentation.
But that means positing as 'true a
priori' our belief in the concept of substance— that
when there is thought there has to be something 'that
thinks' is simply a formulation of our grammatical
custom that adds a doer to every deed.4
For Nietzsche, the concept of the subject in philosophical
discourse is a subjectification or anthropomorphism created
by a creature which "can only prosper through a relative
rightness..."5

In other words, the autonomous subject of

modernity is a supreme fiction.

However, this fictionally

constructed subject has nevertheless, managed to serve as
the foundation for much of modern thought.
As we shall see in the forthcoming discussion, the
modern desire to ground knowledge of the world in either a
coherent, deep, or natural subject is attacked in
postmodern thought as being inaccurate, fictional, or at
least highly problematic.

4 Ibid., p. 268.
5 Ibid., p. 266.
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Freud. Lacan, and the Unconscious
It is perhaps an understatement to say that the
totality of Freud's work constitutes one of the most
influential doctrines of thought in the twentieth century.
The view of the subject provided by Freud calls for a
reappraisal of many modern and Enlightenment notions of the
subject and the conditions of subjectivity.

Paramount

among these Freudian notions is the concept of the
unconscious.

For Freud, the unconscious was a vast,

unchartered "region" which contained the raw, essential
energy of humankind.

While consciousness may be the

outcome of a culturally-specific reality-order, the
unconscious contains the essential material of human nature
itself.

In other words, the unconscious contains the

foundational characteristics of all humankind.

Freud's aim

was to bring this foundational material into the realm of
scientific investigation and classification, thereby
revealing the hidden elements which unite all individuals
in all places and times.
In a much discussed example from the annals of
psychoanalysis, Freud relates the story of "Rat Man."

This

example can serve as an avenue into the Freudian
understanding of the unconscious and its relationship with
the conscious subject.

Freud describes the case of Rat Man

as follows:
One day when he was away on his summer holidays the
idea suddenly occurred to him that he was too fat
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and that he must make himself slimmer. So he began
he began getting up from the table before pudding came
round and tearing along the road without a hat in the
blazing heat of an August sun. Then he would dash up a
mountain at the double, till, dripping with
perspiration, he was forced to come to a stop...Our
patient could think of no explanation of this
senseless, obsessional behavior until it suddenly
occurred to him that at that time his lady had also
been stopping at the same resort; but she had been in
the company of an English cousin, who was very
attentive to her and of whom the patient had been very
jealous. This cousin's name was Richard, and, according
to the usual practice in England, he was known as Dick.
Our patient, then, had wanted to kill this Dick.6
In this case the unconscious desire to kill Richard is
manifested in the surrogate form of losing weight.

The

reality principle makes it impossible for the conscious
contemplation of Richard's murder to become an actual
possibility.

Consequently, this desire is relegated to the

unconscious where it "is associatively related in some way
to the its original presentation" (i.e., the relationship
between the English signifier "Dick" and the German
signified "losing fat").7
In this example, and at various other points throughout
his work, Freud reveals two important ideas about the
functioning of the human mind.

First, is the obvious

illustration of the workings of the unconscious.

The

unconscious is understood to be a central, yet vastly
6 Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. X, ed. by J.
Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1953), pp. 188-89.
7 David Archard, Consciousness and the Unconscious (La
Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1984), p.
26.
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different, aspect or realm of the human psyche.

For Freud,

this realm was capable of being "mapped" with the use of
proper psychoanalytical methods.

In Freud's work, the

unconscious, is shown to be the harbinger of symbols,
images, and impulses which have a direct effect upon
conscious behavior.

What this reveals is that the

unconscious is the most essential part of the individual
which "speaks most truthfully...in slips of the tongue and
other errors..."8

The unconscious speaks the truth, not

the rational consciousness.9

For Freud, the subject

(i.e., the human being as a focus of understanding) is
split into two irreconcilable parts, the rational conscious
and the non-rational unconscious.

Freud's development of

the dual nature of the subject has important ramifications
for Cartesian inspired thought.

If the fully coherent,

rational subject of Descartes, is shown to have another
action initiating realm, of equal importance, the
conditions of subjectivity (i.e., consciousness) cannot be
solely responsible for the conditions for the acquisition
of knowledge.

In other words, the rational subject is not

a complete master of his/her patterns of thought and
action.

8 Ellie Ragland-Sul1ivan, Jacques Lacan and the
Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Urbana, Illinois: University
of Illinois Press, 1986), p. 3.
9 There are some general similarities between this
treatment and Rousseau's.
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The second important point revealed in Freud's
discussion of the case of Rat Man (and the most important
for postmodern thought), points to the importance of signs
and symbols in the manifestation of the unconscious.

While

all relations in the unconscious are not as straight
forward as the one between "Dick" and Richard, the example
of Rat Man does reveal how language is an important feature
of the unconscious and the analysand's translation and
interpretation of it.
This relationship between language and the unconscious
was not systematically developed by Freud.

Generally,

Freud employed nineteenth century biological metaphors in
describing the unconscious and was unfamiliar with the
formulations being developed in linguistics.

With the work

of the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, we encounter one
of the first systematic attempts to fuse the insights of
Freudian psychology with Saussurian linguistics.

The

implications of this union of Freud and Saussure provided
psychoanalysis with a dramatically different and
controversial vision of the human subject.

First of all,

this union strengthened the Freudian inspired critique of
the coherent, fixed, and foundational subject which had
served as the basis for post-Cartesian Philosophy and much
of modern psychology.

Secondly, it undermined the Freudian

view of the unconscious as a natural, universal, and
essential human entity (i.e., the unconscious as a
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harbinger of truth).
Ironically, Lacan proclaimed his project as a "return
to Freud."

Lacan wanted to free Freud's ideas from "the

litter of banalising glosses and explanations that later
writers have heaped upon them.”10

Lacan's target in his

return to Freud was the international psychoanalytic
movement and American ego psychology.

For Lacan, these

movements were responsible for an erroneous, overly egooriented, and consequently one-dimensional treatment of
Freud's work.

Lacan believed that these movements

represented an "effort to purge Freud's writings of
elements that are accused of having no empirical basis"
(i.e., the unconscious).11

As a fundamentalist Freudian

(i.e., returning to Freud's original interpretation of the
unconscious), Lacan wanted to revive the radical insights
of Freud in relation to the unconscious and fuse them with
some of the recent terminology and methodology of
linguistics.
Lacan's contribution to psychoanalysis and philisophy
revolved around three related propositions.

First, the

idea that the unconscious is structured like a language.
Secondly, the notion that the unconscious is the discourse
of the Other.

And finally, the idea that language is the

10 Malcolm Bowie, Freud. Proust and Lacan (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 101.
11 Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philisophv
of the Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 5.
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condition (i.e., the cause) of the unconscious.12 Of
these contributions, it is the latter one which is the most
significant for our current discussion.

In order to

explore the importance of this last proposition we will
begin with Lacan's discussion of the "mirror stage" of
childhood.
In July of 1936, Lacan presented his first views on
the mirror stage at the Fourteenth International PsychoAnalytical Congress in Marienbad, Czechoslovakia.13
For Lacan, the first six months of human life is a pre
linguist ic or "Imaginary period" where images are
undifferentiated and "the infant experiences its body as
fragmented parts and images."14

For Lacan, in the "pre

mirror phase the child has a "lack of coordination of his
own motility...intra-organic and relational
discordance."15

The child does not have the linguistic

capacity to perceive himself or herself as an autonomous
individual.

This is due to the fact that it is only

12 Cf. David Archard, Consciousness and the
Unconscious. 1984, p. 60.
13 Lacan failed to submit a written text to the
proceedings. The written portion discussed here is from
John Muller and William Richardson's, Lacan and Language: A
Reader's Guide to Ecrlts (New York: International
Universities Press, 1982), pp. 26-41.
14 Ragland-Sullivan, Lacan and the Philosophy of
Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 18.
15 Jacques Lacan, Ecrits; A Selection, trans. by Alan
Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), pp. 18-19.
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through language that ve are provided

with the

differentiations between self and other and self and world.
Beginning somewhere in the six to eighteenth month
maturation period, the child is able or has the opportunity
to view itself in a mirror or through a mirror-like
reflection from a significant other.
perceives is one of a connected whole.

The image the child
The experiential

body which is fragmented and uncoordinated is counter
transposed to a body that is whole and non-fragmented.

The

gap between the experiential body and the perceived body
creates a sense of insufficiency and anticipation.

The

child develops a sense of desire for the unity reflected in
the mirror or through the significant other.

Through the

other reflected in the mirror, the child desires the state
when a fully coherent body will be possessed.

The

importance of this for Lacan is that in the mirror phase
the child encounters and develops a desire for the "other"
reflected in the mirror.

The "child assumes itself to be

the »other' it sees reflected, and models itself upon its
image."16
By the time the mirror-stage has come to a close,
somewhere around eighteen months, the child has passed from
treating images as real to representing them in verbal
signifiers.

The mirror phenomenon is the mechanism which

16 Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism (La Salle,
Illinois: Open Court Press, 1986), p. 125, emphasis added.
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gives rise to language and the subsequent acquisition of
the symbolic order.

Describing this transition, Ellie

Ragland-Sullivan has written,
Symbolic elements— the ability to name things—
replace Imaginary ones in an identificatory reshaping
of the subject. The imagistic and fantasmatic
subject of identifications continues, nonetheless, to
coexist with the subject of language and cultural codes
throughout life.17
Through the mirror stage and resulting acquisition of
language, the child has become a social and cultural
being.18
One of the important aspects of the mirror stage is
that it points to the beginnings of identity.

The unity of

the body "has been found outside and, accordingly, the
destiny of humans is to (re-) experience themselves only in
relationship to others."19

In other words, the "other" is

the model upon which the subject is constructed.

Another

important point to be found in Lacan's formulation of the
17 Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy
of Psychoanalysis. 1986, p. 29.
18 Although theoretically distinct, this Lacanian
insight parrells those made in symbolic interactionist
social theory, specifically Cooley's notion of the
"looking-glass self" and G.H. Mead's discussion of the
development of the "self." Cf., Charles Horton Cooley,
Human Nature and Social Order (New York: Scribner's, 1902)
and George Herbert Mead, Mind. Self and Society (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. 1934).

19 Ibid., p. 27, emphasis added. As a point of
contrast, it is noteworthy to add that the Kanji symbol in
Japanese for the human being is "among people," that is, in
Japanese society the person is a relational entity.
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mirror phase is that it marks the child's entrance into the
symbolic and linguistic order.

With this entrance, the

child replaces the imagistic with signification.

The

outcome of the acquisition of the symbolic order is that
the child's imagistic world is relegated to a secondary
realm.

For Lacan, this secondary realm is the unconscious.

The unconscious is that which is sacrificed or "murdered"
t>Y signification.

Essentially, the unconscious is the scar

left bv language and the symbolic order.
The importance of Lacan's reformulation of Freud is
that it reveals that the unconscious is not a biological or
natural entity that is born into the subject, but is a
condition that is acquired through the learning of
language.

The unconscious, a realm of the psyche which is

partly responsible for behavior, is revealed to have its
origins in the linguistic and symbolic order.
is society not biology.

Its source

The implication of this is that

there are not developmental or biological first principles:
Development and "maturation" are always conditioned by the
symbolic order.

There are no essential human

characteristics outside of language and culture, including
that mysterious realm known as the unconscious.
In Freud and Lacan we encounter two ideas which call
for a reformulation of the modern subject.

First, Freud

revealed that the unconscious is a unique, separate, and
action causing realm.

This means that the fully coherent,
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rational ego of Cartesianism coexists with a non-rational
entity.

In other words, the subject has a dual nature.

This duality makes the acquisition of complete rationality
unobtainable.

However, Freud felt that the unconscious was

a biological entity, and as such could be mapped with
precision.

With Lacan, we encounter the idea that the

unconscious is not an outcome of biological or genetic
makeup.

It is not an essential element that exists before

culture, language, and society.

Society and its linguistic

order is responsible for the unconscious.

For Lacan, the

unconscious is what is left over after the immersion into
signification.

In Lacan's reformulation of Freud, there is

no human essence, which awaits examination and
classification.

The "human essence" exists only as a

result of society.

The Freudian inspired search for the

universal characteristic or first principle of human nature
is shown to be in vain.
In the next section, we will explore another important
attack on the modern all-knowing subject— the work of
Michel Foucault.

Foucault and the Genealogy of the Subject
In an attempt to distance himself from the emphasis of
traditional historiography on continuity and certainty,
Foucault, in the Introduction to The Archeology of
Knowledge. declares, "Do not ask who I am and do not ask me
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to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our
police to see that our papers are in order."20

Several

years later in an interview conducted in the Fall of 1982
at the University of Vermont, when asked to define his
academic position and intellectual function at the College
de France, Foucault responded, -I don't feel it is
necessary to know exactly what I am."21

These seemingly

innocuous remarks reveal more about Foucault and his
position on the subject than would be first recognized.
Foucault's entire intellectual goal was, in his words, "to
create a history of the different modes by which, in our
culture, human beings are made subjects."22

For Foucault,

like Nietzsche before him, the subject is not something
given.

The subject is a social construction.

Specifically, for Foucault, the subject is a historicallycontingent product of power, discourse, and institutional
practices.

The subject is defined by, and enmeshed within,

a complex network of power and discursive practices.

This

network is unstable and can never be fully coherent or
20 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge,
trans by A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books,
1972), p. 17.
21 Michel Foucault in Technologies of the Self, ed.
by L. Martin, H. Gutman, and P. Hutton (Amherst, MA: The
University of Massachusetts Press, 1988), p.9, emphasis
added.
22 Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject and
Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel
Foucualt: Bevond Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 2nd ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 208.
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visible to the individual subject.

Consequently, for

Foucault to engage in discussions where he provided a
definitive declaration of his own subjectivity would have
been a violation of his entire theoretical orientation
towards the subject and its historical contingency.
Foucault divided his work into three "modes of
inquiry," each of which took the historical construction of
the subject as its central theme of investigation.

These

modes of inquiry do not represent a stage like evolution in
Foucault's thinking, but point to certain themes which
recur throughout the corpus of his work.

Despite the

changing nature of Foucault's work during his life course,
each of the modes of inquiry sought to explore the "modes
of objectification which transform human beings into
subjects."23 The first theme in Foucault's work examined
the "modes of inquiry which try to give themselves the
status of sciences."24

Specifically, Foucault was

concerned here with the ways in which the human sciences,
which include biology, psychology, and the social sciences,
create the subject as an object of classification and
analysis, and hence, of social control.

The second theme

in Foucault's work explored "the objectivizing of the
subject in...'dividing practices'.n2S
23 Ibid., p. 208.
24 Ibid., p. 208.
25 Ibid., p. 208.
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Here, the focus is

on the ways the subject is divided "inside himself or
divided from others."26

These dividing practices are part

of institutional classification strategies in which the
subject is divided between mad and sane, criminal and non
criminal, normal and pathological, etc..27

Finally,

Foucault, particularly in his late work, focused on "the
way human beings turns him- or herself into a subject.”28
The focus in this mode of inquiry is on the discursive
practices in which human beings come to understand and
enunciate their subjectivity.

For Foucault, this

discursive/power creation of a speaking subject (i.e., as a
user of discourse) is best exemplified by various
techniques associated with the religious or professional
confessional.

The first two processes are concerned with

the different matrixes of power that produce a subject
capable of being classified and manipulated.

The third

process is concerned with the historical creation of a
speaking subject which is capable of creating, enunciating,
and explaining his/her own "deep" subjectivity.
It is evident from Foucault's description of his work
that his main object of examination is discourse.

However,

it is not discourse alone, but one which is enmeshed within
26 Ibid., p. 208.
27 In some ways this parrells Derrida's deconstruction
of philosophical dicotomies in language, see Chapter 4 in
this dissertation.
28 Foucault, "Afterword," 1983, p. 208.
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complex power configurations or regimes.

Like Levi-

Strauss, who sought to explore "not how men think in myths,
but how myths operate in men's minds," Foucault, despite
important methodological differences from Levi-Strauss,
sought to examine not how humans use discourse and power,
but how discourse and power operate on humans.29

Foucault

does not consider whether or not these discourse are true
reflections of reality, rather he is concerned with how
various discourses are used within specific power
arrangements to create, classify, and transform humans into
subjects.

In the following discussion we will focus

briefly on each of the three themes in Foucault's
examination of the subject and how they contribute to
Foucault's overall treatment of the subject.
In The Order of Things. Foucault tackles two related
issues:

the historical transformation of classification

schemas, schemata, and systems (epistemes) and the
emergence of the human sciences.30

Specifically, Foucault

is concerned with how these related issues produce a
subject which can be the object of scientific
classification and examination.

In order to accomplish

such an examination, Foucault employs one of his most
29 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and the Cooked, trans.
by John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), p. 12.
30 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An
Archaeology of the Human Sciences, trans. by (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1970).
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important early concepts, the episteme.

Foucault defines

the episteme as,
...the total set of relations that unite, at a
given period, the discursive practices that give
rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and
possible formalized systems... its aim is not to
reconstitute the system of postulates that governs
all the branches of knowledge of a given period, but
to cover an indefinite field of relations...the
episteme makes it possible to grasp the set of
constraints and limitations, which, at a given
moment are imposed on discourse... 1
Epistemes mav be thought of as underlying codes of cultural
organization.

These codes make certain types of knowledge

and cultural production possible.
Foucault argues that in the transformation from the
Renaissance, through the Classical Age, to Modernity we
have seen profound shifts in epistemes.

The Classical

episteme (17th and 18th century) centered itself on
developing an "exhaustive ordering of the world."32

This

ordering worked towards "the discovery of simple elements
and their progressive combination..."

At the "center they

form a table on which knowledge is displayed in a system
contemporary with itself."33

The Classical age aimed at

the "project of constructing a universal method of analysis
which would yield perfect certainty by perfectly ordering
representations and signs to mirror the ordering of the
31 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge. 1972, pp.
191-92.
32 Foucault, The Order of Things. 1970, p. 74.
33 Ibid., p. 74.
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world... h34
However, Foucault's main concern is not with the
Classical episteme, but with the rise of the modern
episteme.

According to Foucault, somewhere at the end of

the eighteenth century an important epistemic shift took
place.

This epistemic shift began to order and classify

the world differently from the classical representational
episteme.

The modern episteme removed representation from

the center of its system and replaced it with the human
being (man).

It is at this point that "man becomes the

subject and the object of his own understanding."35
Foucault writes,
When natural history becomes biology, when the
analysis of wealth becomes economics, when, above
all, reflection upon language becomes philology, and
Classical discourse...is eclipsed, then, in the
profound upheaval of such an archaeological mutation,
mem appears in his ambiguous position as an
object of knowledge and as a subject that knows:
enslaved sovereign, and object of knowledge...36
For Foucault, this "archeological mutation" marks the
beginning of modernity.

Unlike the Classical episteme.

which ordered humans within a larger classification system.
the modern episteme depicted human beings as being the
center of knowledge.

Humans become the core of knowledge.

The critical aspect of this epistemic upheaval was that
34 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 1982, p. 19.
35 Ibid., p. 28.
36 Foucault, Order of Things. 1970, p. 312.
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humans came to be viewed as being both a determined
empirical product and a knowing transcendental subject (cf.
the discussion of Condorcet in Chapter 2 and an earlier
discussion in this chapter).

Foucault refers to this dual

ordering as the empirico-transcendental doublet:
Man, in the analytic of finitude, is a strange
empirico-transcendental doublet, since he is
a being such that knowledge will be attained in
him of what renders all knowledge possible...
...The threshold of our modernity is situated not
by the attempt to apply objective methods to the
study of man, but rather by the constitution of an
empirico-transcendental doublet which was called
man.37
The empirico-transcendental doublet is the modern subject
as we understand it today.

He/she is seen as being an

empirical outcome of structure but nevertheless capable of
grasping his/her own true essence or nature within this
structure.
According to Foucault, prior to the eighteenth-century
"man did not exist."38

The human sciences could not have

developed as they did without the construction of man-asdoublet.

The framework provide by the modern episteme

allowed the human sciences to emerge.

Disciplines (and

discourses) such as political economy, sociology,
anthropology, psychoanalysis, criminology, and biology all
emerged and operated within the framework provided by the
modern order of things.

Each discipline operating on the

37 Ibid., pp. 318-19.
38 Ibid., p. 344.
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dual view of the subject sought to create and establish a
particular foundational view of humans.

Each discipline

sought to capture, describe, and explain what they felt was
the true nature of being human.

In doing so they each

inscribed a certain definition of humans and created
different variations on the modern empirical subject.
With the development of the modern episteme, the human
sciences were given the idea of an empirical subject, which
was capable of being understood by the transcendental
subject.

With the modern subject in place, the human

sciences could begin the process of defining and labeling
this newly acquired idea of man as object and subject.
Paradoxicially, they located the subject within the
empirical enviornment, yet preserve subjectivity as a
priviledge means for access to this knowledge of the
empirical.
Foucault saves some of his more critical remarks on
the human sciences for his work, Discipline and
Punishment.39

For Foucault, coercion and control go hand-

in-hand with the rise and development of the objectifing
human sciences.

The human sciences provided the "serious

discourse" which was used to coerce and transform the human
being by new modalities of power.

For Foucault, the birth

of the human sciences are to be found in the "ignoble
39 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punishment: The
Birth of the Prison, trans, by Alan Sheridan (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1977).
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archives, where the modern play of coercion over bodies,
gestures and behavior has its beginnings."40 The
institutions of power (hospitals, prisons, bureaucracies,
etc.) "needed new, more refined and operationalized
discourse and practices," which the human sciences were
capable of providing.41

Foucault writes,

I am not saying that the human sciences emerged
from the prison. But, if they have been able to
be formed and to produce so many profound changes
in the episteme, it is because they have been
conveyed by a specific and new modality of power:
a certain policy of the body, a certain way of
rendering the group of men docile and useful. This
policy required the involvement of definite
relations of knowledge in relations of power...42
Foucault is pointing out that the human sciences cannot
separate their generation of knowledge from the power
configurations of modern society.

They are part of modern

technologies of discipline and control.

Like Nietzsche,

Foucault would caution that "knowledge works as a tool of
power" therefore, "it increases with every increase of
power."43

The human sciences' schemes of classification

are completely involved in the various processes of
coercion and control.

They operate within the space

provided by a certain thinking and policies about the body

40 Ibid., p. 191.
41 Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Bevond
Structuralism and Hermeneutics. 1983, p. 160.
42 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 305.
43 Nietzsche, The Will to Power. 1968, p. 266.
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and the mind.
Another aspect of Foucault's work on the subject, is
presented in his works, Madness and Civilization and
Discipline and Punishment.4*

A substantial part of these

works explore the "dividing practices" that have been
employed in the social categorization and subsequent
treatment of the subject.

The dividing practices used by

psychiatrists, social reformers, and policy and law makers,
like the development of the human sciences, have extended
and further refined the modern objectivization of the
subj ect.
Foucault's work Discipline and Punishment is
subtitled, "the birth of the prison."
is not Foucault's major concern.

However, the prison

Foucault seeks to write,

a correlative history of the modern soul
a new power to judge; a genealogy of the
scientifico-legal complex from which the
punish derives its bases, justifications
from which it extends its effects and by
masks its exorbitant singularity.45

and of
present
power to
and rules,
which it

Foucault is concerned with the ways power and discourse
form configurations which produce what he calls "docile
bodies."

These are bodies which are capable of being

molded by power (i.e., psychiatrists, social reformers,
44 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A
History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, trans. by R.
Howard (New York: Vintage Books, 1973). Discipline and
Punishment: The Birth of the Prison. 1977. Of these two
works, we will discuss the latter as representative of
Foucault's work of dividing practices.
45 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 23.
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police, etc.)*

Here, Foucault is introducing or

reintroducing a Nietzschian conception of the body.
Nietzschian body is not a biological entity.

The

The

Nietzschian body is a historical and social construction
"embedded within a political field" and "subject to power
relations which restrain it."46

It is a body capable of

being altered, transformed, and reformed by power
configurations.

In Foucault's words, power relations

"invest it (the body), mark it, train it, torture it, force
it to carry out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit
signs."47

Foucault refers to this relationship between

power and the body as "bio-power."

One of Foucault's

primary missions is to show how the social control of the
body or bio-power is made possible in modernity or within
the modern episteme.
A crucial point must be made here.

It is important to

note that Foucault's examination of power and the body is a
marked departure from traditional accounts (i.e., Marxist
and Neo-Marxist).
of sovereign power.

Those accounts rest on an understanding
Consequently, they generally see power

as emanating from top levels of the stratification system,
i.e., the state and bourgeoisie, and being used as a tool
to control the masses.

For Foucault, however, power is

46 Barry Smart, Foucault. Marxism and Critique
(London: Unwin, 1983), p. 86.
47 Foucault, Discipline and Punishment. 1977, p. 25.
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omnipresent.

It is a factor in every intellectual and

policy consideration.

Even the allegedly objective

classification and treatment of the criminal conducted by
experts and the legal system are shown to be in compliance
with certain technologies of control (and also technologies
of the self).
In addition to his concern for the creation of docile
bodies, Foucault is concerned with the array of discourses
and practices which make the modern control of the body
possible.

These discourses and practices serve as the

underpinning for classification and exclusion of the
"criminal" from the non-criminal.

Foucault finds these

origins in the modern forms of disciplinary technology
(e.g., prisons, humanist reform, counseling, etc.).
Disciplinary technologies operate directly on the body.
The body is open to power configurations.

These

configurations seek to forge a body "that may be subjected,
used, transformed and improved....discipline makes
individuals; it is the specific technique of a power that
regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of
its exercise."48

It is this disciplinary power which

separates or organizes the criminal from the non-criminal
and mandates different techniques to transform the criminal
into the non-criminal.

48 Ibid., p. 136.
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Foucault argues in his late work, History of Sexuality,
that our current understanding of sex and sexuality are
modern inventions/9

According to Foucault, "We have had

sexuality since the eighteenth century and sex since the
nineteenth."50

Like, Foucault's conception of the

historical body, this is a historically constituted
sexuality.

This is a modern sexuality which is capable of

identification, classification, and control.

In this

instance, however, it is not simply the imposition of
disciplinary technologies from "outside" but the willing,
speaking subject who takes part, along with the expert, in
the classification and control processes.
In this work on sex and sexuality, Foucault moves his
focus away from what could be called the "external social
forces" which create the subject to a different but related
avenue of inquiry.

This avenue explores the ways in which

the individual sees his or herself as possessing
subjectivity.

In such related social practices as

psychoanalysis and the confessional, it is the subject who
must reach "deep within" and express some hidden deep truth
about his or her own subjectivity— beyond the surface to
the real.

In the various confessional practices the

49 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality. Volume
I, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1980).
50 Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings
1972-77. ed. by C. Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980),
p. 210-11.
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individual learns to see himself or herself as a subject
and cooperate in the enunciation of their subjectivity.
However, there are also important dynamics of power at
work in this creation of a speaking subject.

Certain

institutions have induced the subject to create and speak
its subjectivity.

It is within such an environment of

power that "Western man becomes a confessing animal."51
Foucault writes:
The confession has spread its effects far and wide.
It plays a part in justice, medicine, education,
family relationships, and love relations...One
confesses in public and in private, to one's parents,
one's educators, one's doctor, to those one loves;
one admits to oneself, in pleasure and in pain,
things it would Le impossible to tell to anyone
else, the things people write books about. One
confesses— or is forced to confess. When it is not
spontaneous or dictated by some internal imperative,
the confession is wrung from a person by violence
or threat.52
For Foucault, "the confession gives certain needs to the
soul and renders it a specific nature."53

Church

practitioners and various sex professionals have given the
individual his or her essence, which must be apprehended by
both the investigator and the individual.
For Foucault, the reasons for the insistence on
individual confession is a recognition by the experts that

51 Foucault, History of Sexuality. 1980, p. 59.
52 Ibid., p. 59.
53 Paul Wapner, "What's Left: Marx, Foucualt, and
Contemporary Problems of Social Change." Praxis
International, 9, 1989, p. 97.
157

the self is a protector of some "deep truth."

Particularly

for Foucault, sex in the modern era has been seen as one of
the key sites of this deep truth.

The subject, through the

aid of an expert, could gain access to this site of truth
and render it up for explication and examination.
modernity sex became a matter of truth.

In

Foucault writes,

The essential point is that sex was not only a
matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and taboo,
but also of truth and falsehood, that the truth of
sex became something fundamental, useful, or dangerous,
precious or formidable: in short, that sex was
constituted as the problem of truth.54
The nineteenth century gave us the "interplay of truth and
sex."55

Beginning in this period the subject was seen as

the harbinger of a great secret which was the foundation of
his or her being.

This great secret was capable of

rendering knowledge about the deep self and humanity if it
was "spoken in time to the proper party and by the person
who was both the hearer of it and the one responsible for
it..."56

The individual became at once the object of

expert discourse and the subject of his/her self-created
subjectivity.

The ironic aspect of this treatment of

sexuality is in "having us believe that our liberation is
in the balance."57

Once the individual, through the help

54 Foucault, The History of Sexuality. 1980, p. 56.
55 Ibid., p. 57.
56 Ibid., p. 67.
57 Ibid., p. 159.
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of an expert interpreter, brought forth the hidden truth,
the door was open to enlightenment, self-understanding, and
in the end, self-improvement (and an endless array of T.V.
talkshows).

However, for Foucault what this reveals is

more reliance upon mechanisms of social control or
expertization.
Sex was not something one simply judged; it was a
thing one administered.
It was in the nature of a
public potential; it called for management procedures;
it had to be taken charge of by analytic discourses.
In the eighteenth century, sex became a police
matter...an ordered maximization of collective and
individual forces...58
When "sex became a police matter," new forms of discursive
and practical controls were put in place to manage sex.
Government bureaucracies arose to deal with issues of
reproduction.

Experts on sexuality emerged to translate

the deep truths and to develop appropriate social policy
which could regulate and channel it.

Meanwhile, the

individual was given the narrative tools for the
classification and control of his or her body.

The

individual had learned to see himself or herself as a
subject capable of being the harbinger of deep truths.

The

subject became an accomplice in his or her own creation,
classification, and management.
What is the outcome of Foucault's examination of the
modern subject?

Perhaps it is best summarized by

Foucault's observations that "man is an invention of recent
58 Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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date.

And one perhaps nearing its end."59

Foucault even

went as far to "wager that nan would be erased, like a face
drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."60

Despite the

apocalyptic anti-humanist tone of these statements,
Foucault is not forecasting the end of the human race.
Rather, he is pointing to the subject as an unstable and
contingent product of a specific cultural and historical
episteme or an "order of things."

For Foucault, the

subject (man) is a historical creation.

The subject, as a

personality type and a social datum for examination, is a
product of a particular episteme.

More specifically and

crucially, it is the outcome of a particular discursive
strategy and power configuration.

The empirico-

transcendental subject of modernity is but part of
particular "order of things." In the same way that the
Classical episteme gave way to the Modern episteme, soon
that latter system which placed man at its center will fade
away and with it the idea of the subject.61
In chapter 2, we explored how modernity placed two
conceptualization of the subject at its center:
Cartesian and the Rousseauian.

the

Like other counter-modern

thinkers we have examined, Foucault seeks to show how both
59 Foucault, The Order of Things. 1970, p. 387.
60 Ibid., p. 387.
61 Although Foucault rarely uses the term postmodern,
this seems to be what he has in mind as a replacement for
the modern order of things.
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are illusions.

However, he proceeds in a somewhat

different manner.

The Cartesian self, which sought to

bring all objects before the investigating subject, is
shown not to be ahistorical or universalistic but as part
of a particular historically-constituted "order of things"
which places man at its center.

Likewise, the deep

Rousseauian self is shown not to be a vital, untapped realm
of knowledge, but something that is created and imposed by
certain disciplinary power arrangements and technologies.
Instead of history as a litany of humanistic progress or as
the unfolding of the human spirit, Foucault gives us a
historical journey wrapped in new forms of discipline.

For

Foucault, humanity does not walk from the darkness of
traditional authority and oppression into the light of
enlightenment and freedom, but is continuously surrounded
by various new forms of coercion and social and self
control.

Western society continues to erect self-trapping

illusions advanced as realities.

Po p Art. Authenticity, and the Subject
So far, we have been primarily concerned with
postmodernism as it is manifested in theory and philisophy.
This may give the impression that what is labeled
postmodern is merely an intellectual discursive activity
occurring in the discipline of philosophy or academia in
general.

However, many of the ideas of postmodern thought
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can be found in other areas of contemporary cultural
production.

In this section, we will extend the discussion

of postmodernism beyond academic discourse into the arena
of cultural production.

Here, we will address how the

phenomenon of pop art, which has been part of the Western
art scene since the 1960's, may be seen as part of the
larger postmodern movement.

Specifically, we are concerned

with how pop art and so-called post-pop art approach the
related issues of authenticity and authorship.62

Pop art,

like the discourses in linguistics, post-structuralism, and
Lacanian psychoanalysis, contribute in unique ways to the
postmodern project of decenterina the subject.
The pop art phenomenon can trace some of its roots to
the Dadaist Movement of early twentieth-century culture.
Part of the Dadaist artistic and theoretical project was to
take everyday artifacts from industrial production and use
them as items of art and artistic contemplation.

Two

outcomes of the Dadaist's artistic experiment, which were
incorporated by pop art, were a blurring of the distinction
between art and non-art and a questioning of the role of
the artist in art production.
In the wake of World War II, a related artistic
ideology and method to Dadaism resurfaced.

During the

1950's the term "pop art" was coined by the British critic

62 For a discussion of post-pop art see, Paul Taylor,
Post-Poo Art (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989).
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Lawrence Alloway to refer to "a group of artists interested
in redeeming popular culture."63

Artists such as Roy

Lichtenstein, Robert Watts, Andy Warhol, and Claus
Oldenburg began incorporating images and signs from popular
culture into the realm of so-called "high" or "serious"
art.

In the most celebrated cases, Lichtenstein used comic

strips while Warhol used soup cans and Marilyn Monroe silk
screens as part of artistic creation.

In the pop art of

Lichtenstein and Warhol "images from mass culture, regarded
as vulgar, unworthy of an aesthetic consecration, returned
virtually unaltered as materials of the artist's
activity."64

By treating commodities of capitalist

production as items of art, the pop-artists began restating
important questions concerning authenticity, authorship,
and the nature of art itself.65

Within the pod scheme,

the artist did not have to accept the romantic mythology of
the isolated, alienated, creative genius to be classified
as an artist.

Nor did art have to be seen as the

63 Carol Anne Mahsun, Po d Art and the Critics (Ann
Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1987), p. 5.
64 Roland Barthes in Paul Taylor's, Post-Pop Art.
1989, p. 22.
65 The commercial nature of Warhol's art led the
Canadian government to impose a merchandise duty on some of
his sculptures that were to be shown in a Toronto gallery.
According to the Canadian National Review Act only original
sculpture or replicas were to be imported duty free. Cf.,
Jay Walz, "Canada Rules Out Boxes as 'Art': Creations by
Warhol Held as 'Merchandise' Subject to Duty," The New York
Times, March 9th, 1965.
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production of something original and authentic to be viewed
as art.66

The artists could take the role of the pop

celebrity and art could be created with the aid of
photographs, reprints, reproduced material, and copying
procedures.
After a period of decline, the pop art movement began
to resurface in the 1980's as "the most influential
movement in the contemporary art world."67

Under the

label, neo-pop, post-pop, or simply postmodern, artist
began to incorporate more of the images and technological
methods used in the pop art of the 1960's.

With the

introduction of new technologies, such as the copying
machine and the personal computer, into society and art
production, questions reemerged with regard to authorship
and authenticity.

Some artists, such as Barbara Kruger,

have used the new technologies to challenge directly the
traditional notions of authenticity, representation, and
authorship.

Kruger has described part of her artistic

strategy as deconstructing "the notion of being a great

66 The style employed by the pop artists was not well
received by those accustomed to traditional notions of art
and the role of the artist. Writing in the early 1960's,
the art critic Max Kozloff labeled pop artists as the "new
vulgarians,” who share a "common concern with the problems
of the commercial image, popular culture, and metaphysical
disgust." Max Kozloff, "Pop Culture, Metaphysical Disgust,
and the New Vulgarians," Art International 6, 1962, pp. 3436.
67 Paul Taylor, Post-Pop Art (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1989), p. 11.
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artist."68

Like the first generation of pop artists,

Kruger seeks to call into question the modern reliance on
the genius, self-mastering artist and his/her production of
"original art."

She attempts, in her words, "to ruin

certain representations, to displace the subject and to
welcome a female spectator into the audience of men.”69
Kruger's artistic strategy is to use "images from published
sources and to add texts to them."70

By using copies from

existing sources and superimposing messages on them, Kruger
confuses the notions of art-as-representation and
undermines the idea of the creative, self-reflecting, and
autonomous artist.

If art can arrange and use already

produced material, the idea of art cannot be viewed as an
"original representation."

Essentially, it is and can only

be a representation of a representation, a point made in
semiotics.

Futhermore, if the artist can be simply an

arranger of existing sources, the view of the artists as
"creative genius" cannot be theoretically sustained.

In

terms of our discussion, it can be said that the
Rousseauian inspired source of deep truth or creativity is
replaced by a more postmodern conceptualization.
For pop-art and other forms of postmodern expression,
68 Barbara Kruger quoted in Margot Lovejoy, Postmodern
Currents: Art and Artists in the Age of Electronic Media
(Ann Arborm MI: UMI Press, 1989), p. 113.
69 Ibid., p. 111.
70 Ibid., p. 111.
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the artist cannot have, or be perceived as having, a
privileged position in the production of cultural
artifacts.

The postmodern artists is simply arranging

previously produced images and signs in a particular
manner.

What emerges from this is an aesthetic of

"simulated authorship, in which ideas of originality and
repetition, authenticity and theft are teased out to their
problematic limits."71
Walter Benjamin in his essay, "The Work of Art in the
Age of Mechanical Reproduction" captured the importance of
the relationship between technological change and art when
he wrote,
...Mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of
art from its parasitical dependence on ritual. To
an ever greater degree, the work of art reproduced
becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility.
From a photographic negative, for example, one can
make any number of prints; to ask for the *authentic'
print makes no sense. But the instant the criterion
of authenticity ceases to be applicable to artistic
production, the total function of art is reversed.
Instead of being based on ritual, it begins to be
based on another practice— politics.72
For Benjamin, changes in technology led to changes in the
productional rationale and organization of art.

It would

make little sense to question postmodern artists such as

71 Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture: An
Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary (New York:
Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1989), p. 95.
72 Walter Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of
Mechanical Reproduction," in Illuminations, ed., by Hannah
Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 224, emphasis
added.
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Kruger, Lichtenstein, Warhol, and others on issues of the
authenticity and authorship of their art.

These are

questions which only have meaning within the modern
organization of artistic production.

As Benjamin noted,

"the presence of an original is the prerequisite to the
concept of authenticity."73

Postmodern artist's use of

previously produced material in the construction of art
makes the questions of authorship and authenticity
unanswerable or simply, meaningless.

If art can be

produced by pushing a button on a copying machine or a
personal computer, it can no longer be perceived as being
an authentic outcome of a creative author.

Art moves from

being a righteous ritual, which relies on prescribed
procedures, precedent, and codes of conduct, to a political
matter, where the emphasis is placed on the management of
artistic production, promotion, and consumption (cf. the
promotional personality of Warhol).

In Benjamin's terms,

art loses its cult value and is replaced by an exhibition
value.

Describing this process, David Roberts writes,

Technical reproduction destroys the unique aura of
the art of the past by alienating the reproduced from
its context, by breaking it from the matrix of
tradition
The whole function of art is thereby
revolutionized. The liberation of the art of the past
from the alienation function of magic and religious
representation (cultic value) and aesthetic selfrepresentation (authenticity) frees art for its

73 Ibid., p. 220.
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new function.74
This new function described by Roberts is determined to a
great degree by the politics of mass production and
consumption.
Benjamin's linking of art and technological change
provides important insight into the sociological background
of postmodern art.

However, it does not provide us with a

description of the affirmative and ironic attitude of many
postmodern artists.

Whereas Benjamin, as a critical

theorist, laments the movement away from reliance upon
authenticity and authorship, many postmodern artists
welcome and celebrate the demise of this reliance.

For the

postmodern artist, the emphasis of modern art on
authenticity and authorship are artistic representatives of
erroneous and out-dated philosophical and artistic
principles.

To call or search for authenticity requires

the artists to assume a privileged position in cultural
production.

Postmodernists deny this privileged position

(or any privileged position, cf. the Derridean revolt
against linguistically based conceputal hierachies) and the
accompanying search for authenticity.

74 David Roberts, "The Museum and Montage," in Theory,
Culture and Society, 5, 1988, p. 549-50, emphasis added.
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Summary
In this chapter, we have examined the process of the
decentering of the subject.

As we have seen the

decentering process can take different forms.

While each

area discussed— psychoanalysis, genealogy, and pop-art— has
certain idiosyncrasies in its appraisal of the modern
subject, a thread of continuity can be glimpsed in
comparison.

The thread revealed is best summarized by the

idea that the modern subject is a social and cultural
construct.

For Lacan and Foucault, there are no first

principles of the subject which can serve as a basis for
knowledge or as a foundation for human sciences.
The dual nature of the subject described by Freud,
leads to the conclusion that the metaphysical subject of
philosophy cannot be the sole condition for rationality and
knowledge.

In Lacan's writings, it is revealed how the

Freudian inspired search for a foundational human nature is
itself misplaced.

In Foucault's writing, we see how the

subject is a creation of discursive and power
configurations.

Finally, in pop art we see how the modern

idea of the authenticity and artistic creativity are
becoming outdated with changes in art, society, and
technology.

These propositions, taken together, reveal the

postmodern ethos that the subject is a complex, socio
culturally, constructed anthropomorphism.

For

postmodernists, this recognition may symbolize the final
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phase of the modern subject and the dethroning of the
modern human being as the center of Western philosophy.
The decentering of the subject also provides a space for
counter-modern social movements, such as feminism, to
develop an ideology of liberation.
In the forthcomming chapter, we will take-up the
relationship between rationality, historical change, and
emancipation.

This seemly inherent relationship is another

central battle ground between modernists and
postmodernists.

Specifically, we will discuss how

postmodernists answer the question:
to emancipation?
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Does rationality lead

CHAPTER VI
THE CRITIQUE OF RATIONALITY, PROGRESS, AND EMANCIPATION
In the previous chapter, we sought to illustrate how
the critique of subjectivity is an important element of the
postmodern framework.
topic:

Here, we will explore a related

Some of the twentieth century's discontentments

with the Enlightenment's closely-related notions of
rationality, progress, and emancipation.

We will begin

with an exploration of the twentieth-century disenchantment
with both Enlightenment and Marxist theories of
evolutionary change (i.e., liberalism and socialism).

In

that section, we will explore the works of Walter Benjamin,
T. Adorno, and Max Horkheimer.

We will specifically focus

on Adorno and Horkheimer's, Dialectic of Enlightenment as
paradigmatic of the disenchantment with these views of
emancipation.

We will followed this with a discussion of

the recent debate between Juergen Habermas and JeanFrancois Lyotard on the possibilities and limitations of
rationality in contemporary epistemology and emancipatory
politics.

Finally, we will explore the attitude towards

the past and historical change that is exemplified in socalled postmodern architecture.

Here, we will examine how

postmodern architecture attempts to break with the
progressive style of modernism's International Style of
Architecture through the use of an ironic historicism.
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We

will conclude this chapter with a discussion of the
political outcomes of the death of archetypical theories of
human emancipation.
In a statement which captures part of the socio
political rebellion against the Enlightenment's liking of
rationality, progress, and emancipation, C. Wright Mills
wrote in 1959,
Our major orientations— liberalism and socialism—
have virtually collapsed as adequate explanations
of the world and of ourselves. These two
ideologies came out of The Enlightenment, and
they have had in common many assumptions and
values.
In both, increased rationality is held
to be the prime condition of increased freedom.
The liberating notion of progress by reason, the
faith in science as an unmixed good, the demand
for popular education and the faith in its
political meaning for democracy— all these ideals
of The Enlightenment have rested upon the happy
assumption of the inherent relation of reason
and freedom.1
For Mills, and other social and cultural theorists of the
twentieth century, many of the Enlightenment's important
doctrines have become indefensible, untenable, or simply
exhausted.

Central among these exhausted doctrines is the

idea of teleological historical change or "progress" (cf.
the discussion of Condorcet in Chapter 2).

This doctrine

was accompanied by an "evolutionary optimism" which
enthusiastically embraced reason and rationality as the
vehicles through which history moved and humanity obtained
emancipation and freedom.

In the aesthetic, political, and

1 C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 166.
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scientific realms, reason was seen as the force that would
shatter the irrational features of traditional society.
With the destruction of tradition and its political and
religious barbarism, emancipation would finally be
realized.
As discussed earlier, for an Enlightenment
philosopher, such as Condorcet, the capacity for "the
perfectibility of man is truly indefinite."2

By employing

the power of rationality and science, the emerging
enlightened society could free itself both from the dogmas
of traditional knowledge and the confines of traditional
authority.

With this cognitive and political emancipation

would come moral development and ultimately the perfection
of the individual and society.

Subsequent historical

developments (e.g., the proliferation of war, the
environment crisis, etc.) have made the Enlightenment's
conclusions about evolutionary progress and resulting
emancipation untenable.

They no longer seem to corespond

with "socio-political reality." In the view of Robert
Wallace,
*Progress' is no longer the watchword, the
unquestionable beneficial goal and process that it
once was in the United States and the West....
It is no longer only *counter-cultural' types
who doubt the possibility or even the meaning of
progress.... For many of us 'progress' has thus
become another name for the steamroller of
2 Marquis de Condorcet, Sketch for a Historical
Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. by J.
Barraclough (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 4.
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history— a steamroller which it now seems may
only stop when it has obliterated its 'drivers'
as well as everything else.3
As this statement indicates, today there is a tendency to
see progress and rationality as mutually exclusive
catagories.

The "lessons of history" found in the World

Wars, National Socialism, the environmental crisis, and
countless other episodes and events of the twentieth
century, make Condorcet's and other similar optimistic
forecasts of moral perfectibility and emancipation through
rationality highly problematic.
The inherent relationship between rationality and
progress is more than an idea fostered by the
Enlightenment.

It is a complex belief system that appears

in many different forms throughout modern Western culture.
For the sake of the discussion to follow, we will break
this belief system into two types.

These types, while

closely related, may be differentiated on the basis of
their locus of social change.

First, are views of history

that promote a supra-historical philosophy to explain
socio-historical change.

Often these views see social

change in terms of transcendent factors, such as the
manifestation of a subterranean rationality or human
spirit, as in Hegelian philosophy.

Generally, these

philosophies relate change to some metaphysical or
3 Robert Wallace, "Progress, Secularization and
Modernity: The Lowith-Blumenberg Debate." The New German
Critique, 22, 1981, p. 63.
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spiritual unfolding of trapped human potentiality.

In

other words, humanity or history are thought to have an
inherent logic waiting for release.

Related to these

supra-historical philosophies, are theories in the social
sciences which see historical change as the evolution of
society towards higher or more complex forms.

These views

have appeared in the form of Comtian and Parsonian
evolutionary theory, Marxist accounts of social change,
Neo-Marxist accounts, such as Habermasian communicative
evolution, and various theories of socio-economic
development.

As a tendency, these theories argue that

societal and technological complexity are becoming more
finely tuned or advanced with the refinement of rationally
constructed knowledge.

Seen in terms of an evolutionary

process, societies or historical periods can then be
evaluated by the degree or level of scientific or societal
rationality present.
What differentiates these sociological theories from
their philosophical counterparts is where they place the
locus of change.

In the social sciences the locus is to be

found in the phylogenetic characteristics of the social,
while in the philosophical it is to be found in some
metaphysical

potentiality.

However, despite discrepancies,

both of the above versions of historical change have two
things in common.

First of all, both of these theories

assume that modernity or civil society mark an important
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step in the eventual emancipation of humanity.

Secondly,

both accept the idea that history is a unified, linear,
totality, with inherent meaning.

These versions of change

forge the events of history into a totality where stages
follow one another in progressive succession, as in most
traditional historiography.4
He will begin with a dicussion of Adorno and
Horheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment.

The Dialectic of Enlightenment
Marx's historical materialism attempted to temper
bourgeois culture's unequivocal optimism in civil society
as the fulfillment of an inherent historical logic.
However, Marxist theory did not completely distance itself
from this doctrine and its framework.

In place of

bourgeois culture's reliance upon idealistic models of
societal evolution, Marxism substituted a "materialistic
conception of history."5

This, however, was done while

retaining many of bourgeois theory's teleological features.
Essentially, dialectical theory took "seriously the utopian
promises of bourgeois philosophy, but shows that capitalist
4 There are of course exceptions to this linear
historiography. Specifically, cyclical theories of social
change, cf. Oswald Spengler, Today and Destiny: Excerpts
from The Decline of the West of Oswald Soenqler. ed. by
E.F.Daking (New York: Norton, 1940).
5 Karl Marx, A Contribution to the Critique of
Political Economy, trans. by M. Dobb (London: International
Publishers, 1970), p. 220.
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class societies nust structurally fail to fulfill then."6
For Marx, history was leading somewhere, but the ultimate
manifestation was not to be found in capitalist society or
bourgeois culture.

Communism would mark the completion of

the dialectical movement of history.

It would be the final

stage in historical development, not bourgeois civil
society.
For many Marxist-inspired writers of the twentiethcentury, the theory of a dialectical movement of history
culminating in world communism, did not successfully
distance itself from the "naive optimism" in rationality
that was evident in bourgeois thought.

For these writers,

the Marxist philosophy of historical evolution, did not
lead to an equitable society and emancipation, but to a
Weberian iron cage administered by a technocratic
instrumental rationality.
Walter Benjamin's 1940 essay, "Theses on the
Philosophy of History," is representative of the growing
disenchantment many twentieth century Marxists experienced
with Marx's evolutionary theory and its political
embodiment in various working class movements.

The theses,

written shortly before his suicide while attempting to flee
Nazi occupied France, sought to analyze the problems

6 Stephan Fuchs, The Loalflcation o f History: A
Critique of Neoevolutionist Thought. Unpublished
Manuscript, University of California at Riverside, March,
1986, p. 186.
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inherent in Marxist and vulgar Marxist historical theory.7
For Benjamin,
nothing has corrupted the German working class so
much as the notion that it was moving with the
current. It regarded technological developments
as the stream with which it thought it was moving.
From there it was but a step to the illusion that
factory work which was supposed to tend toward
technological progress constituted a political
achievement.8
The German workers had been misled by the linking of the
historical mission of the working class with bourgeois
society's adherence to technological "progress."

For many

socialist groups in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, work was viewed as the "savior of modern
times."9

Within this Marxist-inspired view, labor was

seen as the primary mechanism of historical evolution.
Labor was also the force which would be eventually
responsible for emancipation and socio-political
fulfillment.

Technological progress, made possible by

labor, was seen as an irresistible force, propelling all of
humankind towards historical perfection.

While Marx did

distinguish "necessary" from "free labor,” critics believed
it, nevertheless, collapsed all meaningful human action
under the label of "homo laborans." In other words, labor
was seen as the true human quality.

As a result of this

7 In Walter Benjamin's, Illuminations, trans. by
Hannah Arendt (New York: Schocken Books, 1969, pp. 253-264.
8 Ibid., p. 258.
9 Josef Dietzgen, quoted in Ibid, p. 259.
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overemphasis on labor as the center of meaning, Marxist
theory and the labor movements associated with it had
inadvertently leveled the distinctions between
technological advancement and human emancipation.
Technological development became the vehicle of personal
and group emancipation.
The linking of the historical destiny of the working
class with the logic of progress was made possible by what
Benjamin believed was a fatal flaw in Marxist or "vulgar"
Marxist theory.

Marxist theory had failed to critique and

successfully differentiate itself from bourgeois cultural
rational mastery and domination of nature.

Vulgar Marxist

theory,
recognizes only the progress in the mastery of nature,
not the retrogression of society; it already displays
the technocratic features later encountered in
Fascism. Among these is a conception of nature which
differ ominously from the one in the Socialist utopias
before the 1848 revolution. The new conception of
labor amounts to the exploitation of nature, which
with naive complacency is contrasted with exploitation
of the proletariat.10
What the labor movement did not realize was that it was a
very short step from the Enlightenment's emphasis on the
mastery of nature to the mastery and control of workers, it
is an age of Weberian rationalization so-to-speak.

The

Enlightenment's goal of bringing the mysteries of nature
under the control of rationality, science, and technology
were easily transferable to the human condition.
10 Ibid., p. 259.
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For both

the bourgeoisie and the Marxists, the progress of
rationality and science were "something boundless, in
keeping with the infinite perfectibility of mankind."11
This proved to be a fatal error for Marxism's theory of
emancipation for it "bypasses the question of how its
(capitalist society) products might benefit the workers
while still not being at their disposal."12
Benjamin's pessimistic appraisal of Marxist historical
theory and its practical embodiment provided part of the
inspiration for the critique of the Enlightenment found in
Adorno and Horkheimer's 1944 work, The Dialectic of
Enliahtenment.

In this work, Adorno and Horkheimer take up

and expand Benjamin's reappraisal of the Enlightenment's
and Marxism's happy relation of rationality and progress.
With Fascism as a historical backdrop and Nietzsche and
Weber as theoretical guides, Adorno and Horkheimer seek a
total reevaluation of the legacy of Enlightenment
rationality.

Their self described goal was "the discovery

of why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human
condition, is sinking into a new kind of barbarism."13
For Adorno and Horkheimer, like Benjamin before them,
the regression so evident in contemporary society was but
11 Ibid., p. 260.
12 Ibid., p. 259.
13 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of
Enliahtenment. trans. by J. Cumming (New York: Herder and
Herder, 1972), p. xi.
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the working out of the very logic contained within
bourgeois Enlightenment rationality.

In the Enlightenment

"the submission of everything natural to the autocratic
subject finally culminates in the mastery of the blindly
objective and natural.nU

The submission of the natural

to the all-knowing subject "condemns the spirit to
increasing darkness" (cf. Weber's "iron cage").15

As a

result, "the fully enlightened earth radiates disaster
triumphant."16
The origins of the disaster of the Enlightenment was to
be 'found in its orientation towards knowledge and control
of the world.

For Adorno and Horkheimer, Bacon's essay "In

Praise of Human Knowledge" was paradigmatic of the
Enlightenment's relation of knowledge and power.
Despite his lack of mathematics, Bacon's view was
appropriate to the scientific attitude that prevailed
after him. The concordance between the mind of man
and the nature of things that he had in mind is
patriarchal: the human mind, which overcomes
superstition, is to hold sway over a disenchanted
nature. Knowledge, which is power, knows no obstacles;
neither in the enslavement of men nor in compliance
with the world's rulers.17
As the rational human mind seeks to develop a concordance
between itself and nature, it eventually succeeds in
bringing the world under its autocratic gaze and control.
14 Ibid., p. xvi.
15 Ibid., p. xiv.
16 Ibid., p. 3.
17 Ibid., p. 4, emphasis added.
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Furthermore, as the rational mind seeks to overcome myth
and superstition, its growing power permits an unrestricted
domination, not only of nature, but ultimately of self and
others.

What began as the rational mastery and control of

nature through science and technology eventually becomes an
omnipresent rationality which reifies and dominates
everything it encounters— it is extended to all human
endeavors.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, a key aspect of the
Enlightenment's paternalistic rationality is its
manifestation in and control of technology (e.g., the
merger of science and capatalistic production).

Within the

logic of the Enlightenment, technology becomes "the essence
of knowledge."18 This technology progresses not "by
concepts and images," but through the "exploitation of
others."19

"What men want to learn from nature is how to

use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men."20
Technology makes this control of nature and humans
possible.

The violence of rationally constructed knowledge

and its technological manifestation becomes the standard
through which modernity measures societal advancement.
A further central aspect of the Enlightenment, which
was an outgrowth of its ruthless appropriation of nature,
18

Ibid., P- 4.

19

Ibid., P- 4.

20 Ibid.,
P- 4.
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was its tendency to pull all outer or unknown realms into
its analytic gaze and manipulative rationality.

As a

result, all that "does not conform to the rule of
computation and utility is suspect."21

Like Odysseus'

encounter with the Sirens, where self preservation is the
only protection against the seduction of the mytho-poetic
past, modern rationality has constructed a representational
world which is as alienating as it is liberating.

From the

perspective of rationality, all unknown realms must first
be represented in order to be repressed.

For Adorno and

Horkheimer,
Men have always had to choose between their
subjection to nature or the subjection of nature
to the Self. With the extension of the bourgeois
commodity economy, the dark horizon of myth
is illuminated by the sun of calculating reason,
beneath whose cold rays the seed of the new
barbarism grows to fruition. Under the pressure
of domination human labor always led away from
myth— but under domination always returns to the
jurisdiction of myth.22
Bourgeois society, with its doctrine of instrumental
rational self-preservation and its belief in technological
progress, is the seed of a new barbarism which is harsher
than the allegedly mythical world it sought to overcome.
Human labor under domination leads away from traditional
myth, but domination must inevitably resort to mvth to

21 Ibid., p. 6.
22 Ibid., p. 32. As Dostoevsky has said, "man
continues to be moved by myth, miracle, and authority"— and
mostly in that order.
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support its appropriation of Dover.

Under this system of

power and domination, progress becomes regression and
enlightenment becomes myth.
For Adorno and Horkheimer, this is not the story of
how the Enlightenment went wrong, but the story of the
unfolding of its intrinsic logic.23

In equating knowledge

with the subject's domination of nature through technology,
the Enlightenment "is as totalitarian as any system."24
As such, "myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment
reverts to mythology."25

The Enlightenment did not

inadvertently veer from the course of reason and
emancipation, these were but mythical constructs to cover
its naked appropriation of power.

These mythical

constructs were the price humanity paid for a disenchanted,
de-magicalized world stripped of meaning by an overly
exuberant rationality.
In his late work, Negative Dialectics. Adorno
declares, "No universal history leads from savagery to
humanitarianism, but there is one leading from the
slingshot to the megaton bomb."26

This "retrogressive

23 As we shall see in our discussion of Habermas, this
is the critical difference between the first and second
generation of critical theorists.
24 Adorno and Horkheimer, The Dialectic of
Enlightenment. 1972, p. 24.
25 Ibid., p. xvi.
26 Theodore Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. by
E.B. Ashton (New York: Seabury, 1973), p. 320.
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anthropogenesis," as Paul Connerton has phrased it, is
consistent with, and in many ways summarizes, the general
outlook of the Dialectic of Enlightenment.27 What was
triumphant modernity for the French Philosophes and Hegel,
was tragic modernity for Adorno and Horkheimer.

As such,

the Dialectic of Enlightenment, along with Weber's
discussion of the iron cage, can be included among the
important works that was part of the reevaluation of what
was generally the taken-for-granted association of
rationality, progress, and emancipation.

Today, this

position is perhaps best summarized by Octavio Paz's
statement,
We used to believe that revolution, transformed into
universal science, was the key to history, the magical
command which would open the doors of the prison
to which humanity had been held from the very
beginning. Now we know that the key does not open
the doors: it closes them tight shut.28
In the next section, we will take-up Habermas'
appraisal of Adorno and Horkheimer's critique of the
Enlightenment and a similar orientation in poststructualist philosophy.

27 Paul Connerton, The Tragedy of Enlightenment: an
Essav on the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980), p. 114.
28 Octavio Paz quoted in Serge Moscovici, Questions
for the Twenty-first Century," Theory, Culture and Society,
1990, 7, p. 6,
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Communicative Rationality or Incommensurable
Language Games; The Habermas/Lvotard Debate
Juergen Habermas has been called the "last great
rationalist"— a title which is either negative or positive
depending upon the position of the person doing the
labeling.

Habermas is either the last hope to preserve the

Enlightenment's goals of reason and emancipation or the
defender of an outdated mode of thinking and theorizing.
For many, Habermas' social theory holds the promise for a
reconstruction of the Enlightenment's ideals of reason.
progress, and emancipation.

For those loyal to Habermas,

what his theory provides is a socially constituted or
normative basis for rendering social critique.

Those who

support his project believe that without such a basis for
grounding and legitimizing critique, no vision of
emancipation is possible.29

We are therefore doomed to

face a world of incommensurablity, undecidability, and
indefensible domination.
Habermas' attempts the reconstruction of the
Enlightenment ideals of reason, progress, and emancipation
through what he refers to as the "theory of communicative
action."30

Habermas agrees with other contemporary

29 For a sympathetic reading of Habermas Cf. Richard
J. Bernstein, Bevond Objectivism and Relativism: Science.
Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1983).
30 Cf. Juergen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest,
trans. by Jeremy Shapiro (London: Heinemann, 1972), and
The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. l, trans. by T.
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critics of the Enlightenment that given the theoretical
revelations of the twentieth century we can no longer
accept a correspondence theory of truth and a denotative
theory of language.

In other words, we can no longer

accept the traditional rationalist argument that theory
captures and language reports unmediated reality.

This

being the case, we can no longer appeal to a foundational
metaphysics or "first principle" to legitimate a discourse
and its truth claims.

However for Habermas, the demise of

the correspondence theory of truth and foundational
metaphysics does not mean we are foundationless.

There

remain certain everyday structures and rules embedded in
linguistical practices and speech acts that define and
legitimate all discursive activities.

In other words,

language and speech are not just mediums for the conveyance
of ideas they have a normative function.

This revelation

makes the quest for a foundational critique possible.
For Habermas, the communicative rules of everyday
validity claims always appeal to a normative rationality
for legitimation (i.e., the stength of the better
argument).

Verbal utterances and discourses must appeal to

this normative context to be socially legitimate.

In

drawing on this normative background, the individual
speaker is evaluated in regard to his/her level of
communicative competence.

These rules embedded in

McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984.
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communicative action make the quest for truth through
consensus a normative framework that guide all speech acts.
In Habermas' words,
actions regulated by norms, expressive selfpresentations, and also evaluative expressions,
supplement constative speech acts in constituting
a communicative practice which, against the
background of a lifeworld, is oriented to achieving,
sustaining, and renewing consensus...The rationality
inherent in this practice is seen in the fact that
a communicatively achieved agreement must be based
in the end on reasons.31
Essentially, communicative rationality serves as a "court
of appeal" for the settlement of validity claims.

If the

discursive arena is free from the distortions of power,
self-interest, and ignorance, then open communication and
reason are possible.

Under these "ideal speech"

conditions, truth claims can be settled by appealing to the
background of a particular discursive community.

This

being the case, truth becomes what is agreed upon under
these conditions of "ideal speech." In other words, truth
is that which is obtained through consensus.

Truth is a

conversationally dependent and normative principle.

As a

consequence, truth does not have to be grounded in some
type of "first principle" or foundational metaphysics.

The

affirmation of truth is already given in the potentiality
of communication.
In order for Habermas' theory of communicative action
to be more than simply a sophisticated type of utopian
31 Habermas, Ibid., p. 17.
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idealism, it must, within the rationalist tradition, ground
itself in a (scientific) theory of society.

With this in

mind, Habermas promotes his theory as a foundation for a
neo-evolutionist theory of social change.

For Habermas,

preceding evolutionary theories, specifically Marx's,
Weber's, and Parson's, fail to draw a distinction between
the systems (i.e., institutional) rationalization of the
state and economy and the rationalization of lifeworlds.
Unlike systems rationalization, rationalization of the
lifeworld does not entail the progressive application of
instrumental rationality.

Lifeworld rationalization is

similar to the learning process that occurs in the
development of the individual.

Using Piaget, Kohlberg, and

other developmental psychologists as models, Habermas
argues that lifeworlds evolve on the basis of a "societal
learning process."32

Central to this argument is the idea

that "*organizational principles' 'institutionally embody'
the structures of consciousness provided by world
views."33 Just as an individual is able to learn from life
experience and incorporate it into consciousness, a society
can integrate cultural solutions to shared problems into
social institutions (i.e., a society can "learn" and "mature").

32 Jurgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of
Society. trans. by T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1979). Habermas has altered this position somewhat in more
recent works.
33 Fuchs, The Loaification of History. 1986, p. 96.
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Habermas' communicatively informed evolutionary
theory allows societies to be evaluated on the basis of
their level of learning.

Societies can "be rated and

classified according to the extent to which they exemplify
the higher forms of social integration and higher problem
solving capacities."34

This allows Habermas to grant

legitimacy to certain aspects of the modern age,
specifically in regard to the level of social integration
found in its legal problem solving institutions.

Comparing

traditional and modern societies' degree of social
integration, Habermas writes,
Social integration accomplished via kinship relations
and secured in cases of conflict by preconventional
legal institutions belongs, from a developmentallogical point of view, to a lower stage than social
integration accomplished via relations of domination
and secured in cases of conflict by conventional legal
institutions.35
This does not mean that modernity is legitimate-in-itself.
Modernity is plagued by "problems of the superseded social
formation" (e.g., class struggle).36

However, it does

exhibit a more advanced form of social integration and
therefore learning.

In other words, Habermas concludes

that it is possible to find alternatives to metaphysical

34 Michael Schmid, "Habermas's Theory of Social
Evolution, " in J. Thompson and D. Held (eds.), Habermas:
Critical Debates (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), p. 169.
35 Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of
Society. 1979, p. 163,
36 Ibid., p. 163.
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notions of progress and to provide a new rationale for
societal emancipation.
Habermas' theory of communicative action and social
evolution is a marked departure from the views of the first
generation of critical theorists.

This discrepancy forces

Habermas to come to terms with the critique of modernity
rendered by the previous generation of critical theorists
(e.g., Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer), as well as the
related critique in poststructualist thought (e.g.,
Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, etc.).

For Habermas, the

critical theory of Benjamin, Adorno, and Horkheimer exhibit
a "totalizing critique" of modernity.

By this he means

that they see society as one all-encoumpasing totality.
These writers, like those in traditional social science
evolutionism, draw no distinction between systems
rationalization and the rationalization of the lifeworld.
In failing to develop this differentiation, they exhibit,
what he refers to as a "performative contradiction."

In

other words, as a result of "identifying reason with
repression, they undermine the foundations of their own
critique."37

Given the logic of their argument "it is no

longer possible to place hope in the liberating force of

37 Nancy Love, "Epistemology and Exchange: Marx,
Nietzsche, and Critical Theory," New German Critique, 41,
1987, p. 71.

enlightenment."38 Consequently, it becomes impossible for
Adorno and Horkheimer to legitimate their critical theory
of society, since it is built upon the Enlightenment's
separation of repression and reason— a position they
undermine in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
For Habermas, the central problem with Adorno and
Horkheimer's critique of modernity is their over reliance
upon a philosophy of consciousness.

This position, first

articulated in Cartesian philosophy, "conceives of human
action primarily in terms of individual speaking and acting
subjects.”39

Habermas seeks to show that Adorno and

Horkheimer's reliance on a philosophy of consciousness, as
opposed to a theory of inner subjectivity, is the fatal
flaw which results in the "totalizing critique" of modern
existence which levels all distinctions between
instrumental rationality (i.e., means and ends rationality)
and reason.

Describing Adorno and Horkheimer's position in

the Dialectic of Enlightenment. Habermas writes,
Reason itself destroys the humanity it first made
possible— this far reaching thesis, as we have seen,
is grounded in the first excursus by the fact that
from the very start the process of enlightenment is
the result of a drive to self-preservation that
mutilates reason, because it lays claim to it only
in the form of purposive-rational mastery of
nature and instinct— precisely as instrumental
38 Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of
Modernity, trans. by F. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1987), p. 106.
39 Richard Hoiin, "Critical Theory and the Dialectic
of Rationalism." New German Critique, 41, 1987, p. 23.
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reason.40
By equating Enlightenment reason with the rationality of
self preservation, Adorno and Horkheimer are essentially
identifying subjective reason with instrumental reason.

In

other words, Habermas believes that Adorno and Horkheimer
do not reconize that there is a difference between
intersubjective reason and individualistic instrumental
rationality.

For them, objectivizing thought (in the form

of total reification) and purposive-rational action, which
both accompany modern subjectivity, are the final outcomes
of the Enlightenment's domination of nature through
purposive-rational mastery.

The result of Adorno's and

Horkheimer's critique is the production of a "'life' that
is characterized by the knowing and acting subject's
devotion to a blind, self-directed, intransitive, selfpreservation as his only 'end.'"41

There is no reconition

of a intersubjective lifeworld that does not play by the
same instrumental rational rules.

Within the Adorno and

Horkheimer position, "nothing more than instrumental reason
is retained when we think through 'the basic processes of
conscious life....' "4Z

40 Cf. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action Vol.
I, 1984, p. 388, emphasis in the original.
41 Ibid., p. 388.
42 Ibid., p. 396.
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Habermas' purpose in discussing the Dialectic of
Enlightenment is to show how this critique and other
related arguments inevitably leads to a dead end as long as
the philosophy of consciousness serves as a guide.

What is

needed, in Habermas' view, is the recognition of an
intersubjectivity informed by communicative reason.
A subjectivity that is characterized by communicative
reason resists the denaturing of the self for the
sake of self-preservation. Unlike instrumental reason,
communicative reason cannot be subsumed without
resistance under a blind self-preservation.
It refers
neither to a subject that preserves itself in
relating to objects via representation and action,
nor to a self-maintaining system that demarcates
itself from an environment, but to a symbolically
structured lifeworld that is constituted in the
interpretive accomplishments of its members and
only reproduced through communication.43
By "denaturing of the self" Habermas means that his
intersubjective constituted subject does not adhere to the
instrumental rationality occurring at the institutional
level or within Adorno's and Horkheimer's argument.

The

intersubjective self operates under different guidelines.
Employing the idea of communicative reason enables
critical theory to be grounded in "the conditions for the
communicative sociation of individuals” rather than the
atomistic philosophy of consciousness.44

With the

recognition that "the utopian perspective of reconciliation
and freedom...is built into the linguistic mechanism of the

43 Ibid., p. 398.
44 Ibid., p. 398.
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reproduction of the species," a new track for critical
theory and emancipation can be followed.45

This track, by

avoiding the errors of the philosophy of consciousness, can
successfully steer clear of the totalizing perspective
(i.e., the perspective which sees society as allencoumpasing) and the resulting performative contradiction
within which Adorno and Horkheimer, as well as the
Nietzschian-inspired poststructualists, find themselves
trapped.

Lvotard and the Incommensurablitv of Language Games
Jean-Francois Lyotard would agree with some of what
Habermas has to say about contemporary philosophy and
epistemology.

Lyotard would accept the argument that the

correspondence theory of truth is no longer valid.

He

would also agree that truth claims are explicated within
and determined by linguistic and group boundaries.
However, for Lyotard what is at stake is not these post
empiricist epistemological revelations, but the idea that
they can be used to ground a new critical theory of
society, to reestablish an evolutionary notion of society,
and to promote a universal path for human emancipation.
In The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.
Lyotard seeks to describe the new conditions of knowledge

45 Ibid., p. 398.
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in postmodern culture and postindustrial society.46

For

Lyotard, modern knowledge "legitimates itself with
reference to a metadiscourse.”47

For Lyotard, these

metadiscourses or metanarratives are undelying "first
principles" or aprioris.

They are metaphysical assumptions

on which all modern discourses rest.

The metadiscourse or

grand narrative of modernity has taken the form of "the
dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the
emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the
creation of wealth."48

Lyotard uses the term "postmodern"

to refer to an "incredulity toward metanarratives.”49
Postmodern knowledge does not rely upon a metadiscourse to
legitimate its position.

It accepts the Wittgensteinian

notion that knowledge is guided by language games which are
and can only be "internally legitimate."

These language

games therefore lack any universal or foundational standard
for comparison.

For Lyotard, various discourses and their

truth claims are heteromorphous or radically different
language games with "their own rules, structure and

46 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report on Knowledge, trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, (1979) 1984.
47 Ibid., p. xxiii.
48 Ibid., p. xxiii.
49 Ibid., p. xxiv.
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moves."50

What postmodern knowledge accomplishes is that

"it refines our sensitivity to differences and reinforces
our ability to tolerate the incommensurable.

Its principle

is not the expert's homology, but the inventor's
paralogy."51

In other words, professional discourse

cannot capture these language games in-themsleves.

."All we

can do is gaze in wonderment at the diversity of discursive
species..."52

We do not need nor can we support a new

archetypal theory which can unite or overcome these
heterogeneous language games.
As the "last great rationalist," Habermas is one of
the primary targets in Lyotard's discussion of modern and
postmodern knowledge.

As stated earlier, Lyotard is in

agreement with Habermas on the point that truth claims are
embedded within what Habermas calls "linguistic practice
and communicational interaction." The issue is if this
revelation can be used to reformulate Enlightenment reason
and emancipation.

Lyotard thinks not.

There is no reason to think that it would be
possible to determine metaprescriptives common
to all of these language games or that a
revisable consensus like the one in force
at a given moment in the scientific community
could embrace the totality of metaprescriptions
regulating the totality of statements circulating

50 Douglas Kellner, "Postmodernism as Social Theory,”
Theory, Culture and Society, 5, 1988, p. 250.
51 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. xxv.
52 Ibid., p. 26.
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in the social collectivity.53
In other words, Lyotard feels that language games are so
incommensurable and consensus is so illusive that no theory
can unite them into a coherent explanatory framework.

From

Lyotard's perspective, Habermas' communicative action
theory with ideal speech as its means and consensus as its
goal rests on "the validity of the narrative of
emancipation."54

It is but another attempt to establish a

metanarrative— a new first principle on which a allencoumpasing theory can be constructed.

However, in an age

where the creation of knowledge is no longer dependent on
metanarratives for legitimation, Habermas' theory can no
longer lay claim to universal validation.

Along with

Richard Rorty, Lyotard would contend that the notions of
communicative action and ideal speech "are simply moral
virtues" and not epistemological guarantees.55
Essentially, Habermas' theory is an attempt to
establish a metanarrative capable of uniting all language
games with the thread of communicative reason.

However,

for Lyotard, communicative action theory makes two faulty
assumptions about the contemporary production of knowledge.
First, it fails to recognize that "language games are
53 Ibid., p. 65.
54 Ibid., p. 60.
55 Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and
Irrationalism," Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 1980, 53, p. 736.
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heteromorphous, subject to heterogeneous sets of pragmatic
rules."56

Contemporary knowledge, even in science, works

within its own parameters and adheres to its own set of
internal rules of the game.

These games are

incommensurable with the games played in other arenas of
knowledge production.

Secondly, communicative action

theory fails to understand that "consensus is only a
particular state of discussion, not its end."57
"Consensus is a horizon that is never reached."58

In

Lyotard's view, the goal of discussion is not consensus but
paralogy (i.e., disagreement and dissent).

Scientific

knowledge production is not guided by underlying norms of
consensus, but by an internal political struggle over
proper research.

Scientific truth is forged under the

tension between varying and conflicting viewpoints.

This

"double observation" against communicative action theory,
destroys a belief that still underlies Habermas'
research, namely, that humanity as a collective
(universal) subject seeks its common emancipation
through the regularization of the 'moves' permitted
in all language games and that the legitimacy of
any statement resides in its contributing to that
emancipation.59
In Lyotard's view, in Habermas' writings, "the cause is

56 Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition. 1984, p. 65.
57 Ibid., p. 65.
58 Ibid., p. 61.
59 Ibid., p. 66.
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good, but the argument is not."60
For Lyotard, the death of the metanarratives of
modernity and the lack of consensus need not signal the
onset of nihilism or the "decline of the West." Lyotard
writes,
Most people have lost the nostalgia for the lost
narrative.
It in no way follows that they are
reduced to barbarity. What saves them from it is
their knowledge that legitimation can only spring
from their own linguistic practice and communicational
interaction. Science 'smiling into its beard' at
every other belief has taught them the harsh
austerity of realism.61
This is the condition of knowledge in postmodern culture.
Knowledge can only be legitimate when it is local or within
the context of "the little narrative" (petit recit)
These "little narratives" of everyday life are cohesive
enough to provide local patterns of meaning, but are too
fragile to support a universal system of knowledge or an
emancipatory politics.

Knowledge no longer requires the

creation of archetypical theories to provide meaning and
orient action— it does not seem to require transcendence or
unitary coherence.

These "theories" already exist within

the practices and communication circuits of the lifeworld.
Young or old, man or woman, rich or poor, a person
is always located at 'nodal points' of specific
communication circuits, however tiny these may be. Or
better: one is always located at a post through which
60 Ibid., p. 66.
61 Ibid., p. 41.
62 Ibid., p. 60.
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various kinds of messages pass. No one, not even the
least privileged among us, is ever entirely powerless
over the messages that traverse and position him at the
post of sender, addressee, or referent.43
This statement sounds strangely Habermasian.

However,

Lyotard does not think these communication circuits are
encompassing enough to transcend heterogeneous life forms.
They, therefore, provide no basis for the establishment of
a new critical theory of society nor can they serve as a
foundation for a universal politics of emancipation.
Communication circuits are simply part of the condition of
knowledge in the postmodern world and reflect the
incoherence and fractionalization of the world.
One of the central issue at stake in the
Habermas/Lyotard Debate is whether or not we can have or
need new notions of rationality, emancipation, and
progress.

Habermas seeks to develop a theory that is

capable of both explaining historical progress and
providing a rational foundation for social critique and
emancipatory politics.

Habermas is convinced that only a

rationalistic account with universal significance can
provide the foundations we need to conduct life, politics,
and science.

Without a foundation, we lack the ability to

provide anything but opinion and speculation.

For Lyotard,

it is no longer possible to have such an archetypal theory
as Habermas' in the postmodern condition with its

63 Ibid., p. 15.
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incommensurable language games and parological conditions.
The independent language games of professional knowledge
and the little narratives of everyday life are all that are
necessary for legitimation.

Simply put, for Lyotard the

"mourning process (for the lost metanarrative) is
over...there is no need to start all over again."64
The debate over the exhaustion of the Enlightenment's
orientation towards rationality, progress, and emancipation
can also be found in other discusive formation.

In the

section to follow, we will explore how this debate can also
be found in the architectural debate over aesthetic style.

The Ironic Historicism of Postmodern Architecture
Seen through the eyes of postmodern architects, one of
the central problems with modern architecture, which led to
its figurative and literal collapse, was its negation of
community and historicity.

In the drive to create clean

and pure space, modern architects, like the Enlightenment
Philosophes, had viewed the past as something to overcome.
History and tradition were seen as strangling the attempt
to build a new, modern world.

What was needed was a type

of architectural social engineering which would provide
people with rational space and thus produce enlightened
lives.

However, the results of the use of rationality to

break and transcend historical continuity were not as
64 Ibid., p. 41.
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intended.

Instead of contributing to the emancipation of

the individual, modern architecture, in the view of
Heinrich Koltz, left humanity "surrounded by a sea of
endless monotony," filled with "the simplest
functionalism."65

Modern architecture was thus

representative of the bureaucratic confinement of modernity
as a whole.
The "spirit" of modern architecture can be found in
the conclusion to a manifesto of the Bauhaus Movement
written in 1919, Halter Gropius proclaimed,
Together let us desire, conceive, and create the
new structure of the future, which will embrace
architecture and sculpture and painting in one
unity and which will one day rise toward heaven
from the hands of a million workers like the
crystal symbol of a new faith.66
Modern architecture's vision was to employ both art and
science in the creation of a new universal form.
Traditional ornamental and irrational structures were to be
replaced by an architectural form which could accentuate
the rational human's inborn rationality by enhancing
individual choice and freedom.

This vision of a new

rational architecture was to be made possible through the
use of the techniques of modern mass production.

In the

65 Heinrich Koltz (ed), Postmodern Visions: Drawings.
Paintings, and Models of Contemporary Architects (New York:
Abbeville Press, 1985), p. 7.
66 Walter Gropius quoted in Ulrich Conrads (ed.),
Programmes and Manifestoes on Twentieth-Century
Architecture (London: Lund Humphries, 1970), p. 49.
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words of Le Corbusier, another important proponent of
architectural modernism, "houses must go up all of a piece,
made by machine tools in a factory, assembled as Ford
assembles cars, on moving conveyor belts."67

Together,

the new ahistorical form and mass production came to be the
defining features of modern architecture.

In the

description of Robert Stern, modernism "proposed a break
with history and a repudiations of traditional aesthetics
in favor of self-referential, functionally and
technologically determined form."68
On July 15, 1972 at 3:32pm the Pruitt-Igoe Housing
Development in St. Louis was demolished.

For the

postmodern architect and modern critic, Charles Jencks,
this date marks the end of Gropius', Le Corbusier's, and
other modern architect's dream of providing clean, pure,
and rational space.69

What began as an attempt to provide

a new international style which was functional, universal,
mass produced, and accessible had ended in the rubble of a
St. Louis implosion.

For Jencks, the Pruitt-Igoe housing

development, which once was hailed as the future of housing

67 Le Corbusier quoted in Reyner Banham, "Progressive
Building in Paris: 1918-1928," in Peter Serenyi, L£
Corbusier in Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, 1975), p. 38.
68 Robert A.M. Stern, Modern Classicism (New York:
Rizzoli, 1988), p. 8.
69 Charles Jencks, The Language of Post-Modern
Architecture (London: Academy Editions, 1984), p. 9.
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for the poor, represented all that was wrong with both
modern architecture and modern society.

Pruitt-Igoe, built

in the 1950's as part of the U.S. government's plan to
provide subsidized housing for the poor, had proven to be a
disaster in both design and function.

Although less than

twenty years old, the development had been deemed
unlivable.

For Jencks, this architectural disaster was not

just representative of the failures of government housing,
but of the failures of modernism's dream of rational,
ahistorical form.70
It is within this climate of the perceived failure of
modernism where postmodern architecture emerges.
Postmodern architecture adopts a radically different
orientation toward the past.

The past, becomes a source of

inspiration, rather than negation.

Paolo Portoghesi

describes modernism's paranoia of the past,
The negation of the past, or rather the rigid
morphological separation between present and past
desired by the Modern Movement, was a typical
defense mechanism, to use the Freudian term for
negation. 'The cathartic illusion,' wrote
Marcello Pignatelli, 'of freeing ourselves from
all dross and obstacles, of cutting the knots of
conditioning and guilt, of waking up different
tomorrow, destroying yesterday's house full of
unbearable memories, really means projecting the
internal conflict onto a magical act, in the
impossibility of elaborating on it.'71
As this quote indicates, modernism wanted to wipe the slate
70 Ibid.
71 Paolo Portoghesi, Postmodern: The Architecture of
Postindustrial Society (New York: Rizzoli), p. 20.
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clean.

It wanted an architecture and a society which was

free from the confines, "dross, and obstacles" associated
with tradition.

However, for Portoghesi and other

postmodern architects the "end of prohibition" has arrived.
The past is no longer taboo:

Architects are now free to

incorporate modes of expression and design from the past.
For Portoghesi, architectural postmodernism can then be
used to describe "any building that breaks the modern
prohibition against historical reference, whether with iron
self-commentary or with vernacular earnestness."72
If postmodernism was merely a type of aesthetic return
to the past, it could easily be labeled as part of a
romantic anti-modernism that is as old as modernity itself.
However, there is an added element which distinguishes
postmodernists from the anti-modernists.

Many postmodern

architectural works blend the so-called return to the past
or classicism with an ironic presentation.

It is, in

Jencks words, "a classicism without tears.”73

In blending

the styles of the past with a type of parody, it seeks to
call into question issues of historical progress,
continuity and even the coherent meaning of history itself.
As Brent Brolin comments, "while postmodernists acknowledge

72 David Kolb, Postmodern Sophistications: Philosophy.
Architecture, and Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1990), p. 89.
73 Charles Jencks (ed.), Postmodern Classicism
(London: Architectural Design, 1980), p. 5.
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history, many seem compelled to torture it until an
'original' contribution to artistic Progress has been
made... "74
This type of ironic historicism was given a polemical
voice with the writings, drawings, and works of Robert
Venturi.

Venturi wanted more than a return to the past.

Architectural works must incorporate irony into its
reappropriation of the past.
The architect who would accept his role as a
combiner of significant old cliches— valid
banalities— in new contexts as his condition
within a society that directs its best efforts,
its big money, and its elegant technologies
elsewhere, can ironically express in this indirect
way a true concern for society's inverted scale
of values.75
Thus architecture becomes a means for calling into question
the value system o f modern society.

It becomes a political

statement in the form of an ironic h istoricistic
architecture.
One of the most representative works of the
architectural irony outlined by Venturi is Charles Moore's
Plaza d'Italia in New Orleans.

The Plaza employs

traditional Italian historical references, however it
rearranges and presents them in parodic style.

Linda

74 Brent Brolin, Flight of Fancy (New York: St. Martin
Press, 1985), p. 309.
75 Robert Venturi, Complexity and Contradiction in
Architecture (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 1966), p. 44.
Also cf. Robert Venturi et al., Learning from Las Vegas
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1972).
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Hutcheon describes Moore's Plaza:
Moore encodes signs of local Italian ethnic
identity— from Latin inscriptions to a parody of
the Trevi fountain. That particular corner of
Rome is a complex mix of theatrical stage, palace,
sculpture, and nature.
In Moore's parodic
rendition, the same elements are retained, but are
now executed in a new media. Sometimes even
structures are refashioned and *refunctioned': a
Tuscan column becomes a fountain, with water running
down it.76
Within Hutcheon's reading, postmodern architecture's ironic
presentation, as represented by Moore, "shows both its
critical awareness and its love of history by giving new
meaning to old forms..."77

Past styles are not just

incorporated as literal, they are mixed with an ironic
presentation to produce a new nonliteral and perhaps
critical meaning.
What does the attitude of postmodern architecture, in
either its ironic or earnest form, tell us about the issues
of

rationality, progress, and emancipation?

in part, it

can be read as a cultural representation of what Adorno and
Horkheimer described in the Dialectic of Enlightenment.
Like Enlightenment rationality, the modern architect's
dream of providing rational space, free from the ornamental
trappings of the past, is reducible to an exercise of
76 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism:
History. Theory. Fiction (New York: Routledge, 1988), p.
32.
77 Ibid., p. 31. This has been interpreted as a new
extension of modernism's elitism. As Lebbeus Woods notes,
the Plaza reads like "a sequence of one line jokes..."
quoted in Stern, Modern Classicism. 1988, p. 78.
208

power.

While modern architecture ideologically presented

itself as enhancing personal freedom, it, like
Enlightenment rationality, actually produced alienation and
contributed to the process of total reification.

Nowhere

is this point more evident than in modernism's ideas about
worker housing.

As Hutcheon points out,

Although Gropius and Le Corbusier both designed
workers' housing, neither seems to have felt the
need to consult those who would live there: it must
have been tacitly assumed that the intellectually
underdeveloped would allow the architects to arrange
their lives for them.78
Like Enlightenment rationality which assumed the role of
legislator to the "uneducated masses," modern architecture
wanted to provide rational space, in order to create a new
type of humanity— to influence the unenlightened
However, it is not just a critical theory of modernity
nor an unproblematic return to the past which most of
postmodern architecture espouses.

The past is not, as it

is for conservative anti-modernists, a model to correct the
banality of contemporary life.
question the past.

Postmodern architects also

Essentially, they argue that there is

no unified, totalizing past from which we can draw on.
past is discontinuous and fragmented.

The

Furthermore, it is

always interpreted with the confines of the contemporary.
History is always constructed rather than being simply
there.

And like contemporary life, the past is viewed as

78 Ibid., p. 27.
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consisting of multiple and incommensurable or unconnected
life forms.

Thus, the only means of expressing history is

with a type of tongue-in-cheek approach which is "both a
homage and a kind of ironic thumbed nose to the past."79

Conclusion: Post-Metanarrative Politics
The postmodern perspective, despite its theoretical
and practical diversity, emphasizes the point that history
has no inherent logic.

It, therefore dismisses those

approaches which have sought to impart an overarching logic
to social change (e.g. Hegel, Condorcet, Marx, etc.).

This

being the case, any theory which seeks to connect history
and emancipation within a rational, economic, or
communicative metanarrative (i.e., an essence or implied
standard of judgement) is suspect.

Thus, the postmodern

position is distrustful of both philosophical and social
science accounts of socio-cultural evolution.

Both

accounts have tried to grant history a teleology.

And,

both have used various strategies to link emancipation with
some apriority (e.g., rationality, communicative action,
etc.).
Within the intellectual climate created by the demise
of the traditional metanarratives of emancipation,
contemporary politics is left with two possibilities.
Either,

(a) it can become an ironical critical theory— as

79 Ibid., p. 31.
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manifested in certain works of postmodern architecture,
or, (b) it retreats from conventional philosophy into the
lifeworld to find meaning and/or emancipatory potential.
The former position recognizes the historicity of all
statements and often blends this realization with an ad hoc
socio-political critique.

However, because this position

lacks a foundation for critique, it is unable to articulate
criticism in a coherent, universal form.
then is parody.

Its only option,

In the latter position, where the life

world is embraced as a potential site of emancipatory
politics, we can find two divergent reactions, represented
by Habermas and Lyotard.

Habermas seeks to use the

potentiality of the lifeworld as material for an all
encompassing emancipatory politics.
the lifeworld.

Lyotard too looks to

However, for him the lifeworld is too

fragmented to employ successfully an overarching formula
for emancipation.

Thus, Habermas' approach is merely

repeating the mistakes of the past.

For Lyotard, we must

accept the inevitability of incommensurable language games
and life forms.

Localized emanciapation and conceptions of

justice are all we can have (if any).
In this chapter and in the previous two, we sought to
outline some of the central postions of the postmodern
framework.

Essentially, we argued that postmodernism can

be seen as rebellion against lingustic correspondence,
modern subjectivity, and the Enlightenment's linkage of
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rationality, progress, and emanciaption.

In the following

chapter, we will begin to shift the focus towards a
sociology of postmodernism.

We will attempt to show how a

social epistemology can avoid postmodernism's collapse or
leveling of all meaning.
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CHAPTER VII
TOWARDS A SOCIOLOGICALLY-INFORMED POSTMODERNISM
We have been concerned with the various theoretical
and cultural positions of postmodernism, trying to show how
postmodern thought forces a reevaluation of the
conventional modern understanding of such issues as
referentiality, subjectivity, and historical continuity.
Obviously, there are important theoretical and practical
differences between cultural postmodernism and postmodern
philosophy, Adorno/Horkheimer and Lyotard, Foucault and
Derrida, for example:

We have, however, sought to

deemphasize these differences in favor of developing a
general postmodern framework or position.
In this and subsequent chapters, we will begin
shifting the focus away from explication and towards
explanation.

We will now be concerned with providing a

sociological account of postmodernism.

Obviously, this is

not a straightforward or an easy task.

The arguments of

postmodernism pose a formidable challenge to conventional
sociology's epistemological position and many of its
cherished concepts and theories.

In this section, we will,

nevertheless, begin the process of describing what a
"sociological account of postmodernism" might look like and
what it might seek to accomplish through the introduction
of a social epistemological framework.
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The central task of this chapter is to examine the
complex relationship between sociology and postmodern
thought.

The principal argument of this chapter is that

postmodernism can use certain sociological insights to
escape its idealistic, relativistic, and often nihilistic
conclusions.

This encounter between sociology and

postmodernism is viewed as a reciprocal exchange:

What we

will refer to in this chapter as "conventional sociology"
can also benefit from the postmodern position, e.g., from
the postmodern critique of objectivism and correspondence
referentiality.

What follows is not a standard

sociological critique of a philosophical or knowledge
system, but an attempt to develop both a sociologically
informed postmodernism and a postmodernist informed
sociology.

We will draw upon the writings of Baudrillard,

Durkheim, and others to develop our argument.
One of the apparent ironies of this encounter between
sociology and postmodernism is that much of postmodern
theory already shares the general orientation of certain
schools of sociological thought, specifically the outlook
found in certain variants of the sociology of knowledge.
Both postmodernism and elements of sociology exhibit what
could be termed a "de-ontologized" or "de-naturalized"
orientation towards many of the metaphysical,
philosophical, or ideational issues of Occidental culture
and its modern expression (e.g., natural essences, the
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conditions of subjectivity, theory/reality correspondence,
innate rationality, etc.)*

In this regard, sociology and

postmodernism can be seen as sharing a related view of the
mechanism which produce knowledge of the world.
this is where the similarity ends.

However,

There appears to be

little interest in incorporating a sociological position
into the postmodern framework.

As Randall Collins has

noted:
It is widely accepted that questions of knowledge,
of science, of intellectual discourse in general, are
grounded in a social context. Yet philosophy has not
made the transition from the social to the
sociological. Philosophers invoke the social in a
general way and taken-for-granted way, while their use
of actual sociology is meager and often uninformed.1
The reason postmodernism has not relied on sociological
insights is perhaps due to sociology's image as an
exclusively positivistic or realistic endeavour or, as
Collins points out, it may be an "anti-positivist ploy" to
"deny the objective or at least demonstrable nature of
knowledge in general."2 In either case, sociology, it will
be argued, has the intellectual tools for the construction
of a sociologically-informed postmodernism and the material
for an alternative way of thinking about some of the
philosophical quagmires within which postmodern theory
finds itself embedded.

1 Randall Collins, "For a Sociological Philosophy,"
Theory and Society, 17, 1988, p. 669.
2 Ibid., p. 669-70.
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In order to unravel the relationship between sociology
and postmodernism, we will begin our discussion with an
overview of the postmodern theoretical position.

This is

an attempt to summarize and condense the labyrinthine
positions discussed in the previous chapters.

This will be

followed by an examination of conventional sociology's
understanding of its object of analysis and disciplinary
goals.

Specifically, we will focus on sociology's

understanding of the issues of objectivity and social
reality.

Afterward, we will discuss Jean Baudrillard's

critique of that conventional sociological perspective.
Baudrillard, with his declared objective of putting an end
to the social, provides an important postmodern challenge
to conventional sociology's understanding of itself and its
stance on objectivity and correspondence referentiality
(cf. our discussion of language in Chapter 4).

In this

section, we will evaluate the successes and failures of
Baudrillard's and the general postmodern analysis of the
possibilities of reliable knowledge of the social world.
In the succeeding section, we will begin the discussion of
how to merge certain insights of both postmodernism and
sociology— without falling into either the objectivism of
conventional sociology or the relativistic "unknowablity"
of postmodernism.

Here, we will examine Durkheim's

pragmatism lectures given at the Sorbonne in the 1913-14
academic year.

These lectures, it will be argued, provide
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the epistemological roots for rethinking postmodernism's
leveling of all meaning and theoretical expressions.
Finally, we will conclude with a brief discussion of some
important questions raised by our sociological assessment
of postmodern thought.

The Modern and the Postmodern: An Overview
It is quite possible to become lost in the
labyrinthine lexicon of postmodern thought and practice.
Consequently, it is important before discussing the
relationship between sociology and postmodernism to
reexamine the epistemological and general theoretical
position of postmodernism.

The following catagories

provide some of the basic "ideal type" differences between
modern and postmodern thought and their respective cultural
orientations.

Most of these points overlap in some way;

they have been, however, differentiated for the sake of
continuity and simplicity.

Within this admittedly

simplified schemata, postmodernism and modernism are seen
as sets of binary oppositions.
Modern
universality
foundationalism
the apriori
certainty
science
unity/consensus
presence
linearity

Postmodern
incommensurablity
indeterminate truth
the pragmatic
fal1ibility/interpretation
1iterature/poet ics
fragmentation/parology
absence/di fference
non-linearity
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optimism

nihilism3

In this section we will briefly discuss each one of these
binary distinctions for purposes of further clarification.
First of all, in place of modern thought's reliance
upon universal conditions or essences, postmodernism
emphasizes multiple voicing and the incommensurability of
various life forms (i.e., group cultures) or language
games.

For the postmodernists, there are no universal

essences or laws which transcend the locality of culture,
language, history, or the organization of knowledge.

These

localities mark the boundary between radically different
life worlds or forms of life.

From the postmodern

position, there is no need to search for an underlying
element which unites all life worlds.

Any such strategy

would simply be an hegemonic attempt to establish and
affirm the superiority of one classification system and one
truth claim over another.

Thus, for the postmodernists,

determining who is "telling the truth" and who is engaged
in rhetorical pontification is an impossible theoretical
task.
Secondly, since life forms are incommensurable, it
becomes impossible to have firm foundations for making
truth claims.

In postmodernism, truth is a philosophical

3 Some of these categories are adapted from Thomas
McCarthy's Introduction of Habermas', The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), p.
ix.
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ideal which has very little relevance in the actual
establishment of knowledge.

In this regard, postmodernists

are strongly influenced by Nietzsche's linking of power and
knowledge.

For the postmodernists, truth is more an issue

of power/knowledge legitimation than an empiricallydiscovered or rationally-constructed foundational
principle.

Therefore, postmodernists emphasize the local

character and indeterminacy of truth.

When a "truth event"

occurs it is a local event and ultimately a matter of the
power and knowledge matrix at work within a
knowledge/culture producing community or organization.
Consequently, the scientific discovery or isolation of a
causal or first principle or the identification of law-like
patterns is merely a mythical construct to cover what is
actually a very haphazard and power-laden endeavor.
Thirdly, postmodernists emphasize the pragmatic over
the apriori.

The pragmatist approach views truth, in part,

as nothing more than a convenient instrument for the
conduct of daily life or knowledge production.4

Within

this view, foundational truths are impossible to obtain.
Consequently, if truth is to remain it must be stripped of
its metaphysical illusions and viewed as merely an
instrumental means for organizing our experience of the

4 For a discussion of pragmatism and social theory,
cf. Eugene Rochberg-Halton, Meaning and Modernity: Social
Theory in the Pragmatic Attitude (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1986), specifically, pp. 1-23.
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world

(e.g., Rorty).
Fourthly, in place of the modern attempt to ascertain

and establish the certainty of competing truth claims,
postmodernists emphasize the infinite fallibility of such
an enterprise.

For the postmodernists, the world can never

be captured as-it-is.

Knowledge of the world is always

mediated bv pre-existing intellectual cataaories. social
factors. or language.

The best we can do is engage in a

poetic interpretation of the world.

However, the goal of

this interpretation cannot be the recovery of some hidden
dimension or underlying structure, as in depth hermeneutics
(cf. Foucault's critique of hermeneutics).

Such a strategy

would merely be another form of Occidental culture's
endless search for absolute certainty (cf. Derrida's
discussion of "presence").

Instead, the goal of discourse

(if indeed it is a goal) is one marked by a ceaseless
interpretative strategy, where the individual merely writes
for the sake of writing.
This move brings us to the fifth set of catagories.
The postmodernists see themselves engaged in literature or
textual analysis rather than traditional science.

For

them, the intellectual superiority of scientific discourse
over literary discourse cannot be sustained.

Science is

merely one form of writing which differs from literature
only in regard to the level of sophisticated rhetorical
strategies it employs in making and protecting truth
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claims.

Essentially, all knowledge is merely the product

of writing or a text of the world.

Consequently, all that

we can do as intellectuals or scientists is engage in
textual analysis like the literary critic.
Sixthly, in the place of modernity's emphasis on unity
and consensus, postmodernism points to fragmentation and
parology (i.e., conflict).

The postmodernists dismiss as

useless the attempt to construct a unitary framework of
knowledge.

For the postmodernists, knowledge and cultural

production is non-cumulative and non-unified.5

Consensus

is seen as being both a myth and a hazard for contemporary
knowledge production.

It has been and will continue to be

philosophically impossible for scientists or other
knowledge producer to reach a consensus on what counts as
reliable knowledge and successfully to exclude that which
is not appropriate.

Furthermore, the lack of consensus is

not viewed in a negative light.

For the postmodernists, a

pluralistic multiple voicing is the best protection we have
from theoretical hegemony.
Seventhly, modernists generally accept (at least in
some form) a correspondence between word and world (i.e.,
correspondence referentiality).

Words, concepts, and

theories are seen as enabling the investigator to bring a

5 For a discussion of this in science see, Thomas S.
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1962), and Paul Feyerabend,
Against Method (London: New Left Books, 1975).
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social or natural object into the direct light of analysis.
The object is seen as having presence (Derrida), which
means that the object can be immediately brought before the
investigating subject.

This enables the object to be open

to examination and classification.

However, the

postmodernists contend that correspondence referentiality
is an extremely naive perspective.

Like the idealists and

nominalists, postmodernists see words, concepts, and
theories as human constructs without immediate (or
postponed) presence.

When we refer to something in the

world we are employing a differentiated linguistical system
(Saussure) that is a human or cultural creation.

As such,

its bearing on reality-in-itself is non-direct or absent.
Eighthly, postmodernists point to non-linearity over
linearity.

In regard to historical change, postmodernists

emphasize how history is void of any transhistorical logic.
History has no inherent rationality which unfolds into a
preplanned form.

Rather than the modernist emphasis on

evolutionary and temporal linearity, postmodernists stress
historical and temporal relativity.

This historicistic

move enables postmodernism to attack such cherished ideas
as progress, emancipation, and societal evolution.6

There

6 Historically, these terms were used as Euro-American
slogans or ideologies for subjugating the "Third Word."
Recently, various Southern Hemisphere intellectuals have
pointed out the relationship between these concepts and
periphery exploitation.
For a discussion of this in
relation to Marx, see Tsenay Serequeberhan, "Karl Marx and
African Emancipatory Thought: A Critique of Euro-Centric
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historicistic stance is another means for calling into
question the overall modernistic agenda of providing
certain and secure knowledge of the world.
Finally, in place of modernistic optimism,
postmodernism tends to be nihilistic.

Since all knowledge

is a contingent outcome of power, cultural hierarchies, or
rhetoric, there appears to be little hope of establishing
meaning and firm knowledge of the world.

As we shall see

in the next few chapters, these nihilistic conclusions are
one of the central differences between postmodernism and
the sociological position to be presented.
The classification system employed above is very
general.

It is intended merely as a overview— a means for

placing postmodernism in perspective.

In the next section,

we will be concerned with examining the epistemological
orientation of conventional sociology.

As will be shown,

the perspective of conventional sociology is generally
modern in its orientation.

The discussion to follow is

intended as further means for setting the stage for our
view of the theoretical encounter between sociology and
postmodern ism.

Modern Sociology: Between Positivism and Realism
Ernest Gellner has said that "every philosophical baby
that is born alive is either a little positivist or a
Metaphysics," Praxis International, 10, 1990, pp. 161-179.
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little Hegelian."7

This statement also applies to

"sociological babies."

The history of sociology is closely

linked with the larger modern philosophical and scientific
effort to establish firm and reliable knowledge of the
world.

Since Comte's establishment of a "social physics"

in the early nineteenth century, sociologists have sought
to either develop social laws from patterns of sensory
experience (positivism) or provide accurate, rational
interpretations of social phenomena (realism), at least in
theory.

While sociologists may differ over the proper

means for achieving understanding of the social, most are
in agreement over their general intellectual mission, or at
least, seek to give the impression of unity.8
Historically, what has united most conventional
sociologists, regardless of their focus, method, or
theoretical position, is the belief in a real social realm
beyond the subject's definition of the situation and beyond
linguistic signification.

Sociologist may bicker over the

definition of concepts or theoretical interpretations (i.e,
positivist vs interpretive, macro vs micro, or conflict vs
symbolic interactionism), but they are virtually united in
the belief that material conditions, social organization,
interactional networks, or some societal region are sites
7 Ernest Gellner, Relativism and the Social Sciences
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 4.
8 This is perhaps more of a professional ideology than
an indication of "sociology in action."
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of intrinsic meaning or causality.

Philosophers may ponder

the meaning of referentiality and theory/reality
correspondence, but most sociologists take the social to be
real, actual, and determining.

As an anti-nominalist and

anti-idealist enterprise, sociology sees itself as going
beyond the unanswerable and paradoxical questions of
philosophy into something that is pragmatic and empirically
or rationally verifiable.

Sociology sees this move away

from philosophy and metaphysics as allowing it to make
definitive statements on the overall nature of society or
some societal element.
While sociologists are virtually united in their
intellectual mission to uncover the social, they are often
methodologically divided on how to achieve it.9

Since its

inception, conventional sociology has been caught between
two combative epistemologies— positivism and realism.
These divergent epistemologies agree that any type of
science should be an empirical, objective, and rational
activity which produces reliable explanations of the social
or natural world.10

Their disagreement arises over how

these objectives should be achieved.

For the "ideal type"

positivist, the only source of true and reliable knowledge

9 Cf. Everett C. Hughes, The Sociological Eve. Vol. II
(New York: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), pp. 431-477.
10 Russell Keat and John Urry, Social Theory as
Science. 2nd ed. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982),
p. 5.
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is sensory experience.

The point of any scientific

endeavor is to establish lavs from the patterned
regularities of the domain of direct (or systematically
refined) experience.

Knowledge gained through other means

(e.g., deduction, interpretation, metaphysics) is
unreliable since it results in the production of
unverifiable truth claims (i.e., it cannot be tested).
On the other hand, realists argue that any science
should concern itself with uncovering the hidden structures
that produce patterned regularities or outward appearances.
For the realists, truth and reality are hidden below the
surface of visible "events."

The unearthing of meaning

requires some form of indepth analytics to reach this
hidden reality below the surface of appearance.
Consequently, the realist see sociology, in part, as a
constructivist activity, which searches for underlying
structures.

Within this view, the rational mind is seen as

playing a key role in the uncovering and construction of
accurate and reliable knowledge of the social world.
These two conceptualizations of the proper orientation
for doing science have produced two intellectual (and
political) camps, two styles of intellectual work, and two
types of sociologists.

One follows the dictates of

positivistic epistemology by seeking to locate patterned
laws of the social; the other is concerned with uncovering
a deep reality.

Like their epistemological counterparts,
<1
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both are in agreement that sociological methods should
capture, and sociological knowledge report, the social
world-as-it-is.

Their differences are centered around the

issues of the appropriate methodology to employ to reach
and recover the social (i.e., scientific or interpretative,
cf. the methodenstreit debate in late nineteenth-century
social theory) and the proper level at which to find social
reality.11
Positivistic sociologists believe in the existence of
a social world beyond individual experience and
signification.

They claim that the social "exists prior to

and independently of such (sociological) knowledge."12
The social world and its elements can be recovered through
the use of methods which exact and refine sensory
experience (i.e., scientific method, often of a
quantitative variety).

This position is best exemplified

by Durkheim*s attempt to establish the existence of "social
facts." Durkheim defined social facts as a constraint which
is "general throughout a given society, while at the same
time existing in its own right independent of its

11 For a discussion of this see Anthony Giddens (ed.),
"Introduction" in Positivism and Sociology (London:
Heinemann, 1974), pp. 1-22.
12 Derek Layder, "Beyond Empiricism? The Promise of
Realism," Philosophy of Social Science 15, 1988, p. 255.
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individual manifestations."13

For the positivist camp,

Durkheim*s classic study of suicide, with its statistical
revelation of social facts, is a model of what the science
of society should be doing.14
The sociological realist questions the appropriate
methodology and "unit of analysis" for the reappropriation
of the socially real.

In other words, the realist position

does not agree with the positivist description and
presentation of the social.

Since the human sciences are

inevitably linked with, and caught within, the social
world, it is impossible to utilize the same positivistic
methodology as the physical sciences which deal exclusively
with inert matter.

What is needed are rational methods of

interpretation which uncover deep or hidden meaning.
Meaning for the hermeneutically inclined realists does not
lay at the surface.

Therefore, meaning can not be obtained

through sensory experience alone, as it is for the
positivists.

A proper methodology requires some

combination of sensory data and rational interpretation to
establish a conjunction of events.
The realist way of seeing the social is perhaps best
represented in Marx's "materialist conception of history."

13 Emile Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method,
trans. by S. Solovay and J. Mueller (New York: The Free
Press, 1966), p. 13.
14 Emile Durkheim, Suicide, trans. by J.A. Spaulding
and G. Simpson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).
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Marx wanted to distance his work methodologically from both
the idealism of Hegelian philosophy and the positivism of
"vulgar economics."

In the German Ideology. Marx and

Engels tackle the problems of idealism.

In one of their

most powerful and sarcastic critiques of the implications
of idealism they write:

"once upon a time an honest fellow

had the idea that men were drowned in water only because
they were possessed of the idea of gravity."15

Later, in

a more analytical statement, Marx concluded:
To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain,
i.e., the process of thinking, which under the
name of "the Idea," he even transforms into an
independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real
world, and the real world is only the external,
phenomenal for "the Idea." With me, on the
contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the
material world reflected by the human mind, and
translated into forms of thought.16
However, this rejection of Hegel did not lead Marx to
abandon the rationalism of idealism in favor of the pure
sensory inclination of positivism.

Marx was also skeptical

of the positivistic perspective, which only analyzes "the
superficial, phenomenal or apparent features of social and
economic life."17

In this sense, the Marxist view of

social reality serves as a model for the realistically

15 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology
(New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 2.
16 Karl Marx, Capital. Vol I.(Moscow: Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1954), p. 19.
17 Keat and Urry, Social Theory as Science. 1982, p.
99.
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inclined sociologist.

Sociologists should employ both

observation and logic in their construction of the true
causal structure of events or phenomena.
The sociological orientation towards the social world,
in either its positivistic or realistic vein, certainly has
its advantages, at least in an instrumental sense.

The

taken-for-granted existence of the social, backed by the
objective or rational measurements of quantitative or
qualitative methodology, allows sociologists to make what
they believe to be absolute pronouncements on a range of
social principles, issues, and problems.

However, in doing

so both schools of sociology open themselves up to a series
of philosophical attacks and a general intellectual
skepticism (cf. Foucault's discussion of the human sciences
in an Chapter 5).

First of all, from a postmodern

position, conventional sociology is unable to explain how
the sociologist can be removed from the cultural and
linguistic scene to give an objectivistic account of social
reality.

Nor is conventional sociology able definitively

to state or explain how it is that its concepts, measures,
or interpretations come to capture accurately and report
unmediated social reality (i.e., the problem of
reflexivity).

Seen from the vantage point of post-

positivistic postmodernism, the failure of modernistic
sociology to address adequately these issues makes it an
extremely problematic discipline and its knowledge content
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suspect.
In the section to follow, we will explore Jean
Baudrillard's postmodern critique of conventional
sociological positivism and realism.

In this encounter we

can better see the theoretical positions at work in both
sociology and postmodernism and postmodernism's important
challenge to the conventional sociological framework.

Baudrillard and the End of the Social-as-Real
The early work of Jean Baudrillard in the late 1960's
and early 1970's sought to supplement traditional Marxist
theory with insights from structural linguistics and
semiotics.18

Baudrillard was then concerned with

understanding political economy as a semiological system of
sign consumption rather than as a specific mode of economic
production.

For Baudrillard, contemporary society is a

post-industrial one— marked by mass consumption.

As such,

the logic of its dynamics are to found at a different level
than a production-oriented society.

Baudrillard envisions

consumption, not in the traditional Marxist terms of an
usurping of use value by exchange value with the
development of the capitalist mode of production, but as "a
system which assures the regulations of signs and

18 Cf. Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of the
Political Economy of the Sion, trans. by Charles Levin (St.
Louis: Telos Press, (1972) 1981.
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integration of the group."19

This means that a consumer

society "substitutes a social order of values and
classification for a contingent world of needs and
pleasures, the natural and biological order."20
Consequently, in consumer society:
Marketing, purchasing, sales, the acquisition of
differentiated commodities and object/signs— all
of these presently constitute our language, a code
with which our entire society communicates and
speaks of and to itself. Such is the present
structure of communication...21
The underlying code or language of consumer society is
distinct from the underlying code of an industrial or
production oriented society.

The code of consumer society

is marked, not bv the underlying dynamics of class conflict
and exchange rationale, but bv a proliferation of
consumption inducing signs.
By the late 1970's the language or code of consumer
society had become all-pervasive for Baudrillard.

The

proliferation of the commodity sign, made possible by the
simulational world of television and other informational
technologies, had completely permeated the sphere of
language, communication, and as a consequence, society.

As

William Bogard has described it:

19 Jean Baudrillard, "Consumer Society" in Mark Poster
(ed.), Selected Writings (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1988), p. 46.
20 Ibid., p. 47.
21 Ibid., p. 48.
232

What fascinates modern man, and what finds its
support in the hi-tech, digitalized world of
post-industrial consumer society, is electronic
simulation (television, which for us has become
more true than true; computer models, more real
than real), fashion (more beautiful than beautiful),
catastrophe (more eventful than the event)...22
Essentially, post-industrial consumer society is so
"entangled in illusion that the distinction between true
and false. TV and reality, cannot legitimately be made."23
With this proliferation and blurring of original notions of
direct signification caused by the various informational
technologies, the real has become the hyperreal.

"We have

become completely absorbed by models, completely absorbed
by fashion, completely absorbed by simulation."24

As a

result, traditional notions of referentiality have
collapsed.
the real."25

The "precession of the model...puts an end to
It becomes impossible to establish

correspondence referentiality in a climate where the sign
replaces and obliterates the object it originally

22 William Bogard, "Closing Down the Social:
Baudrillard's Challenge to Contemporary Sociology,"
Sociological Theory, 8, 1990, p. 4.
23 Steven Best, "The Commodification of Reality and
the Reality of Commodification: Jean Baudrillard and PostModernism, " in Current Perspectives in Social Theory, ed.
by John Wilson (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1989), p. 38,
emphasis added.
24 Jean Baudrillard, "Fatal Strategies," in Selected
Writjpgs, 1988, p. 187.
25 Jean Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent
Majorities (New York: Jean Baudrillard and Semiotext(e),
1983), p. 98-99.
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represented (e.g., "is it real...or is it memorex").
Reality has been replaced by appearance.

It becomes

impossible to distinguish between the real and simulacrum.
One important result of the collapse of referentialitv
is that what we once called society has become an
indistinguishable "mass." Cultural, ethnic, and class
differences are becoming leveled by the homogeneous (and
homogenizing) hum of the television and related
simulational technologies.26

In Baudrillard's words, "the

masses are no longer a referent because they no longer
belong to the order of representation."27

The masses as a

signifier no longer corresponds to an object-in-the-world.
The masses no longer can be referred to as a civil society,
culture, "the people," class, or a repository for
revolution or social action.

All referentiality and with

it all attached meanings have been leveled.

With this

leveling comes the "implosion" of the social-as-signifier.
The social has become empty.28

Baudrillard writes:

....If the social is both destroyed by what produces
it (the media, information) and reabsorbed by what it
produces (the masses), it follows that its definition
26 The leveling of ethnic and class differences has
also been pointed out by North American mass media critics,
cf. George Gerbner, "Television: A New State Religion?" Et
Cetera, 34, 1977.
27 Baurdillard, In the Shadow of the Silent
Majorities. 1983, p. 20.
28 Baudrillard is not only saying that the social has
disappeared, he is also arguing that the social has never
existed, cf. Ibid., pp. 71-72
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is empty, and that this term which serves as universal
alibi for every discourse, no longer analyses anything,
no longer designates anything. Not only is it
superfluous and useless...it conceals that it is
only abstraction and residue, or even simply
an effect of the social, a simulation and an
illusion.29
The social as a "universal alibi" for politicians and
social scientists has ceased to exist.

The social as a

grand concept or reality principle has been destroyed by
information technologies and redeployed in an
undifferentiated or undifferentiatiable mass. Here, the
social ceases to have hermeneutical meaning or critical
potentiality.
(The masses) don't express themselves, they are
surveyed. They don't reflect upon themselves, they
are tested. The referendum (and the media are a
constant referendum of directed questions and
answers) has been substituted for the
political referent. Now polls, tests, the
referendum, media are devices which no longer
belong to a dimension of representation, but to
one of simulation.30
As further evidence of the collapse of the social,
Baudrillard cites the refusal of the French to protest the
extradition of a German lawyer (Klaus Croissant) while a
soccer match was on television.31

A sociality (i.e., a

sense of social identity) with any inherent meaning has
ceased to exists.

He asks, "where is sociality in Los

29

Ibid., p. 66.

30

Ibid., p. 20.

31

Ibid., p. 12.
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Angeles?"32
For Baudrillard, the rise of the undifferentiated mass
marks, not only the end or implosion of the social, but
also the end of that positivistic or realistic discourse
which developed and sought to capture it— sociology.
Sociology, as the master discourse on the social, no longer
has an object— a point of reference— a signified.
Therefore, it dies alongside the social.

Baudrillard

writes:
Sociology can only depict the expansion of the social
and its vicissitudes.
It survives only on the positive
and definitive hypothesis of the social. The
reabsorption, the implosion of the social escapes it.
The hypothesis of the death of the social is also
that of its own death.33
The social and sociology have been swallowed up by a new
version of society.

In this version all transcendence and

referentialitv are impossible.

In other words, it is no

longer possible for the "all-knowing sociologist" to
utilize the term "society" to capture the social.

Speaking

as sociologist (or more accurately as an ex-sociologist),
Baudrillard writes:
The situation no longer permits us to isolate reality
or human nature as a fundamental variable. The result
is therefore not to provide any additional information
or to shed any light on reality, but on the contrary,
because we will never in the future be able to separate
reality from its statistical, simulative projection
in the media, a state of suspense and definitive

32 Ibid., p. 83.
33 Ibid., p. 4.
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uncertainty about reality.34
Sociology then dissolves into a form of literature,
poetics, or science fiction— although the "gibberish of the
'social sciences' will still echo it, i.e., the social,
long after its disappearance."35

It no longer can claim a

privileged epistemological position from which to express
and defend its truth claims.

Sociology's epistemological

position was based on the ability of its perspective and
concepts to extract meaning from (or impart meaning to) the
social.

These meaning-extracting and granting functions of

sociology are no longer possible in an era marked by the
social's disappearance.

The traditional type of social,

that is the actively-constructed, community based culture,
has been upsurbed by a simulational mass society.
Ironically, Baudrillard's argument is a social theory
of the death of social theory.

It is meant to be a type of

final word on the irrelevance of sociology in the
contemporary world.36

Henceforth, Baudrillard commits

himself to writing something akin to science fiction or an

34 Jean Baudrillard, "The Masses," in Mark Poster
(ed.), Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 210.
35 Baudrillard, In the Shadow of the Silent
Majorities. 1983, p. 68.
36 In this regard, cf. Alvin W. Gouldner, The Coming
Crisis in Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970).
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"absurdist pataphysics" (i.e., emotionally based
comments).37

This science fiction may have "flashes of

insights," but it is literature or poetics rather than
traditional critique, analysis, or theory.

The goal of

analysis is to become excessive and exuberant.

Baudrillard

writes:
(Theory) must become excessive and sacrificial
to speak about excess and sacrifice.
It must
become simulation if it speaks about simulation,
and deploy the same strategy as its object.
If
it speaks about seduction, theory must become the
seducer, and deploy the same stratagems...38
Sociology's only option is to become hyper-conformist.

It

must, in a Nietzschian way, recognize the mass "as the
repository of a finally delusive, illusive, and allusive
strategy, the correlative of an ironic, joyful, and
seductive conscious."39
In many ways, Baudrillard can be seen as bringing
postmodern problematics into sociology.

What was once

merely an obscure and arcane debate in philosophy,
architecture, and literary criticism has now infiltrated
the "serious discourse" of the social sciences.

For

Baudrillard. not only is the individual decentered, but
also the social.

It seems that the social is as unstable

37 Cf. Best, "The Commodification of Reality," 1989,
p. 36. One of the most illustrative examples of this style
of writing is Baudrillard's, America (London: Verso, 1988).
38 Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication (New
York: Semiotext(e), 1988), p. 27.
39 Baudrillard, "The Masses," 1988, p. 217.
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as modernist "man."

The social, it turns out is not able

to take the place of the subject, as the structuralist
seemed to argue.

Baudrillard's "critique" of sociology is

a clever and ironical attack upon the epistemological
position and cherished principles of the discipline.
Baudrillard, the social is a text without depth.

For

It is

nothing (and never has been anything) but a system of
signification.

When this signification becomes confused or

blurred, the social simply ceases to exist— it dies or
implodes.
Baudrillard, as with most postmodernists, generally
offers us a nominalistic view of the social.

Within this

framework, when sociologists speak of the social or any of
its elements or characteristics (e.g., social class,
status, anomie, alienation, etc.), they are not talking
about a real realm or real phenomena.

Essentially,

sociologists are giving an artificial and arbitrary
signifier, which could easily be represented in another way
or not represented at all.

Consequently, sociology is

trying to create meaning and causality in a realm which
lacks independent substance.

There is no correspondence

between the sociological word and the social world.

Within

the Baudrillardian and the nominalistically-influenced
postmodern framework, if referentiality is no longer
possible, then all hopes of finding fixed, determinate
meaning (such as in the social) ceases to be possible.
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The

only courses of action which remains are nihilistic
surrender or endless and meaningless literary
pontification— a rather necessary, but not sufficient,
aspect of the transition to a different intellectual
culture.
Despite his playful idiosyncrasies, Baudrillard is
offering an important critique of the modern, conventional
sociology discussed earlier.

Both the positivists and

realists rest their truth claims on grasping the social as
it exists:

If we accept Baudrillard's argument, this task

is no longer possible.

In the context of his views,

sociologists are at best bad poets or at worst
unsophisticated con artists1
Baudrillard's vision of the social is as unacceptable
as the objectivistic positivism and realism of conventional
sociology.

We can no more accept the idea that our

sociological concepts capture and illuminate the social-initself, than we can accept Baudrillard's postmodern
position that the social is merely signification-withoutreference.

Both perspectives represent the extremes of

objectivism and nominalism.

They either promote their

knowledge as completely accurate or they argue that
concepts are relative and have no validity.

Both

perspectives need new ways of conceiving the social which
avoids both all-knowing objectivism and the total collapse
of meaning in postmodernist relativism and nihilism.
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In the next section, we take up this issue of how we
can develop a view of the social which avoids (not solves)
the problems of both conventional sociology and
postmodernism.

This does not involve a fateful strategy of

out-manoeuvreing one's opponent.
impossible.

This is philosophically

It is more along the lines of thinking of the

social and social investigations in different terms.
Fortunately, the material for this construction is already
in place.

The late work of Durkheim provides a means for

examining the postmodern position and for providing an
alternative vision of epistemology.

Rethinking Durkheim;

The Encounter with Pragmatism

Durkheim is generally recognized to be the individual
responsible for the establishment of sociology as an
objectivistic and positivistic endeavor.

As such, he is

generally considered by critics to be one of the most
extreme advocates of the conventional sociology discussed
earlier.

There is certainly enough evidence to support

this position.

In The Rules of Sociological Method.

Durkheim proclaimed sociology's intellectual mission as the
search for "social facts."40

Sociology is to be an

objective discipline "dominated entirely by the idea that

40 Durkheim, The Rules of Sociological Method. 1966,
pp 1-13.
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social facts are things and must be treated as such."41
However, in this section, and in the next chapter, we would
like to go beyond the objectivism and facticity of
Durkheim's social facts into a Durkheimian-based sociology
of knowledge.

This sociology of knowledge was introduced

in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life, however, it
seems to come to its fruition in his encounter with
American pragmatism.

It is this encounter we wish to

explore, for it seems to provide an important means for
evaluating the total collapse of meaning in postmodernism.
First, however, a brief caveat on two very unlikely
compatriots, Nietzsche and Durkheim.

Nietzsche and Durkheim
Two important declarations on God were made in the
late nineteenth century.

The most notorious of these

statements was Nietzsche's affirmative proclamation, "God
is dead."

The other, by Durkheim, declared that "God and

society are one."42

At first glance, it would appear that

these statements have little in common beyond their point
of reference.

The former statement was made to signal the

end of moral and philosophical foundationalism and the
dawning of a postmodern age of nihilism and unverifiable

41 Ibid., p. 143.
42 Emile Durkheim, The, Elementary Forms of Religious
Life, trans. by J.H. Swain (London: Allen & Unwin), p. 206.
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truth claims.

The latter statement was made as part of an

effort to establish a science of society and allow for
definitive truth declarations.

Generally, Durkheim's

statement is seen as affirming and extending the
explanatory power of modern notions of rationality and
science.

However, from a sociology of knowledge

perspective these statements can be read as complementary
theoretical visions.
When Nietzsche argued that God was dead he was not
simply making a statement about the secularization of
Occidental culture.

He was also saying that all efforts at

establishing transcendental or extra-human knowledge are in
vain.

Essentially, Nietzsche was using the death of "God"

as a metaphor for the inevitable demise of modern science's
epistemological myth of transcendental or objectivistic
knowledge.

At a certain level, this argument is parallel

to what Durkheim is arguing about the relationship between
God and society.

In arguing that explanations of God must

be found in the collective organization of the social,
Durkheim is too saying that the transcendental and
metaphysical explanations of God and truth are
unacceptable.

Both Nietzsche and Durkheim seek to replace

philosophically-based truth claims, with a different
version of belief/knowledge production.

For both Nietzsche

and Durkheim, all phenomena are "human, all-too-human."
However, it is at this point that these two related visions
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of the exhaustion of traditional philosophy part company.
We have traced the Nietzschian-inspired postmodern path
into nihilism.

Now we will explore the sociological path.

Durkheim's Pragmatism Lectures
During the 1913-14 academic year, Durkheim gave a
series of lectures on pragmatism at the Sorbonne.

Marcel

Mauss refer to these lectures as "the crowning achievement
of Durkheim's philosophical work."43

The verbatim content

of the lectures were never published and were subsequently
lost.

However, under the guidance of Mauss, the lectures

were compiled and later published using student lecture
notes.44

The content of these lectures reveal a different

and more complex Durkheim than the one given by and adapted
into conventional sociology.

As Armand Cuvillier remarks

in the Preface to the French edition, in these lectures
"Durkheim's sociological realism finally resolves itself
into a theory of knowledge which is at the same time
idealistic and realistic."45

These lectures serve as a

platform for Durkheim to explore "the nature and function

43 Quoted in Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim; His Life
and Work (London: Allen Lange, 1973), p. 485.
44 Originally published as Praomatisme et socioloaie
(Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1955). Translated
by J.C. Whitehouse as, Pragmatism and Sociology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1983).
45 Ibid., p. xv.
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of concepts, and the role of speculative thought.H*4
Through a disucssion of Durkheim's encounter with
pragmatism, we will perhaps find a way of rethinking the
total collapse or leveling of all meaning in postmodernism.
As the title of the lectures suggests, Durkheim seeks
to come to grips with the American pragmatist movement.

He

is sympathetic to the general attempt of pragmatism "to
soften truth."47

However, Durkheim has serious

reservations about pragmatism's amorphous conclusions
(i.e., its formlessness and relativism).

Durkheim

appreciates pragmatism's "heightened sense of human
reality, the feeling for the extreme variability of
everything human."40

Specifically, he accepts the

pragmatists arguments that reality is unstable and that
truth is a human product.
sociology are in agreement.

On these points, pragmatism and
Durkheim writes:

History begins nowhere and it ends nowhere.
Everything in man has been made by mankind in
the course of time. Consequently, if truth is human,
it too is a human product. Sociology applies the
same conception to reason. All that constitutes
reason, its principles and categories, has been
made in the course of history.49
However, the pragmatists take this revelation about the
human construction of truth to mean that the only
46

Ibid., p. xl

47

Ibid., p. 67.

48

Ibid., p. 71.

49

Ibid., p. 67.
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conceptualization of truth that is possible is one where it
is conceived as a convenient instrument for the attainment
of individual goals.

For the pragmatists, truth has only a

practical or utilitarian value.

Truth is nothing more than

a helpful means for the organization of individual
experience and for the conduct of daily life.50

This

being the case, the pragmatist conclude that there is no
need for any broader, cumulative, or speculative
philosophy.
It is on this point that Durkheim and the pragmatists
part company.

For Durkheim the revelations of the human

character and instability of truth does not mean that it
has ceased to serve as a guiding principle of a society or
group.

For Durkheim, truth is best conceived of as a

"collective representation."

As such, truth, like

morality, has an "obligatory nature," rather than merely a
philosophical or epistemological one.51

"Truth is a norm

50 Durkheim seems to be refering more to the
pragmatism of James than that of Dewey or Pierce.
For
example, Pierce once wrote, "...the real is the idea in
which the community ultimately settles down..." quoted in,
C. Wright Mills, Sociology and Pragmatism (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1969), p. 202. Pierce's social theory of
reality seems close to Durkheim's conceptualization.
However, Pierce does not believe that the community
actually constitutes the truth. The community will
eventually appropriate the nature of reality. Dewey
promotes a consensus theory of truth, similar to
Durkheim's, yet it relies on a much more individualistic
version of society. Undoubtedly, Durkheim presents a
simplified view of pragmatism.
51 Durkheim, Pragmatism and Sociology. 1983, p. 98.

for thought in the same way that the moral ideal is a norm
for conduct."52

Hence:

We are not free in a state of certainty. We feel
obliged to adhere to truth. We see our certainty
as something that is not personal to us, and that is
to be shared by all men. Whether this is an illusion
or not, we have that belief.53
Truth, then, is something beyond individual experience and
individual utility.

It cannot be adequately understood in

the subjectivistic terms described by the pragmatists.

A

better understanding is provided from a sociology of
knowledge perspective.
While Durkheim agreed with the pragmatists that truth
has no ultimate metaphysical foundation and we can
therefore "no longer accept a single, invariable system of
catagories or intellectual frameworks," its sacred nature
does serve as a means to orient life and for the social
production of knowledge.54
It could well be that certainty is essentially
something collective. We are onlv certain when we
are certain that we are not the only ones who are
certain. Even when we have worked out a personal
belief, we need to communicate it, in order to
to be certain that we are not mistaken. The authority
of tradition and opinion is not, of course, exempt
from criticism. When we criticize them, however,
it is always in their*own name. When, for example,
we criticize popular prejudices in the name of science,
we are using the authority which opinion accords to

52

Ibid., p. 98.

53

Ibid., p. 101.

54

Ibid., p. 71.
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science.55
Both pragmatism and the Durkheimian sociology of knowledge
agree that certainty and truth are not absolute catagories
derived from the real world.

However, unlike the

subjectivistic implications drawn by pragmatism, sociology
emphasizes that certainty and truth are socially contingent
issues that are worked-out and negotiated through
interaction with others.

Furthermore, if there are

disagreements on truth, there is an appeal to legitimate
authority/knowledge structures to determine the outcome of
competing claims.56

Durkheim concludes that "if there are

ways of acting which impose themselves on us through
collective authority, why should there not be ways of
thinking that would impose themselves on us in the same
way, through the authority of the collective
consciousness. "57
Durkheim further concludes that "the concepts worked
out by the masses and those worked out by scientists are
not essentially different in nature."58

Both are products

of the confines of particular knowledge producing
55 Ibid., p. 102, emphasis added. Cf. Baudrillard's
vision of the "social," discussed earlier in this chapter.
56 This is similar to Habermas' position described
earlier, however, Durkheim does not wish to use this
insight to develop a larger emancipatory model.
In this
regard, it is perhaps closer to Nietzsche's power/knowledge
perspective.
57 Durkheim, Pragmatism and Sociology. 1983, p. 101.
58 Ibid., p. 105.
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Durkheim writes:

Concepts which are collective in origin (as all
concepts really are) take on in our eyes, even when
their object in not a real one, such a strength that
it appears to be real. That is why concepts acquire
the vividness and force of action, of sensations.59
Durkheim acknowledges the arbitrary nature of concepts, but
this does not mean that they are socially or heuristically
meaningless.

Within the confines of a community or

society, these concepts have a collective representation
(collective symbolism) that extends their meaning beyond
the dictates of the philosophical community and its
arguments about referentiality or correspondence.

These

concepts serve to orient the conduct of social life.
In these lectures (and throughout his work) one could
certainly raise objections to Durkheim's hegemonic and
totalizing use (to borrow some terms from Foucault) of
collective consciousness and collective representation, but
conclude that Durkheim's basic point is still valid.60
From a Durkheimian sociology of knowledge perspective, even
if we dispense with the traditional philosophical notions
of truth and concept/reality correspondence, meaning does
not become disintegrated and scattered.

There remain

59 Ibid., p. 101.
60 This totalizing of collective consciousness led to
the development of the control position in theoretical
sociology. To avoid this, it would seen more appropriate
to break Durkheim's totalizing collective representation
into smaller sub-fields which compete in knowledge
production and vie for legitimation.
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interactional networks and authority hierarchies which
organize and utilize the notion (or ideology) of truth.
Granted this is not the idea of truth sought after by the
majority of Western philosophy, we can say that it is still
a guiding pragmatic principle of the organization of
society.
One of Durkheim's central arguments in these lectures
is that issues of truth and reality cannot be adeguately
dealt with through a traditional philosophical or
epistemological reading.
sociology of knowledge.

An adequate accounting requires a
The sociology of knowledge is not

concerned with drawing distinctions between true and false
forms of knowledge.

Rather, it is concerned with

accounting for the how and why of knowledge production.

It

is this point that is most crucial for our discussion and
requires further elaboration.
There are some important parallels between
postmodernism and pragmatism which make Durkheim's lectures
most poignant for our considerations.

Both pragmatism and

postmodernism seek to move away from traditional philosophy
and both tend to level the distinctions between fact and
fiction, science and literature, and professional and lay
interpretations.

However, the critical point that can be

extracted from Durkheim is that while this move is
"philosophically logical," at least within the defined
goals of classical philosophy, it is not "sociologically
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logical."

In making this move, both the postmodernists and

pragmatists end up denying the socially (or group)
constituted performative nature of truth.

Within the

intellectual framework of philosophy, it indeed may be no
longer possible firmly to establish foundational truth by
capturing the world-as-it-is.

However, sociologically, the

ideal of truth still has meaning.
One of the central reasons that the social version of
truth still has meaning is due to the absence of a
correspondence between the social version and nature of
truth and the philosophical version.

Essentially, the two

versions were never connected or compatible— they are
incommensurable.

From the sociology of knowledge

perspective, we can say that revealing that philosophy can
no longer distinguish between fact and fantasy does not
require that people begin marching in the streets demanding
a restoration of correspondence referentiality or that
scientists stop working because their concepts no longer
enable them to construct a computer or engage in bio
technology research.

Concepts such as truth and reality

have a certain social facticity beyond the idiosyncratic
idealistic debates of philosophical discourse (or any
discourse).

Hence, the collapse of meaning in pragmatism

and postmodernism does not tell us anything about the
collapse or non-collapse of the organization and production
of reality and truth.

It only tells us why one particular
251

productional rationale of truth and one version of reality
are no longer ideationally possible.

Commenting on the

pragmatic leveling of truth, Durkheim writes:
(For the pragmatists) reason is placed on the
same plane as sensitivity; truth on the same plane
as sensations and instincts.
But men have always
recognized in truth something that in certain respects
imposes itself on us, something that is independent
of the facts of sensitivity and individual impulses...
It is one thing to cast doubt on the correspondence
between symbols and reality: but it is quite another
to reject the thing symbolized along with the
symbol.61
Essentially, this is an ironic vindication of
transcendence; it can be considered the outcome of both
pragmatic and postmodern thought.

In postmodernism's

idealistic and pragmatism's subjectivistic collapse or
leveling of all meaning, they inevitably throw out the
object with the symbol.

The symbol or the idea is seen as

being more concrete, real, and confining than the actual
object.

Objects only exist as mental representations.

Once these representations have been "deconstructed," the
object ceases to be "real" and produce "real" consequences.
Again, this may make philosophical sense, but it does not
make sociological sense.

Indeed, the relationship between

signifier and signified may be ideationally arbitrary and a
correspondence between word and world may not exist, but
this does not mean that these distinctions are socially
meaningless or cease to have social or group importance.

61 Ibid., p. 68.
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For Durkheim and the sociology of knowledge, the "pressure
that truth is seen as exercising on minds is itself a
symbol that must be interpreted, even if we refuse to make
of truth something absolute and extra-human.w62

On this

point, Durkheim writes:
Pragmatism, which levels everything, deprives itself
of the means of making this interpretation by failing
to recognize the duality that exists between the
mentality which results from individual experiences and
that which results from collective experiences.
Sociology, however, reminds us that what is social
always possesses a higher dignity than what is
individual. The sociological point of view has the
advantage of enabling us to analyze even that august
thing, truth.63
Unlike pragmatism, postmodernism does make a distinction
between individual experience and the socio-historical
constitution of the individual.

However, there is no

distinction between the philosophical view of the world and
the social world.

Despite arguments to the contrary,

postmodernism essentially is still caught up in a realistic
correspondence model of word and world referentiality.
Only within such a model would it be possible to claim that
Occidental reason is logocentric (Derrida), or that the
metanarratives of modernity have collapsed (Lyotard), or
that the social has imploded (Baudrillard).

Giving up this

model requires more than a new philosophical position
(modern— postmodern, pos itivism— postpos itivism,

62 Ibid., p. 68.
63 Ibid., p. 68.
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constructionism— deconstructionism).

It requires a

sociologically based model which dispenses with determining
who has a better representation of reality or who is
providing us with a true account of a given phenomenon and
turns to the issue of the social production of reality,
truth, and knowledge.

This of course does require some

degree of realism— perhaps a cautious or constructivist
realism (We will discuss this further in the next chapter).
But perhaps this is a necessity in all linguistically or
symbolically based statements or programs.

Conclusion
In this chapter, we have sought to sketch out what an
encounter between postmodernism and sociology might look
like.

As stated earlier, this encounter was not intended

as a sociological critique of postmodernism or as a
postmodern critique of sociology.

We have tried to show

that postmodernism, as an essentially philosophically based
perspective, is somewhat sociologically naive, particularly
in regard to its total collapse of meaning.

Yet, the same

can be said of the objectivistic position of conventional
sociology.
The proceeding exposition raises three important and
related questions for the sociology of knowledge position
presented herein.

First of all, does the outcome of this

encounter mean that sociology has to give up its privileged
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epistemological position on the social?

Secondly, can we

assume that sociology is a form of literature or poetics?
And, finally, how can such an analysis given in this
chapter avoid the problem of reflexivity (i.e., why should
we believe this position's truth claims)?

We can only

answer these questions in a provisional way here.

We will

take up these questions throughout the remainder of this
work.
In regard to the first point, if we see sociology in
the traditional way, the answer has to be, yes.

Sociology

can not defend the position that it has a privileged or
superior access to truth.

However, this does not mean that

sociology has nothing to say or that its intellectual
products are meaningless.

Questions of this nature can

always be seen from either a philosophical or sociological
perspective.
or poetics.

Nor does it mean that sociology is literature
If indeed sociology is merely literature, we

must insert the sociological point that all literature is
not socially the same.

Hence, we can always sidestep the

philosophical position with a sociological one and vice
versa.
Finally, in regard to the problem of reflexivity, it
has been said that philosophers never solve problems, they
only become bored with them.

Perhaps the same is true for

postmodernly inclined philosophers and practitioners of the
sociology of knowledge.

There is really no clear way out
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of the problem of reflexivity.
ironic intellectual trap.

It is a spiralin? and

As Hilary Lawson has written:

For to recognize the importance of language is to do
so within the language. To argue that the character of
the world is in part due to the concepts employed, is
to employ those concepts. To insist that we are
confined by the limitations of our own problematic
is to be confined within those very limits.64
While this may not mean "business as usual" within
sociology or any other field, it can be said that if we
simply refuse to reflect on such isssues, we still are
confronted by the need to end the metatheoretical spiral
somewhere.

Thus, perhaps it is not a matter of selecting

one strategy which forever avoids the problem of
reflexivity, but a matter of deciding on a pragmatically
cautious or constructivist version of reality.

Within the

logical of this position, reality can be used if it
reconized to be a socially constructed heuristic device— a
way of making statments and not an objectivistic
foundation.
In the next two chapters we will take up the specific
ways in which both reality and truth can be perceived in
sociological, rather than traditional philosophical, terms.
64 Hilary Lawson, Reflexivity: The Post-Modern
Predicament (La Salle, IL: Open Court Press, 1985.), p. 9.
Cf. the Goedel Theorem in Mathematics, which maintains that
no logical argument can be made merely by an appeal to
concepts and notions within a given arithematic system;
consistency has to come from another system with stronger
resources.
It is also worth noting that there may be some
parallels between postmodern philosophy and chaos theory in
physics.
Both emphasize, to one degree or another,
randomness and undecidability.
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CHAPTER VIII
FROM A PHILOSOPHY TO A SOCIOLOGY OF TRUTH:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOCIOLOGY
OF KNOWLEDGE
In the preceding chapter, ve began the process of
rethinking postmodernism's frontal attack on all aspects of
meaning through the introduction of a Durkheimianinfluenced sociology of knowledge.

It was argued that

postmodernism is perhaps philosophically correct, yet
sociologically naive, when it dispenses with the concept of
reality and levels down all truth and validity claims.

In

fact, it can be argued that this leveling represents the
type of totalizing thinking (cf. Foucault's discussion of
totalizing discourse) which postmodernism itself seems to
deplore in modern discursive formations.

We concluded that

the postmodern position, despite its argument of being
"post-philosophical," is still deeply enveloped within a
philosophical or epistemological way of seeing and
explaining the world.

Essentially, it may be said that

certain forms of postmodernism remain caught within the
"idealist fallacy," that is, "the belief that all
significant forms of order may be reduced to language like
processes."1 As a consequence of this position, when

1 Timothy J. Reiss, The Uncertainty of Analysis:
Problems in Truth. Meaning, and Culture (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1988), p. 4.
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language or theory "orders" are seen as being no longer
capable of capturing unmediated reality, all discursive
meaning effectively implodes or ends and all "orders"
effectively collapse.

As a result of this philosophical or

idealistic way of perceiving the world, contemporary theory
has a tendency to either become a referentless poetics
(i.e., a form of fiction) or entangled in an inescapable
and hopeless nihilism.
In this chapter, we will continue our search for a
sociological means for reconsidering the issues of reality
and truth.

Specifically, we will discuss the contributions

a sociology of knowledge, particularly in its neoDurkheimian variant, can make for our appraisal of
postmodernism.

We will draw upon the work of Mannheim,

Latour, and others.
Essentially, we will argue three points.

First, while

this sociological version is not unproblematic, it does
point to the existence of a different framework for
approaching such fundamental and traditional philosophical
distinctions or crucial dualities as reality and
appearance, truth and myth, knowledge and belief, and
objectivism and relativism.

Secondly, we will argue that

all of these distinctions, in one way or another, rest on
the realist position that an objective account of social or
natural reality is or has been possible.

This

correspondence account (i.e., that theory captures and
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language reports the real) is one which the sociological
framework seeks to avoid.

However, it is important to

point out that this maneuvering does not stem from the
claim that the sociological framework has captured the true
reality which philosophy has somehow missed.

Rather, it

originates in the argument that truth and reality,
including the sociological versions, need to be thought of
as the "social constructs" of knowledge and culture
producers, instead of metaphysical entities existing
outside of human socio-political activity.

Finally, we

will argue that a perspective of this type allows one to
avoid the meaningless gibberish or nihilistic silence, the
sort of reductio ad absurdum. which is often the outcome of
postmodern philosophical thinking.

It, thus, can be seen

as a possible means for steering clear of the idealistic
quagmires associated with postmodernism.
In order to explore the potential contributions of the
sociology of knowledge to our examination of postmodern
discourse, we will first examine the thought of Karl
Mannheim, explicating his general vision of what the
sociology of knowledge should be doing and how it should
approach the issues of truth and reality.

This section

also contains a discussion of the so-called "strong
program" in the sociology of knowledge, one which seeks to
extend Mannheim's vision of sociology to all spheres of
knowledge.

Next, we will take-up the constructivist
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position of Bruno Latour in the sociology of scientific
knowledge.

Latour's discussion of science provides one of

the most illuminating examples of how a sociology of
knowledge model can respond to the general philosophical
catagories of truth and reality, thus making an important
contribution to our discussion and appraisal of postmodern
theory.

Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of how

these insights from the sociology of knowledge allow us to
"place postmodernism in perspective."
It must be added that there are three general
directions one can take when examining the issues of truth
and reality from a sociological perspective.

First, one

can explore the phenomenology of everyday life or micro
"construction of reality" along the lines of Schutz,
Garfinkel, Goffman, or Berger and Luckmann.2

Secondly,

one can explore the general "social milieu" which molds all
forms of knowledge, such as Mannheim's work.

Finally, one

can explore the organization and production of truth by
certain scientific or intellectual groups, as in the
sociology of scientific knowledge.

Generally speaking, the

first two positions have been concerned with so-called

2 Specifically see, Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology
of the Social World, trans. by G. Walsh and F. Lehnert
(Northwestern University Press, 1967), Harold Garfinkel,
Studies in Ethnomethodoloav (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, 1967), Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974), and Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of
Reality (New York: Anchor Books, 1967).
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"conunonsense knowledge" and the latter with "specialized
knowledge."

For this presentation, selecting the

appropriate sociological approach and "level of analysis"
of reality or truth is not a decision based on who is
closer to the truth about the social world, but a matter of
interpretative expediency or practical reason.

We wish to

avoid the momentum distraction sectarian issues:
utilizing them as we deem fit.

While

We are suspending judgment

on the relative merits of the micro and macro perspectives
and the general micro/macro debate in social theory.
Consequently, since our primary concern is with the
"specialized knowledge" of postmodernism, we will primarily
focus on the latter type of sociology, the "macro” one,
regarless of overlap.

We will select from each perspective

what is necessary for the development and explication of an
over-all sociology of knowledge framework.

The Sociology of Knowledge: From Mannheim to the
"Strong Program"
The roots of the sociology of knowledge can be found
in many of the "classic statements" of nineteenth-century
European sociology, such as Marx's structure/superstructure
dichotomy, Weber's discussion of religious types, and
Durkheim's concept of collective representations.

However,

the sociology of knowledge was only formally introduced as
a branch of sociological analysis by Max Scheler and given
a firm direction by Karl Mannheim in the 1920's.
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For

Mannheim, the chief spokesperson for the early sociology of
knowledge, its goal was to explore how thinking functions
as "an instrument of collective action."3

In this

respect, the goal of the sociology of knowledge is vastly
different from that of traditional philosophy.
Historically, most philosophy had only concerned itself
with one type of (pure) knowledge and one knowledgeproducing system; with few exceptions, it had not been
concerned with the dynamics of everyday or commonsensical
thought and knowledge.

In a paridigmatic statement,

Mannheim's comments,
Philosophers have too long concerned themselves with
their own thinking. When they wrote of thought, they
had in mind primarily their own history, the history
of philosophy....This type of thinking is applicable
only under quite special circumstances, and what can
be learned by analyzing it is not directly transferable
to other spheres of life.4
Traditional philosophy, with its quest for absolute and
universal truth, was not conceptually equipped to address
the historical, cultural, and group variability of
knowledge content.

The tendency of much of conventional

philosophy was to label various knowledge claims as either
rational or irrational or to treat them as "closing in on
the truth" (i.e., leading towards cumulative knowledge).
With regard to the former, knowledge either corresponded to
3 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, trans. by L.
Wirth and E. Shils (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co.,
1936), p. 1, emphasis added.
4 Ibid., p. 1.
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the rigorous requirements of rational or empirical
development, proof, and argumentation and was deemed,
knowledge, or it did not and was labeled, belief.

In the

latter tendency, each historical endeavour was usually seen
as merely a step on the road to ultimate truth about an
object or issue (cf. the discussion of rationality and
progress in Chapter 6).

However, the sociology of

knowledge, as Mannheim conceived it, was to trace the
social origins of certain "modes of thought."5

For

Mannheim, these modes of thought had to be located within
the historically-specific social milieux and the general
social frameworks which produced them.
Mannheim recognizes that the sociology of knowledge is
itself historically and socially constituted.

In a setting

where truth can be clearly ascertained there is really no
need for a sociology of knowledge.

When religion,

philosophy, science, or some other discourse can provide
the appropriate rationale for the conduct of "intellectual
business," there is no need for a discussion of the social
circumstances that produce knowledge.

However, in periods

when truth "slips away," or "dismantles," such as in modern
society, a "relational" sociology of knowledge is a
necessity.

For Mannheim, the fragmentation of knowledge in

the modern world has undoubtedly introduced the appropriate
time for the emergence of a sociology of knowledge.
5 Ibid., p. 2.
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In

Mannheim's words,
It is clear that such problems can become general
only in an age in which disagreement is more
conspicuous than agreement. One turns from the
direct observation of things to the consideration of
ways of thinking only when the possibility of direct
and continuous elaboration of concepts concerning
things and situations has collapsed in the face of
multiplicity of fundamentally divergent definitions.6
The multiplicity of definitions and the resulting
scattering of meaning have forced modern science seriously
to evaluate the underlying factors which influence
knowledge production.
It is in this regard that Mannheim's sociology of
knowledge can be seen, at least in part, as an attempt to
reconstruct the basic rational goals of scientific
investigation.

Mannheim, like the Weber of The Methodology

of the Social Sciences, wanted to disclose the hidden
social and historical dimensions at work in any scientific
endeavor.7

Essentially for both Mannheim and Weber,

laying open the historical context of knowledge was the
"only way to provide a limited autonomy to scientific
inquiry."8

The sociology of knowledge will, in Mannheim's

words, allow us to "calculate more precisely...modes of

6 Ibid., p. 6.
7 Max Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences,
trans. by E.A. Shils and H.A. Finch (New York: , 1949).
8 Edward Davenport, "The New Politics of Knowledge:
Rorty's Pragmatism and the Rhetoric of the Human Sciences,
"Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 17, 1987, p. 397.
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thought and to predict...ideological reactions..."9

It

could be an instrument for further clarifying the factors
that inhibit non-distorted knowledge of the world.
However, the intrinsic logic of such a sociological
approach would, at some point, have to dispense with the
notion that truth claims are evaluated on their ability to
correspond accurately with the object of analysis or the
intellectual integrity of what is claimed as true.

In

other words, the sociology of knowledge would have to
suspend the philosophical quest of determining who is
telling the truth, since it possessed sociological rather
than philosophical criterions of judgment.

Because

Mannheim viewed the sociology of knowledge as partly a
reconstructivist enterprise, that is as way of determining
the factors that distort truth, he was reluctant to open
all forms of knowledge to sociological exploration.
Essentially, he relegated the sociology of knowledge to
what might be called mundane discourse.

The latent

rationalism in Mannheim forced him to treat science, logic,
and mathematics as special cases of knowledge.

These

fields were "free floating" and, therefore, not potential
sites for sociological discussion.10

It was at this point

of limited effort where, according to David Bloor,

9 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. 1936, p. 189.
10 Cf. Ibid., p. 79.
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Mannheim's "nerve failed him."11 It is also the point
where, for purposes of further exploration, the Durkheimian
influenced "strong program" in the sociology of knowledge
emerged.
The so-called "strong program" of the sociology of
knowledge sought to go beyond Mannheim's somewhat timid
approach to knowledge.12

For the advocates of the strong

program, all knowledge is culturally and historically
specific and therefore open to sociological investigation.
Even those fields, such as science, logic, and mathematics,
which Mannheim placed in a special supra-historical
category, were to have their social origins explored and
explicated.

In the words of Mary Hesse, "Knowledge is now

taken to be what is accepted as such in our culture."13 It
is to be conceived of as a pragmatic construction of
various social groups, and not as something independent,
philosophical, or "in the air."

For the strong program

11 David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 8.
12 For some early examples of the strong program, Cf.
Barry Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory
(London, 1974), Harry M. Collins, "The Seven Sexes: The
Social Destruction of a Phenomenon," Sociology 9, 1975, pp.
205-224, Barry Barnes and Steve Shapin, Natural Order
(Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), Bruno Latour and Steve
Woolgar, Laboratory Life (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), and
Ibid.
13 Mary Hesse, The Strong Thesis of Sociology of
Science," in Revolutions and Reconstructions in Philosophy
of Science, ed. by M. Hesse (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1976), p. 42.
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there is "nothing in the physical world which uniquely
determines the conclusions of that (scientific)
community."14

Often using Kuhn's discussions of paradigms

in the philosophy of science as a starting point, the
strong progam argued that even scientific knowledge is to
be seen as historically and socially contingent.15

All

types of science cease to be a special and superior form of
knowledge clearly distinguishable from belief and immune
from sociological examination.

As we shall see, this move

has important implications for our consideration of
postmodernism.
Two of the most outspoken advocates of the strong
program are Barry Barnes and David Bloor.16

For Bloor the

strong program has four basic tenets:
1. It would be causal, that is concerned with the
conditions which bring about belief or states of
knowledge.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity,
rationality or irrationality, success or failure.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation.
The same types of cause would explain, say, true and
false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive.

Like the requirements of

14 Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of
Knowledge (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979), p. 61.
15 Kuhn's work in the philosophy of science helped
pave the way for these developments in the sociology of
knowledge. Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
16 Often they are grouped and simply referred to as
the "Edinburgh School."
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symmetry this is a response to the need to seek
general explanations.
The strong program as outlined by Bloor seeks to move
beyond traditional philosophical discussions of truth and
reality into a sociological explanation of various forms of
knowledge.

In this regard, it is similar to Mannheim's

sociology of knowledge.

However unlike Mannheim, it treats

all knowledge forms as sites of sociological investigation.
Each knowledge form is to be seen as relative to social
factors.

In fact the strong program go as far as to argue

that relativism is a necessity for all types of social
scientific understanding.

Barnes and Bloor write,

Our claim is that relativism is essential to all
those disciplines such as anthropology, sociology,
the history of institutions and ideas, and even
cognitive psychology, which account for the
diversity of systems of knowledge....It is those
who oppose relativism and who grant certain forms of
knowledge a privileged status, who pose the real
treat to a scientific understanding of knowledge
and cognition.18
For Barnes and Bloor the fight is between those who want to
grant a privileged position to one form of knowledge over
another (rationalism) and those who treat all knowledge
equitably or symmetrically (relativism).

For Barnes and

Bloor, it is no longer possible to defend the rationalist
position that science is hierarchically superior to other
17 Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery. 1976, p. 4-5.
18 Barry Barnes and David Bloor, "Relativism,
Rationalism and the Sociology of Knowledge," pp. 21-47 in
M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1982), p. 22.
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forms of knowledge or belief; it is no longer possible to
simply brush some knowledge claims aside by saying that
they are irrational beliefs (i.e., that they do not meet
the rigorous requirements of science).

In their words,

For the relativist there is not sense attached to
the idea that some standards or beliefs are really
rational as distinct from merely locally accepted
as such. Because he thinks that there are no
context-free or super-cultural norms of rationality
he does not see rationally and irrationally held
beliefs as making up two distinct and qualitatively
different classes of things.19
Determining what is rational and what is irrational or what
is true and what is false are simply matters of preference
based on the prescribed norms and standards existing within
the investigator's locality.

There is no need to appeal to

any "higher source" for the determination of these issues
(something akin to the death of God, as asserted by
Nietzsche and the loss of transcendence as emphasized by
others).

The answer is to be found within the social

context which imparts the various criterions for judgment.
As an example of the social contingency of cataaories.
Barnes and Bloor discuss the case of the anthropologist
Robert Bulmer and his difficulty in grasping the taxonomy
of the Karam of New Guinea.20

Bulmer found that the Karam

have a taxon called "yakt" which is similar to our
classification for birds.

However in the Karam's taxon,

19 Ibid., pp. 27-28, emphasis added.
20 Ibid., pp. 38-39.
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bats wars included while cassowaries were excluded.

Bulmer

was forced to examine each "bird" before he was able to
distinguish what belong in the "yakt" taxon and what did
not.

For Barnes and Bloor, this case is important because

it reveals that even empirical terms like "bird" or "yakt"
are linguistically context dependent.

They write:

What these examples show is that even empirical
term like 'bird' do not constitute a special core
of concepts whose application depends only upon an
unconditioned reason. Learning even the most
elementary of terms is a slow process that involves
the acquisition from the culture of specific
conventions.21
As a result, even that knowledge which is supposedly
empirically and universally valid and reliable, such as
science, is dependent upon culturally produced catagories.
Consequently, no rationally based system of knowledge can
escape the conceptual boundaries of society (cf. the Godel
Theorem in physics).
However a central question haunts the strong program:
How can the sociology of knowledge purport to provide
reality while denying that privilege to the more
prestigious natural sciences (i.e., the reflexivity
problem)?

As we shall see in the next section, the bold

claims of the strong program can produce innovative ways of
rethinking basic traditional philosophical polarities and
the means for addressing the dilemma of the preceding
question.
21 Ibid., p. 38.
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From Logic to Sociologies Latauc-'g Constructivist
View of Science

The strong program in the sociology of knowledge has
had its most important impact in the sub-field of the
sociology of scientific knowledge.

Here, it has been

especially instrumental in molding what is often called
"the constructivist thesis" of science.22

Generally, the

constructivist position within the sociology of scientific
knowledge has used the strong program as a guide to examine
empirically how scientists actually go about negotiating
truth and constructing scientific knowledge.

From this

position, scientists are often approached ethnographically,
that is, as if they were members of a newly discovered
tribe.23

The goal of this approach, in accordance with

the position of the strong program, is to suspend
philosophical judgments about reality and truth and focus
on the specifics of how scientists go about forming a
statement about the world and constructing general truths.
One of the most important proponents of the
constructivist thesis in the sociology of scientific
22 Harry Collins has described the task of the
sociology of scientific knowledge as exploring "what comes
to count as scientific knowledge and how is so to count."
In "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Studies of
Contemporary Science," in Annual Review of Sociology
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1983), p. 267 (pp.
256-285).
23 Specifically see, Karin D. Knorr-Cetina, The
Manufacture of Knowledge: An Essav on the Constructivist
and Contexual Nature of Science (Oxford: Pergamon Press,
1981).
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knowledge is Bruno Latour.24

However, Latour's view of

science can be seen as more than simply a restatement or
extension of the relativism of the strong program:

his

work contains the seeds of both a "redefined strong
programme" and an important revision of the tasks of a
broader sociology of knowledge.25

His insights are most

relevant to our consideration of postmodernism.
In Science in Action. Latour seeks to open the "black
box" of scientific fact production.

This is accomplished

by tracing and following the various links which scientists
utilize in building science.

One of Latour's basic

arguments is that scientific facts must be constructed by
establishing strong networks.

The stronger and more

encompassing the network, the harder the fact becomes.

The

scientist, by successfully recruiting allies (human and
non-human), appealing to authority, referring to former
texts, compiling data, creating computer files, etc., is
able to create an encompassing network, the sponsorship of
a sustaining audience, a community of truth.

Therefore,

he/she is able to go from soft rhetoric to hard rhetoric.
In other words, the establishment of a strong network
24 Cf. Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory
Li£&, 2nd ed.(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1986) and Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1987).
25 For a discussion of the "redefined strong
programme" cf. Latour, "A Relativistic Account of
Einstein's Relativity," Social Studies of Science, 18,
1988, 3-44.
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allows the scientist to produce a fact.

What becomes a

scientific fact and an accepted truth is a direct outcome
of the strength of the ties, or in his words "metrological
chains," which a scientist or group of scientists is able
to construct and enforce.

If the scientist has been

successful, reality "has been defined."26

In essence,

then, reality is a matter of definition; it is defined
through social networks.
The importance of Latour for our discussion does not
necessarily come from the specifics of his discussion of
science, but from the general sociology of knowledge he
develops and the methodology he uses to explicate it.
Latour seeks carefully to negotiate a path between
rationalism, which emphasizes the cognitive supremacy (or
asymmetry) of science, and an extreme relativism, which
says there is no criterion for determining anything
(symmetry).

For Latour, both are unacceptable positions.

Treating science as strictly a rational or cognitive
enterprise denies the important social dynamics which must
be employed to establish scientific facts, while an extreme
relativism denies the existence and establishment of any
facts.

For Latour,

If there is no controversy among scientists as to
the status of fact, then it is useless to go on
talking about interpretation, representation, a
biased or distorted world view, weak and fragile
pictures of the world, unfaithful spokesmen. Nature
26 Latour, Science in Action. 1987, p. 179.
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talks straight, facts are facts. Full stop.
is nothing to add and nothing to subtract.27

There

Latour's position accepts as facts those rare statements
which lack controversy, while he remains relativistic with
regard to the ongoing struggle of scientists to turn soft
statements into hard facts.

Latour points out that if a

position, such as relativism, rejects all knowledge claims,
it begins to look ridiculous since there are issues on the
natural world that have been settled by scientists.
However, if we treat science rationalistically, we develop
a distorted view of how science produces hard facts.

In

the Latourian position, facts are socially constituted
"hard fiction."
What does distinguish science from other forms of
knowledge is the degree of material and human resources
available for the construction of facts.
The proof race is so expensive that only a few
people, nations, institutions or professions are
able to sustain it...this means that the production
of facts and artefacts will not occur everywhere and
for free, but will occur only at restricted places
at particular times.28
Essentially, fact production is relegated to those times
and places which can garner the resources and networks
capable of transforming statements into facts.

This does

not mean that knowledge that cannot muster the resources is
invalid, it is simply not "hard knowledge."
27 Ibid., p. 100.
28 Ibid., p. 179.
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However, the central epistemological question remains:
do scientists have a superior access to reality which
enables them to discover truth and report knowledge about
the world?

For Latour, answering this question requires

one to adopt an asymmetrical view of rational thought and
irrational belief, something he and the strong program are
unwilling to do.

Traditionally, it has been held that

every individual who posseses a "sound mind and a sound
method" has the ability to be as rational as the
scientist.29

Those who lacked this attribute (i.e., the

irrational) were merely under the influence of various
social or psychological prejudices.

If those prejudices

were eliminated, the rationality embedded in all of
humanity will finally emerge (cf. Condorcet in Chapter 2).
However for Latour, it is better to think of irrationality
and rationality, not as states of mind, but as constructed
labels.

Irrationality, like rationality, has to be

constructed through networks— in this case a network of
accusers.

However, if irrationality is "put on trial," the

results are at best ambiguous.

For every claim of

irrationality in one knowledge system, exists an element of
irrationality in the rational system doing the accusing.
It turns out that "everyone on earth is as logical or as
illogical as any

one else."30 Latour concludes

29 Ibid., p.

184.

30 Ibid., p.

195.
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that "no

asymmetry between people's reasoning can be recognised."31
Essentially, everyone is a practical reasoner and is as
rational or irrational as the next person.
However, one may ask:

If reasoning is not a matter of

qualitative cognitive differences between people, why do we
not all share the same beliefs?

By eliminating the

cognitive distinction between rationality and
irrationality, Latour's is able to answer this question.
Like the scientist in the laboratory, the practical
reasoner of everyday life is concerned with "what can be
tied to a claim to make it stronger and how can the claims
that contradict it be untied."32

Essentially, people

neither think logically or illogically— they think
sociologically.

All people move from element to element as

they construct statements about the world.

When a

controversy starts, "they look for stronger and more
resistant allies..."33
allies than others.

Some are able to recruit more

As a consequence, their truths become

"harder."
Consequently, what separates science from everyday
practical reason or belief is not an issue of logic but an
issue of the level of controversy and the appropriate
social ties to mobilize to end the controversy (i.e.,
31 Ibid., p. 196.
32 Ibid., p. 198.
33 Ibid., p. 205.
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sociologic).

Essentially, the difference is a natter of

content rather than forn.

The everyday practical reasoner

does not have to mobilize as many allies in the production
or replication of a standard taken-for-granted knowledge as
the scientist does for the production and defense of a hard
fact.

As evidence, Latour provides the following example:

'An apple a day keeps the doctor away,' the mother
said handing out a glowing red apple to her son,
expecting a grin.
'Mother,' replied the child
indignantly, 'three NIH studies have shown that
on a sample of 458 Americans of all ages there
was no statistically significant decrease in the
the number of house calls by family doctors; no,
I will no eat this apple.
In mobilizing the statistics of the National Institutes of
Health, the child is acting as if this everyday
colloquialism is in need of the same type of support
employed by science.

In other words, the child is treating

this soft fact as if it were a hard fact and in need of the
same type of documentation and supporting allies.

Since

this colloquialism has passed from generation to generation
without being challenged, it becomes true.

There is no

need to treat it as an irrational belief or as a potential
scientific fact.

Essentially, soft fact are basically all

we need for the conduct of everyday life (cf. the takenfor-granted in everyday life according to Alfred Schutz and
the role of identity).

34 Ibid., p. 206.
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When in the course of human events, of the conduct of
life, we answer such questions as: How much money did I
earn this month?
normal?

Is my blood pressure above or below

Where was my grandfather bora?

Where is the tip

of Sakhalin Island?, depending on who is doing the
questioning, we can either provide soft or hard answers.35
If we provide hard answers, we must appeal to supporting
documents and begin the process of stacking-up hard facts
and constituting hard truth.

Latour writes:

Even the question 'who are you' cannot be solved,
in some extreme situations, without superimposing
passports to fingerprints to birth certificates to
photographs, that is without constituting a file
that brings together many different paper forms of
various origins. You might very well know who you
are and be satisfied with a very soft answer to this
absurd query, but the policeman, who raises the
question from the point of view of a centre, wants
to have a harder answer than that...36
Soft answers usually do not require the same type of
"metrological chains" as hard answers.

They differ not by

their degree of logic or illogic but by the sociologic
required for their construction.

They are "tribe" specific

measures for the accumulation of soft truth.
Latour provides us with three central insights which
have a bearing on our employment of a sociology of
knowledge approach to postmodernism.

First of all, for

Latour truth should not be treated logically, but

35 Ibid., p. 252.
36 Ibid., p. 252.
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sociologic-ally.
sociologic.

He introduces a move from logic to a

The logical is concerned with drawing

distinctions between rationality and irrationality and
between knowledge and belief.

Latour and his sociologic

makes no such traditional philosophical distinctions.
knowledge and belief are equally logical or

illogical.

cognitive quality of these forms of thought

cannot be

clearly distinguished.

are not

However, while they

Both
The

philosophically distinguishable, they can be sociologically
differentiated.

Belief and knowledge are separated by the

degree of sociologic involved (i.e., the type of
association involved, weak or strong).
Secondly, Latour provides us with both a nonobjectivistic and a non-relativistic vision of truth.

If

truth claims are not attacked and there is no controversy
among competing truth providers, then the claims are true.
In his words,
...If they are not attacked, people know exactly
what nature is; they are objective; they tell the
truth; they do not live in a society or a culture
that could influence their grasp of things, they
simply grasp things in themselves; their spokespersons
are not 'interpreting' phenomena, nature talks
through them directly.3*
If the so-called "black boxes" of knowledge are sealed,
people do not "live in a world of fiction, representation,
symbol, approximation, convention: they are simply

37 Ibid., p. 206.
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right."38

If there is a controversy, various strategies

are employed to strengthen the rhetoric into a hard fact
(cf. the appeal to "principle" as a mask for political
self-gain or exclusion of others) and forging another
"black box."

Truth, then, is not philosophically

determined; it is socially determined.39
Finally, Latour provides us with a reply to the issue
of reflexivity raised in the last chapter.

In other words,

how can sociology defend its own truth claims while
relativizing (i.e., treating science and belief
symmetrically) other forms of knowledge?

In responding to

this, Latour argues that we should develop an alternative
vision of the social.

Instead of focusing on the influence

of class, culture, and politics in the content of a
knowledge system, we should focus on the "relative solidity
of associations" (i.e., networks, a sustaining community of
the faithful)40

While indeed the concepts employed by

sociologists are arbitrary, the associations they utilize

38 Ibid., p. 206.
39 Latour's constructivist view of science may be
contrasted with Foucault's and Habermas'. Foucault
emphasizes the power constraints and dynamics at work in
the development of knowledge. Habermas sees science as a
working example of the ideal speech situation. On the
other hand, Latour is primarily concerned with the
construction of science. Power plays an important role,
but it is not the determining factor of science. Nor does
Latour suggest, as Habermas does, that science is a social
ideal.
40 Ibid., p. 256.
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in constructing the social world are not.

Latour writes,

...Our method would gain nothing in explaining
'natural' sciences by invoking 'social' sciences.
There is not the slightest difference between the
the two, and they are both to be studied the same
way. Neither of them should believed more nor
endowed with the mysterious power of jumping out
of the networks it builds.41
Sociology, or Latour's account of science, does not have a
privileged position in the production of truth.
tell scientists what they are really up to.

It cannot

Sociology, like

the natural sciences, must establish "metrological chains"
in order to establish hard facts about society.

The facts

it produces do not correspond to the philosophical version
of the real, but are negotiated and forged.

Society becomes

what is constructed— either in the hard sense of sociology
or in the soft sense of everyday discourse.

Latour writes,

The very definition of a 'society' is the final
outcome, in Sociology Departments, in Statistical
Institutions, in journals, of other scientists busy
at work gathering surveys, questionnaires, archives,
records of all sorts, arguing together, publishing
papers, organizing other meetings....The results
on what society is made of do not spread more or
faster than those of economics, topology or particle
physics. These results too would die if they went
outside the tiny networks so necessary for their
survival.42
We need not search for philosophical foundations to explain
sociology's description of the social.

Sociology, like all

forms of knowledge, must establish the networks capable of
promoting its vision of the world.
41 Ibid., p. 256.
42 Ibid., p. 257.
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"A sociologist's

interpretation of society will not be substituted for what
every one of us thinks of society without additional
struggle."43

However, this position does not mean that

sociology or philosophy are useless, only that they exist
within a matrix of "legitimate" power.
Latour provides us with a particularly appealing version
of truth and knowledge.

He also provides us with a means of

by-passing the questions of objectivism and relativism
without destroying all meaning, a most important means at
our disposal for reconsidering the positions of postmodern
theory.

Conclusion; A Sociology of Truth
What can we learn about postmodernism from the
sociology of knowledge and Latour's reconstituted strong
program?

Most importantly the recent developments in the

sociology of knowledge make it possible to shift our
conceptions of truth and reality, rationality and
irrationality, and knowledge and belief from a philosophical
logic to what Latour referred to as a sociologic— a process
we began with the discussion of Durkheim in the last
chapter.

This admittedly agnostic view is void of the

explicit or implicit reference to the foundational real.
helps us rethink the generation of knowledge "without
reference to realist definitions of *truth,' 'reality,'
43 Ibid., p. 257.
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It

'f a c t s a n d

'knowledge.

'

Unlike postmodernism, it

accomplishes this redefinition without "textualizing" the
world and leveling all meaning.

As we discussed earlier,

postmodernism does make a move similar to the one taken by
the sociology of knowledge (and sociology in general).

It

too seeks to go beyond the metaphysical obsession with
truth, reality, and context-free knowledge.
However, instead of dropping the search for foundations
and moving in a sociological or constructivist (i.e.,
viewing reality as a social construct) direction, the
postmodernists drop them and move in a nihilistic direction.
Since what counts as knowledge is seen as unverifiable and
arbitrary, postmodernists believe everything is void of
meaning.

They are what we might call "frustrated

rationalists:"

In other words, they see the revelation of

relativism as meaning the end of all definite knowledge
about the world.

However, such as position only seems to

make sense when one thinks there once existed
epistemological certitude and a firm way of knowing which
have somehow been disrupted— rather than context dependent
doubts.

Describing this basic insight of the sociology of

knowledge, Mary Hesse writes,
In such a new construal of cognitive terminology,
rules of argument and criteria of truth are internal
to a social system....but this account does not remove
a Paul Tibbetts, "The Sociology of Scientific
Knowledge: The Constructivist Thesis and Relativism,"
Philosophy of Social Science, 16, 1986, p. 53 (pp. 39-57).
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the motivation for epistemological studies nor
emasculate philosophical theories.
Such consequences
only follow for those who retain a rationalist theory
of knowledge, not for those who accept the redefinition
of 'truth' and 'rationality' implied by their status
as internal to given societies. s
It seems evident to us that from a sociology of knowledge
position, the search for context-free rationality (cf. the
positivism of certain types of science) was a misplaced
project to begin with.

The loss of philosophical

foundations is no occasion to mourn; nor is it an occasion
to embrace nihilism.

It is merely an occasion to suspend

such philosophical distinctions and polarities and move in
another direction.

In this regard, the sociology of

knowledge provides both an alternative to (and a means of
criticizing) the extremes of the postmodern orientation
towards knowledge.

Leveling all meaning and treating the

world as a text is fine philosophically, but postmodernists
should not expect all realms of knowledge production to
follow suit.

The postmodern postion does not enable us to

consider why truth is still a performative concept (i.e., is
socially constraining, cf. our discussion of Durkheim in
Chapter 7) despite its philosophical demise.
Essentially, we may conclude that if truth and reality
are conceptualized in sociological rather than in the terms
of traditional philosophy the outcome is very different.
Instead of ushering in a postmodern world of unfoundational
45 Mary Hesse, "The Strong Thesis of Sociology of
Science," 1976, p. 46.
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claims, we usher in a different model for understanding what
makes truth and reality possible.

In refusing to "play

according to the rules and guidelines established by
traditional philosophy," the sociology of knowledge is
providing us with a radical program for a rethinking of our
knowledge of the world.46
In the next chapter, we will utilize this sociology of
knowledge position described herein to discuss the specific
organization and production of postmodern theory, culture,
and knowledge.

46 Tibbetts, "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge,"
1986, p. 53.
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CHAPTER IX
GROUP SOLIDARITY AND SYMBOLISM: THE PRODUCTION
AND CONSUMPTION OF POSTMODERNISM
In the previous chapter, we explored how recent
variants of the sociology of knowledge approach the
philosophical juxtapositions of truth and falsehood,
rationality and irrationality, and belief and knowledge.
We concluded that these recent developments provide us with
a useful way for rethinking postmodernism's collapse of all
meaning and its leveling and deracination of all discursive
formations (e.g., literature and science).

In addition, we

argued that the constructivist position in the sociology of
scientific knowledge, specifically Latour's, provides us
with an account, a sort of gauge, which illustrates how
knowledge of the world is produced and maintained.

As

such, Latour's becomes an important means for considering
all forms of knowledge— including the philosophical and
cultural.

Most importantly for our consideration, Latour's

inspection of the production and maintence of knowledge is
accomplished without being bogged down in the
epistemological debate between objectivism and
relativism.1

In a word, it offers us an alternative

paradigm and keeps us from falling into a paralyzing debate

1 In fact, this debate becomes meaningless from a
constructivist or social epistemological position.
286

I

on philosophical polarities.
Essentially, we may conclude that recent developments
in the sociology of knowledge illustrate that knowledge is
social through and through.

There is no internal/external

distinction (i.e., between the internal rational and the
external social).

We no longer need to argue that the

sociology of knowledge can only provide a description of
the social factors that impinge on the creation of rational
knowledge.

We can now conclude that all knowledge,

including the scientific and the sociological, have social
origins and all knowledge producers are engaged in the
activity of constructing rather than revealing the world.
In Sal Restivo's words, "selves, minds, and ideas are not
merely social products; nor are they merely socially
constructed; they are social constructs."2
society inside and out.

Ideas are

Therefore, all knowledge can be

seen, to use Latour's term, socio-logically.
In this chapter, we seek to move from the construction
of scientific knowledge in general to the construction and
dissemination of postmodern philosophical and cultural
knowledge.

We intend to combine some of the useful ideas

gained from our previous discussions of Durkheim and the
sociology of science with a discussion of the organization

2 Sal Restivo, "The Social Roots of Pure
Mathematics," in Susan Cozzens and Thomas Gieryn (eds),
Theories of Science in Society (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1990), p. 123 (pp. 120-143).
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of social groups so as to examine postmodernism as a social
construct.

As Collins has noted, "Although philosophy may

not be a 'science,' it has a social structure as an
intellectual community, which can be understood by
extending the techniques and theories of the sociology of
science."3

Such a sociology of postmodernism, then, is

thought to be congruent with the sociology of scientific
knowledge since both seek to explain the production and
consumption of "specialized knowledge" forms.
Principally, we argue that postmodernism and its
accompanying skepticism and nihilism can be seen, not as
the final statement upon matters of truth and reality, but
as a socially and historically contingent discourse.

We

share the view of Eugene Goodheart, who has proclaimed that
"skepticism is an historically conditioned view of
experience, which does not disqualify it as a method or a
system of thought, but its historical character should bar
it from putting on metaphysical or universalistic airs.”4
Consequently, while the sociological account to follow
shares postmodernism's general distrust of any absolute
claim to foundational truths, it does not see this
viewpoint as being necessarily "true" or "false."

It is

3 Randall Collins, "Toward a Theory of Intellectual
Change: The Social Causes of Philosophies," Science,
Technology, & Human Values, 14, 1987, p. 108 (pp. 107-140).
4 Eugene Goodheart, The Skeptic Disposition in
Contemporary Criticism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1984), p. 176.
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simply one form of knowledge-of-the-world among many.

From

this position, we can say that postmodernism is a
perspective which, like all perspectives, must be
constructed, fortified, promoted, and maintained by
knowledge and culture-producing communities and
institutions.

Consequently, the structure of those

knowledge-producing and culture-consuming communities
becomes of central importance.
One final introductory point.

It is worth

reemphasizing that when postmodernists claim that the
metanarratives of modernity have collapsed (Lyotard) or
that it is no longer possible to distinguish fact from
fiction or TV from reality (Baudrillard), it is simply
restating the realist view of knowledge in an inverse form.
In other words, it is de facto assuming that reality
somehow speaks to and from it.

Saying that we cannot be

sure of anything is merely a negative way of saying that we
can be sure of everything!
the same realist dialectic.

Both statements operate under
From our position, what is at

stake is not who has the true story of reality, the
modernists or the postmodernists, but who is able to define
reality, or the absence of reality in the case of
postmodernism, and why this is the case.

Consequently, we,

like Durkheim and the constructivists in the sociology of
scientific knowledge, argue that it is the organization and
production of knowledge which result in reality, or the
289

reality of non-reality in postmodernism, and not vice
versa.5
In order to explicate our sociological treatment of
postmodernism, we will discuss two questions:

(1) Why has

postmodernistic theory been developed and promoted in
certain intellectual discursive fields and not in others?
For example we ask, why has postmodernist theory been
developed in and adapted into literary criticism,
philosophy, and architectural theory and not in physics,
biology, or economics?

(2) Why has postmodernistic culture

been an influential form of "cultural capital" in some
social groups or "life worlds" and not in others?

In other

words, why are artists, cultural theorists, or the new
service classes more inclined to adopt and promote
postmodernistic culture or theory compared to factory
workers, government bureaucrats, or the old bourgeoisie?
These questions may seem unimportant and irrelevant from a
philosophical perspective.

However, from our socio

political perspective they are central to the understanding
of any knowledge/culture system.

Furthermore, they point

to a means for situating the issues of postmodernism within
what postmodernism itself refers to as the "social context"
or "human community."

If knowledge is variable and

context-dependent, as postmodernism itself argues,

s For a discussion of this cf. Stephan Fuchs, The
Professional Quest for Truth. 1991, in press.
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questions and interpretations of the specifics of this
variability are of utmost importance.
In order to address the above questions, we will first
discuss the social organization of groups as presented in
Durkheimian and Neo-Durkheimian sociology.

As we have

already seen, group organization has been used by Durkheim
to counter the position of American pragmatism.

We will

now use a variation of the Durkheimian position to explore
postmodernism.

The organizational approach is intended to

supplement the discussion of the construction of knowledge
discussed in the last chapter.

We will then use these

notions to provide a sociological account of postmodern
intellectual production and consumption.

The Social Organization of Cognitive Styles
In Chapter 7, we drew upon Durkheim's discussion of
pragmatism as a means for rethinking the ironically
omniscient idealism of postmodernism.

In addition to that

"epistemological" discussion, there is also much to be
learned from Durkheim's and the Neo-Durkheimians' linkage
of social organization with religious beliefs,
classification systems, and general cognitive styles.

As

we shall see, this linkage has important ramifications for
both a general sociology of knowledge and our attempt to
situate postmodernism within a sociological as well as a
social context.
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In the Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
Durkheim develops two important concepts with regard to the
organization of social groups and the types of religious
beliefs held by practitioners.6

First, he introduces the

well-known distinction between the sacred and profane.
Durkheim defines the sacred as those symbols or activities
which have special, extraordinary, or forbidden meaning
attached to them; by the profane he refers to the
commonplace or ordinary.

For Durkheim, religion is "a

unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred
*
things."7 In its "elementary form," this sacredness is
nothing more than the symbolic elevation of the clan or
group to the order of a religion.

Its origin is not the

universal psychological condition of humanity or an
irrational response to environmental unknowns, but the
social raised to the level of the "holy."
Secondly, Durkheim provides us with a discussion of
the importance of ritual in the maintenance of the sacred.
Rituals are the means by which the sacred object is
constructed, expressed, and maintained.

They become a

means for charging the object with sacredness— of imparting

6 Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life, trans. by J.W. Swain (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1964).
7 Ibid., p. 47.
292

it with mana.8

When groups join together in a ritual or

"rite of intensification," they are reaffirming the power
of the social.

They are (re)endowing the social with an

extraordinary and all-encompassing power.

This endowment

becomes part of the collective consciousness of the group,
as well as the cognitive structure of the individual
practitioner.
Consequently, for Durkheim those groups with a high
level of internal solidarity are more likely to produce
religious styles that draw rigid boundaries between the
sacred and the profane.

These mechanical societies— i.e.,

those with high "moral density" according to Durkheim, with
a we11-developed "collective conscience"— produce elaborate
and confining religious symbolic codes.

Those less rigid

societies with an "organic" sort of solidarity and with a
more complex division of labor produce individualistic and
universalistic religious types (cf. Weber's differentiation
of "sect" and "church").

Describing the emergence of these

"cults of individualism" in modern Western societies,
Durkheim writes,
As individuals have differentiated themselves more
and more and the value of an individual has increased,
the corresponding cult has taken a relatively greater
place in the totality of the religious life and at
8 Cf. Randall Collins, "The Durkheimian Tradition in
Conflict Sociology," in Jeffrey Alexander (ed.),
Durkheimian Sociology: Cultural Studies (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 111. As Collins
points out this would be an important theme in Goffman's
sociology.
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the sane time it is more fully closed to outside
influences.9
The final outcome for Durkheim is that religious styles are
the result of social and organizational typologies.

Tight

social structures produces rigid religious distinctions
between the sacred and the profane and powerful group
oriented rituals (e.g., totemism and animism).

On the

other hand, organizationally diverse societies produce more
individualistic and fragmented religious and ritual styles
(e.g., civil religions).
In Primitive Classification. Durkheim and Mauss extend
Durkheim's previous discussion of religion to other types
of cultural classification and knowledge systems.10

For

Durkheim and Mauss, "it is because men were grouped, that
in their ideas they grouped other things."11

For them,

the classification systems (i.e., the interrelatedness of
catagories and cultural items) employed by various social
groups were the product of the level and type of social
organization present in various societies.

In short,

"logical relations are, in a sense, domestic relations.1,12
Hhat comes to be a culture's system of differentiation can
9 Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious
Life. 1964, p. 424-25.
10 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive
Classification. trans. by R. Needham (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1963).
11 Ibid., p. 82.
12 Ibid., p. 84.
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be attributed to the level of social integration or type of
organization present in a given society.

Societies with a

rigid sense of solidarity (i.e., the mechanical) tend to
have rigid boundaries between individual elements of a
larger classification system.

Cohesive or socially dense

societies typically have elaborate and rigid symbolic and
hierarchical differentiations between true and false, right
and wrong, bird and fish, space and time, workers and
rulers, etc..

In such settings, "things are above all

sacred or profane, pure or impure, friends or enemies,
favorable or unfavorable..."13

It is a strict dichotomy:

There is not much room for individual interpretation or
mediation.

The symbolic and social order of the group has

been raised to the level of absolute, non-negotiable truth.
Closely bound groups exert a great deal of control over
individual members.

What the group holds as symbolically

representative or as a social distinction is to be held as
sacred by all members of that society.

There is no room

for rule departure or deviance.

What is sacred is sacred

and what is profane is profane.

As Durkheim and Mauss seek

to illustrate, the distinction between sacred and profane
is not simply an aspect of religious belief, it also
extends to the logic of classification distinctions.
conclude that, the "logical hierarchy is only another
aspect of social hierarchy, and unity of knowledge is
13 Ibid., p. 86.
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nothing else than the very unity of the collectivity..."14
Like religion, classification systems are products of the
type and degree of social organization existing within a
given group of people.
One of the most influential attempts to develop
further the Durkheimian position on social organization and
its relations to cognitive styles can be found in the work
of Nary Douglas.

Her work seeks to extend the sociological

approach initiated by Durkheim and Mauss to all forms of
knowledge.

Specifically, Douglas has introduced what she

refers to as the "grid/group theory."15

Her theory is

loyal to the Durkheimian tradition, yet it seeks to avoid
the evolutionist ranking of societies and the granting of a
privileged position to modern systems which can be found in
Durkheim's position.16
For Douglas, "group" refers to the level of solidarity
present in a given group.

This ranges from loosly knit

associations to tightly bound and closed groups.
may have weak or strong group loyalties.

Groups

Within her theory

those groups with strong loyalty ties can be said to have a

14 Ibid, p. 84.
15 Her grid/group theory has gone through several
revisions. For a discussion of this see, James V.
Spickard, "A Guide to Mary Douglas' Three Versions of
Grid/Group Theory," Sociological Analysis, 50, 1989, pp.
151-170.
16 Cf. Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse,
NY: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 98-99.
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high degree of "group."

The second aspect, "Grid,” refers

to the "scope and coherent articulation of a system of
classification."17

Like the group dimension, a

classification system can also vary.

In this case, the

variation is from a coherent, elaborated symbolic hierarchy
with "caste-like" role and class structures to discrete
items and loose and mobile role sets.
When combined, these two dimensions provide "four
extreme visions of social life" and can be employed to
situate the type of cosmology present within different
social groups.18

(a) Groups with a low level of group and

grid tend (LP/LD) to produce a cosmology which "allow
options for negotiating contracts or choosing allies and in
consequence it also allows for individual mobility up and
down whatever the current scale of prestige and
influence."19

Essentially, this category is

"individualistic" and corresponds with the social structure
of "competitive societies."20

(b) A collectivity with low

group and high grid (LP/HD) "ascribes closely the way an

17 Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols (New York: Vintage,
1973), p. 82.
18 Mary Douglas (ed.), Essavs in the Sociology of
Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 3.
19 Ibid., p. 4.
20 Mary Douglas, In the Active Voice (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 212.
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individual may behave."21

The pressure exerted on

individuals within this classification comes primarily from
the hierarchical structure of the group.

(c) Groups which

have a high level of group and low level of grid (HP/LD)
tend to produce social environments where "loyalty is
rewarded and hierarchy respected" (e.g., large bureaucratic
organizations).22

At times, this may also be true for

clans or extended families:

Here, the prevalent dichotomy

is between insiders and outsiders (i.e., We/Them).
Finally,

(d) groups with a high level of group and a high

level of grid (HP/HD) produce an environment where "only
the external group boundary is clear."23

In this

cosmological type, the group "survives not only by
justifying its boundary against outsiders but also by
justifying its separate graded compartments."24
In a certain sense, Douglas combines the two
contributions of Durkheimian thought discussed earlier into
a coherent theory of group organization and cognitive
styles.

She takes Durkheim's notion of the types of

solidarity present in different societies and combines that
with the complexity and variability of symbolic

21 Douglas, Essavs in the Sociology of Perception.
1982, p. 4.
22 Ibid., p. 4.
23 Ibid., p. 4.
24 Douglas, In the Active Voice. 1982. p. 210.
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organization (i.e., role definitions and other hierarchical
structures).

Like Durkheim, Douglas views cognitive styles

or cosmologies as "not at all natural but strictly a
product of social interaction.m2S

Those groups with rigid

control produce one type of cosmology, while those with
slack or loose control produce another.
For Douglas and Durkheim, belief/knowledge systems are
the outcome of social organization.

The specific

sociological issue is not the manifest content of this
knowledge, but the way it is shaped by the type of social
organization present.

As Douglas explains,

All the arguments taking place in families, churches
and sports clubs are about whether the institution
shall draw its group boundary closer, or relax it,
apply its rules more strictly, create more rules
or relax them all....God may be invoked, and curses
uttered before a rift, or blessings for a truce.26
For Douglas, ideational debates over content are
essentially sociological debates over organizational form
and control.

The central issue is the degree of control

that the group is to have over its internal symbolic and
class hierarchy.

Those groups that are "solid" are more

likely to appeal to established guidelines, while those
groups that are "loose" are more likely to relax boundaries
and rule and role distinctions.

25 Douglas, Essavs in the Sociology of Perception.
1982, p. 5.
26 Ibid., p. 5.
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Another important contribution to the Neo-Durkheimian
linking of social organization and cognitive styles can be
found in the work of Richard Whitley.

Whitley extends the

Neo-Durkheimian argument into the production of all types
of scientific or "specialized" knowledge forms.

As such,

it has special significance in our consideration of
postmodern knowledge.

Whitley has pointed out that

disciplines with similar organizational types tend to
produce similar styles of knowledge.27

The style of

knowledge is dependent, in part, upon the degree of "task
uncertainty" and "mutual dependence" evident in a
particular intellectual field.

Task uncertainty refers to

the level of unassuredness or lack of confidence which
accompanies the production of novel knowledge in a
particular work organization.

Those groups with a low

degree of task uncertainty are more likely to have
proscribed, bureaucratic-like procedures for producing
knowledge, while those with high task uncertainty are more
likely to engage in ad hoc procedures.
The second aspect of this theory, mutual dependency,
is an outcome of two organizational processes.

First, the

"extent to which researchers have to use the specific
results, ideas, and procedures of fellow specialists”

27 Richard Whitley, The Intellectual and Social
Organization of the Sciences (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1984). Whitley is also closely connected to the complex
organizational position.
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(i.e., functional dependence).28

Secondly, the "extent to

which researchers have to persuade colleagues of the
significance and importance of their problem..."(i.e.,
strategic dependence).29

Those fields where functional

dependence and strategic dependence are low tend to produce
situations where knowledge producers are able to pursue a
variety of goals "without needing to incorporate specific
results and ideas of particular specialist
colleagues..."30

As examples, Whitley cites post-1960

Anglo-Saxon sociology and management studies.

On the other

hand, intellectual fields where both functional dependence
and strategic dependence are high tend to produce
situations where there is a high degree of specialization
and a strong sense of boundary maintenance (e.g., among
physicists and mathematicians).

These groups have a sharp

distinction between who is a legitimate knowledge producer
and who is not and what counts as knowledge and what is
trivial and unworthy.

They also have a well defined

research agenda which strongly conditions the types of
problems and solutions that can be put forth by individual
knowledge producers.

As an example of this type of field,

Whitley cites Twentieth-century physics.

Between these two

extremes lie various degrees of mutual dependence and
28 Ibid., p. 88.
29 Ibid., p. 88.
30 Ibid., p. 90.
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various knowledge fields and styles.
The Neo-Durkheimian position, as presented by Douglas
and Whitley, leads us to conclude that groups which are
cohesive and integrated produce what is called a "fact mode
of reasoning," while loosely affiliated groups produce a
"conversational mode of reasoning."31

Groups with a tight

knit structure will appeal to the authority of established
principles or "facts" (in the Latourian sense) in
argumentive discourse.

They are principally concerned with

forming and sealing black boxes of knowledge.

These groups

employ what Basil Bernstein has referred to as a
"restrictive code" in the production of group knowledge.32
In these groups communicative acts serve to enforce group
standards.

Within conditions where the group has low task

uncertainity, any attempt to break with the restrictive
code is often seen as a rebellion against the group itself.
Knowledge producers are tied into using the proscribed
procedures of the group code or they face marginality or
exclusion.

On the other hand, those groups that are

loosely coupled and have a high degree of task uncertainity
tend to engage in negotiation and arbitration.

They

31 Fuchs, The Professional Quest for Truth. 1991, p.
170.
32 Cf. Basil Bernstein, Class. Codes and Control I:
Theoretical Studies Towards a Sociology of Language
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971). Bernstein uses
this term in reference to the socialization style of the
working class.
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utilize an "elaborated code" of knowledge production.33
Here, there is importance placed upon individualistic
speech patterns and discursive conversation.

The

individual within this type of knowledge field is
professionalized to express and support his or her truth
claims through appeal to explication, explanation, and
argumentation.

In fields of this type, individual

producers are more likely to engage in discursive debate
rather than the establishment of "scientific facts."
Whitley and Douglas, like Durkheim before them, are
essentially arguing that "cosmologies are sticks people use
to coerce one another...and that different sticks will work
in different social contexts."34

Also, they are arguing

that cosmologies symbolize common group membership.
Cosmologies are basic distinctions that may be "dressed-up"
or enlivened by ideological or cultural debate over
content, but their form remains essentially social in its
origin.

Social organization is an integral part of the

production and dissemination of knowledge or cognitive
styles.

The source of God may be the social as Durkheim

proclaimed, but, as Douglas and Whitley seek to illustrate,
so too is the origins of knowledge and culture (cf. the
discussion of Durkheim and Nietzsche in Chapter 7).
33 Ibid, Bernstein uses this term in reference to the
socialization style of the middle class.
34 Spickard, "A Guide to Mary Douglas' Three Versions
of Grid/Group Theory," 1989, p. 165.
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When we combine the notions obtained from the
Durkheimian and Neo-Durkheimian discussion of the
organization of social groups with the arguments obtained
from the Latourian discussion of knowledge production,
(i.e., the recruitment and marshalling of allies and the
production of "hard facts") we find an important means for
situating the production of postmodern knowledge.

In the

next section, we will explore how these ideas come to bear
upon one specific cognitive style— postmodern
knowledge/culture.

The Production of Postmodern Knowledge
When we scan the academic horizon in search of
bastions or "factories" of postmodern thought, we are often
led to the doors of Philosophy, Social Theory, and Literary
Criticism and not to the doors of Economics or Physics.35
Furthermore, once we enter these "postmodern departments,"
we are often led to the doors of junior or "marginal"
faculty members.36

From our discussion of Durkheim,

35 While postmodernism has affected a number of areas,
we will specifically use Philosophy and Literary Criticism
as paradigmatic examples of postmodern fields throughout
this section.
36 For a discussion of the marginality of "postmodern"
practictiners, cf. Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. xviii-xix.
Describing the post-structuralists, Bourdieu writes, "They
appear like religious heretics, or, in other words, rather
like freelance intellectuals installed within the
university system itself, or at least, to venture a
Derridean pun, encamped on the margins or in the marginalia
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Douglas, and Whitley outlined above, our search does not
simply reveal a methodological and theoretical division of
labor resulting from the common quest for truth.
reveals three very general sociological points:

It
(1)

Different intellectual groups have certain organizational
characteristics that produce various cognitive styles and
forms of knowledge about the world.

(2) Due to

organizational differences between fields, various
intellectual groups have to develop different ranges and
types of coalitions and cliques to establish and promote
their particular knowledge about the world.

(3) Within

these groups there are often struggles to establish,
maintain, or revise the hierarchical and symbolic structure
of the group.

These are instances when ideas become

symbolic weapons in the battle for discipline control.
Below we will discuss the importance of each of these three
points in situating the production of postmodern knowledge.
With regard to the first point, if we compare the
fields where postmodern knowledge has been produced and
adopted we will first of all note that these intellectual
fields are "organizationally looser" and have a relatively
high degree of task uncertainty compared to the fields
where the issues and problems of postmodern skepticism are
not an issue.

In those postmodem-inclined fields black

of an academic empire threatened on all sides by barbarian
invasions (p. xix).
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boxes of knowledge are rarely ever closed.

Knowledge

claims are continuously debated within the confines of a
conversational code of conduct, or to use Bernstein's
terminology, these fields operate under an elaborated or
discursive code.

Within such an organizational setting,

there is often an emphasis on plurality and multiple
interpretations, since these fields lack the type of social
organization necessary for the establishment of what Latour
refers to as "hard facts."

These fields tend to spawn

metatheoretical discussions, reflexivity debates, and a
general relativism.37

As Douglas has pointed out,

- "Questioning and doubt can be held in check only by a
strong institutional structure."38

The disciplines

associated with postmodernism lack the institutional
structure and symbolic code necessary for the avoidance of
skepticism.

They are essentially organizations that

promote a high level of doubt, questioning, conversation,
and debate.
However, while the "methodology" may be ill-defined
and the goals pluralistic, these are also fields where
closely coupled grouped research schools are (and have
been) often a central locale in the production of
knowledge.

In Whitley's schema, these are fields which may

37 Cf. Stephan Fuchs, "Relativism and Reflexivity in
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge," 1991, in press.
38 Mary Douglas, "Pascal's Great Wager," L'Homme, 93,
1985, p.19 (pp. 13-30).
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be classified as having a low degree of functional
dependence and a somewhat high level of strategic
dependence.

In other words, in these postmodern-inclined

fields, knowledge producers are not tied into using the
ideas and procedures of fellow knowledge producers.
However, they are obliged to persuade their colleagues of
the significance of their approach with regard to central,
long-standing issues or problems within the field.

In

disciplines of this type, there is an attempt to
demonstrate, in Whitley's words, the superiority of "their
interpretation to the central issues of the field."39
With regard to postmodern philosophy or literary
criticism, while there is a theoretical emphasis on
multiple interpretations, there is also an attempt to show
that the Derridian, the Lyotardian, or the Rortyian
interpretation of the current state of knowledge and
knowing provides an important contribution to the general
field of philosophy or related problems in the humanities.
Essentially, the contributions of these individuals
"tapped-into" the concern over long-standing problems of
the field.

If we compare this with a discipline such as

sociology where the goals are extremely pluralistic and the
39 Whitley, The Intellectual and Social Organization
of the Sciences. 1984, pp. 92-93. It could also be argued
that in the American context the philosophy departments
that adapted and promoted postmodernism were ones where
continental philosophy has had a prominent position.
Departments with a continental focus have traditionally
been on the margins of mainstream American philosophy.
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functional dependence is quite low and the resulting
knowledge output is fragmented, we can envision how social
organization influenced postmodernism's ability to become
part of the philosophy and humanities intellectual
landscape.

Postmodern practitioners, such as Rorty,

Lyotard, and Derrida, were able to demonstrate the
importance of their approach to long standing philosophical
questions about language, rationality, and universal
foundations.

They were successful in convincing their

colleagues that their knowledge style offered novel and
innovative solutions to shared problems.
However, this factor alone does not give us a firm
sense of why postmodernism became influential.

Another

central aspect was its ability to recruit allies and
disseminate its knowledge style in a number of related
fields.

Since the goals of Philosophy and Literary

Criticism lack prescribed procedures of knowledge
production, the recruitment of allies was perhaps a more
difficult (and perhaps more critical) task than in fields
where functional dependence is high.

However, since

knowledge production of this type is often located at
central knowledge producing institutions, there is an
opportunity to establish and promote their particular
knowledge commodity at other, less prestigious institutions
or centers.
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An illuminating example of the importance of ally
recruitment and the dissemination of information in the
production of postmodern theory has been articulated by
Michele Lamont.40

Lamont uses Derrida as an example of

how interpretive theories can be located and analyzed
within the cultural, institutional, and social conditions
that produce them.

For Lamont, the popularity of Derrida's

deconstructionism is, in part, an outcome of two related
elements.

First, Derrida's philosophy was able to appeal

to a broad spectrum of intellectuals.

Secondly, it was

very successful in developing institutional support
networks to "spread the word."
With regard to the first point, Derrida has been
"successful" by "directing his work to several already
constituted publics rather than to a shrinking philosophy
public..."41

During the 1960's and 70's, the French

government attempted to limit philosophy requirements in
lycees.42

This was accompanied by both a continued

assault directed by the social sciences against the
position and content of traditional philosophy and a
general decline in the interest of the broader intellectual
public.

The intellectual public had always been an

40 Michele Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French
Philosopher: The Case of Jacques Derrida," American Journal
of Sociology, 93, 1987, pp. 584-622.
41 Ibid., p. 587.
42 Ibid., p. 596.
309

I
important audience and backer of philosophy and the
humanities.

Within Lamont's analysis, what Derrida's

position accomplished was that it reformulated the
philosophical project while "attacking the logocentrism" of
social scientific critiques.43

Furthermore, it did this

while simultaneously creating an intellectual issue that
was adaptable and modifiable in other closely related
disciplines.

These disciplines also felt the impact of the

growing loss of the attention of the general intellectual
public, which they rely on for support, and the onslaught
of the social scientific critique.

Since these fields

already have a high degree of permeability (i.e., vague
distinctions and boundaries between public and professional
discourse), Derrida's work served as protection against
these onslaughts while providing them with a novel
intellectual avenue for their own disciplinary purposes.
Latour has pointed out that often the success of a
scientific theory or position is an outcome of an ironical
sense of control.

The individual producer must "enrol

others so that they believe it, buy it and disseminate it
across time and space" while he or she must also "control
them so that what they borrow and spread remains more or
less the same."44

The individual producer must maintain

43 Ibid., p. 596.
44 Bruno Latour, Science in Action. (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 121.
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control over his/her intellectual product, while at the
sane tine allowing roon for the product to be adapted to
the specific needs of other knowledge producers.
Essentially, this is what deconstructionisn was able
to do.

First, it appealed to those who felt that

philosophy was under threat of being contaninated by the
interests of outsiders (e.g., the French governnent and
social science).

Deconstructionisn helped redefine the

blurring boundary between philosophy and social science.
In Durkheinian terns, it redrew a line between "us" and
"then."

Secondly, deconstructionisn allowed related

disciplines the roon to adapt it to their own intellectual
concerns and problens (e.g., literary criticisn, neo-pop
art, architectural theory, urban studies, etc.).

It

served, to use Olga Ansterdanska's phrase, as a "strategy
of reinvestnent."45

Since these fields have a loose type

of social organization and a conversational symbolic code,
yet rely on certain "trend setting" institutions and
individuals, Derrida's philosophical position became an
inportant "cultural investment" for many allied
disciplines.
Related to this recruitment of allies is the
dissemination of information.

For an idea to be

"successful" and influential, it must establish networks of
45 Olga Amsterdamska, "Institutions and Schools of
Thought: The Neogrammarians," American Journal of
Sociology, 91, 1985, p.335 (pp. 332-358).
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dissemination.

The more elaborate and encompassing the

network, the more "successful" a position can become.
Within Lamont's analysis, Derrida's popularity can be
partly attributed to his involvement with journals such as
Tel Quel and Critique.46

These journals published essays

in both philosophy and literary criticism.

They were

directed towards an eclectic group of French intellectuals.
In addition to these "intellectual journals," Derrida's
work received attention by the more "main-stream cultural
media."

The tendency of this media form is, in Lamont's

words, to "cater to the intellectual culture of the uppermiddle class, and their control over access to that market
is a structural feature of the French intellectual
scene."47

Derrida's deconstructionism became part of the

intellectual scenery of the upper middle-class world.

To

be a member of the educated elite and to not know Derrida
became as atrocious of an act as not having the "proper"
dialect, "civilized manners," or drinking the right wine.
Furthermore, it "epitomized dangerously seductive qualities
of style; as intellectual fashion goes, it was flashy,
different, ingenious, and slightly exotic."48

It became

46 Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French
Philosopher, 1987, pp. 597-598.
47 Ibid., p. 598.
48 Maria Ruegg, "The End(s) of French Style:
Structuralism and Post-Structuralism in the American
Context," Criticism, 29, 1979, p. 193.
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indispensible for the conduct of "intellectual life" and
for being in "vogue" (we will return to this point later on
in the chapter).
Finally, we can turn to our third point.

Here, the

ideas of postmodernism serve to challenge the established
hierarchy of philosophy and literary criticism departments
and centers of knowledge production.

As pointed out

earlier, this is the setting in which ideas or theories
become weapons in the battle for organizational control.
Postmodernism became a means for younger or marginal
academics to challenge the "old academism" of their
philosophical or literary predecessors and for less
prestigious centers to counter established knowledge
producing-institutions.49

With regard to the first issue,

Derrida, Althusser, and Foucault all resisted writing a
dissertation.

They chose not to "play by the rules,” yet

managed to win the game.50

For them, the dissertation did

not represent the culmination of academic training, it
served as a means for controlling and limiting the types of
intellectual contributions that could be made (e.g., in
controlling recruitment, graduates, and guild membership).
It was a form of intellectual censorship made by the "gate
keepers" of disciplinary authority.

As such, it

49 Cf. Bourdieu, Homo Academicus. 1988.
50 Cf. Lamont, "How to Become a Dominant French
Philosopher," 1987, p. 605.
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represented the "old academism” and its strangle-hold over
"legitimate" knowledge of the world.

However, we can argue

that such a move is only possible when there is a setting
marked by low functional dependence.

If this were a field

where functional dependence was high, the ability to avoid
the strategic interactions an'' organizational requirements
necessary for the establishment of rigid knowledge would
have severely limited the impact these individuals could
make.

The organization of philosophy and literary

criticism make it possible to make contributions to the
central problems of the field while avoiding official
channels of authority and legitimation (from a socio
cultural standpoint, it can be said that this is truer of
France than the U.S., of Europe than North America).
Secondly, the content of postmodernism proved to be a
powerful means of shifting and realigning not only the
internal organization of these fields but also the centers
of knowledge-production.

For example in the United States,

centers of deconstructionism developed not only at the
traditional literary centers of Yale, Cornell, and Johns
Hopkins but also at the University of California-Irvine and
SUNY-Binghamton.s1

Postmodernism became an avenue for

both the reconstruction of the philosophical and literary
enterprises and a realignment of the sites of knowledge
51 Cf. Jonathan Arc, et al. (eds.), The Yale Critics:
Deconstructionism in America (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1983).
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dissemination.
When we combine the three points discussed above, we
have a means for understanding postmodern knowledge as a
social construct.

First of all, it was manufactured within

organizational confines which allowed for knowledge of this
type to be formed.

Secondly, it was successful in

recruiting allies from a number of related fields (e.g.,
those fields that have traditionally looked to philosophy
for information).

Finally, it served as an ideological

weapon in the battle for redefining the philosophical
enterprise and relocating sites of intellectual production.
Essentially, it became a tool for gaining and legitimating
a new form of political control.

As a consequence, we can

conclude that sociological factors played an important role
in the "success" of postmodernism.

Without these

organizational and interactional factors, postmodernism
would probably not have been developed or disseminated in
the style that it was.

It perhaps would have remained,

like many theories or assumptions, a set of "illegitimate"
ideas on the fringe of mainstream philosophical and
literary discourse.
If postmodernism was simply a set of academic theories
we would have been able to end our discussion here.
However, due to postmodernism's success in recruiting
allies in related fields and in becoming an important form
of "cultural capital" for the "educated public," it has had
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the distinction of being a movement which has affected a
number of culture-producing and consuming realms and a
number of social groups.

This being the case, we must in

some way provide a marketing account, that is, of the
"audience structure" and the subsequent consumption of
postmodern.

The New Bourgeoisie and the Reception of Postmodern Culture
If we were to ask a farmer in Iowa or a miner in West
Virginia to describe the impact that postmodern culture has
had on his or her life, we would find, after the laughter
or blank stare had ceased, that it has had none.

However,

if we were to ask an educated upper middle-class
professional in a larger metropolitan area the same
question, we would perhaps find answers ranging from the
introduction of postmodern teapots, to the impact of
postmodern MTV, to a discussion of the impact of Umberto
Eco or Italio Calvino on contemporary literature.

Within

the anatomy of our argument, what this social distinction
reveals is not a difference in the ontogenetic ability of
people to understand the complexity of "high culture" or
the relativistic "different strokes for different folks,"
but that the reception of postmodern culture, like its
production, is context and group specific.

The culture

audience, like the knowledge/culture producer, has a group
structure and a cognitive style.
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Only the "trained eye" can recognize postmodernist
culture and its often critical irony (cf. our discussion of
the Plaza d'Italia in Chapter 6).

Only certain groups or

classes possess the cultural capital necessary to "get the
joke" and only they can promote it as a means for
distinguishing themselves from other culture-consuming
groups near their situs in the social hierarchy.

It is, to

use another Bourdieu-type term, an outcome of the social
"habitus" of a particular group.52

By habitus, Bourdieu

means the different classification schemes which structure
the cognitive distinctions and action pathways of a given
social group.

Each group uses this habitus to define

itself (i.e., We/Them) and to distinguish itself from other
groups in the occupational structure of a society.
Culturally, each social group struggles to impose the
"taxonomy most favorable to its characteristics, or at
least to give to the dominant taxonomy the content most
flattering to what it has and what it is."53
Within this Bourdieu-based argument, those who ascribe
to the anti-aural and anti-authentic characteristics of
neo-pop art or to the ironical aesthetics of the AT&T
Building in New York, or for that matter the philosophy of
52 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of
the Judgement of Taste, trans. by R. Nice (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1984). While Bourdieu is
concerned with French distinctions, his general analysis of
class cultures is applicable to other Western societies.
53 Ibid., p. 476.
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Lyotard or Derrida, are using these cultural goods as a
form of capital to purchase status.

They are engaged in

defining the boundary of their group and in distinguishing
themselves from other groups.

They are, to invoke

Durkheim, attempting to forge a new version of the sacred.
They, like the religious practitioners and the "primitive
classifiers," are imparting mana to new symbolic objects.
These groups are using postmodernism as part of a rite of
intensification.

This being the case, the questions

become; who and why?

Below we will attempt to answer these

questions.
In societies with a complex division of labor and a
competitive hierarchical structure, intellectual and
cultural products tend to be highly used as status markers.
Historically, this is specifically true for the European
and American upper-middle class or bourgeoisie, whose
location in the stratification system has made them an
important niche for dissemination and consumption of "new"
and "in vogue" forms of culture.

Due to this group's

general lack of social cohesion and its relatively "high"
place in the stratification system or hierarchical and
control structure, cultural goods within it tend to be used
as a means of individual and group differentiation.

In

other words, cultural goods come to have symbolic exchange
value.
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This characteristic is particularly true for the socalled "new middle-class" or service class.

Since this

group, specifically its upper echelon, is becoming a more
integral and powerful aspect of the post-industrial socio
economic environment, its cultural tastes and expressions
are often used as a means of distinguishing itself from the
old bourgeoisie (i.e., the industrial capitalists).

This

parallels the old industrial bourgeoisie's use of cultural
goods to distinguish itself from the landed aristocracy.54
Just as ideas become ammunition in the battle for control
in knowledge producing communities, cultural style becomes
a battle ground for the struggle to control the tastes and
cognitive styles of fellow members and society as a whole.
The new middle class must distinguish itself by
employing new cultural symbols or by giving new meaning to
old ones.

Describing the cultural patterns of this new

class in France, Bourdieu writes,
(They) have abandoned the champagne of the vieille
France industrialists (and the whole view of the world,
and of France, and of France in the world, which
went with it) for the whisky of American style
managers, the cult of 'literature' (delegated to
their wives) and economic news which they read in
English.55
In the French case, whiskey, literature, and economic news
become part of a general lifestyle which displays their
54 Cf. Stuart Ewen, All Consuming Images: The Politics
of Stvle in Contemporary Culture (New York: Basic, 1988),
pp. 26-32.
55 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, pp. 314-15.
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status position.

Lifestyle becomes a personal comment on

belonging and a political statement on social position.
The French service class, like their American, British, or
German counterparts, is systematically employing culture as
a means of differentiation and potential domination— of
making their hegemonic mark.

To paraphrase Marx, cultural

"property is man's personal, distinguishing and hence
essential existence."56
In addition to the upper echelons of the new, post
industrial bourgeoisie, the lower echelons of this group
tend also to be important sites of contemporary cultural
innovation.

This echelon tends to be manifest in

occupations such as advertising, sales, magazine
journalism, TV and video production, counseling, marriage
therapy, etc.57

Often this group has experienced

downwardly mobility compared to their initial status during
early family socialization.

They have a acquired a high

level of cultural capital, yet possess a relatively low
level of economic capital.

The new petit bourgeoisie is

generally engaged in what Bourdieu refers to as the
"symbolic work of producing needs."58

This group is

56 Karl Marx, "Excerpts from James Mill's Elements of
Political Economy" in Earlv Writings (New York: Penguin,
1974), p. 266.
57 Scott Lash and John Urry, The End of Organized
Capitalism (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987),
p. 295.
58 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, p. 345.
320

engaged in the promoting of information technologies and
the marketing and selling of symbolic products.

This class

"had to produce the need for them in potential consumers by
a symbolic action tending to impose norms and needs,
particularly in the areas of life-style...or cultural
consumption."59

Generally, they can be classified as

"need merchants."60

They can become members of the upper

echelons of the new bourgeoisie through the "successful"
deployment of the "symhoiic violence needed to create and
sell new products."61
With regard to cultural patterns, this group is very
likely to consume and promote products that have been
deemed illegitimate by other hierarchically-higher social
groups.

Objects which had been deemed "low brow," camp, or

kitschy by the old or new bourgeoisieundergo
"refiguration" in the hands of the new petit bourgeoisie.
These objects become reinterpreted and made desirable.
Describing the cultural preference of this group in the
French context, Bourdieu writes,
Their ambivalent relationship with the educational
system, inducing a sense of complicity with every
form of symbolic deviance, inclines them to welcome
all the forms of culture which are, provisionally at
least, on the (lower) boundaries of legitimate
culture— jazz, cinema, strip cartoons, science
fiction— and to flaunt (for example) American fashions
59 Ibid., p. 345.
60 Ibid., p. 365, emphasis added.
61 Ibid., p. 358, emphasis added.
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and models— jazz, jeans, rock or the avant-garde
underground ..,a
In the American context, "fifties furniture" and "fifties
anti-sex and anti-drug films" are reinterpreted by this
class and made acceptable and "in." These objects are
stripped of their old meaning and replaced with an
interpretation which expresses the cognitive orientation of
the new petit bourgeoisie, i.e., as new consumables.
This group, it is apparent, is a prime site for the
reception of postmodern cultural products.

The symbolic

deviance of postmodernism, coupled with the symbolicallyoriented professions of the petit bourgeoisie make
postmodernism a prime vehicle of symbolic identification
and differentiation.

In other words, this class uses

postmodernistic culture as a weapon in its ressentiment and
assertiveness of status.

Describing the "art of living”

adapted by this group, Bourdieu writes,
Guided by their anti-institutional temperament
and the concern to escape everything redolent of
competitions, hierarchies and classifications and,
above all, of scholastic classifications, hierarchies
of knowledge....these new intellectuals are inventing
an art of living...they adopt the most external and
most easily borrowed aspects of the intellectual
life-style, liberated manners, cosmetic or sartorial
outrages, emancipated poses and postures, and
systematically apply the cultivated disposition to
not-yet-legitimate culture (cinema, strip cartoons,
the underground), to everyday life (street art), the
personal sphere (sexuality, cosmetics, child-rearing,
leisure) and the existential (the relation to nature

62 Ibid., p. 360.
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love death ),a
It is a social group that seeks to rebel against form
itself (cf. Simmel discussion of modernism in Chapter 3):
Breaking form will allow it to make its cultural mark.
Like the early twentieth century Dadaist, this group seeks
to use "illegitimate" cultural products to distinguish
itself, to promote its rather weak hierarchical position,
and to alter the hierarchy of society as a whole.
Essentially, we can conclude that this petit
bourgeoisie group is— to use Mary Douglas' terminology— low
on both group and grid.

It has, in Lash and Urry's

terminology, "a pre-eminently destructured and decentered
habitus."64

Since this group is characterized by looser

group and grid distinctions, it promotes a sense of
symbolic and hierarchical decenteredness.

Members of this

group refuse to "be pinned down in a particular site in
social space."65

They see themselves as "unclassifiable,

'excluded,' 'dropped out,' 'marginal,' anything rather than
categorized, assigned to a class, a determinate place in
social space."66

This self-identification leads them, not

only to see themselves as "unclassifiable" and

63 Ibid., pp. 370-71.
64 Lash and Urry, Disorganized Capitalism. 1987, p.
296.
65 Bourdieu, Distinctions. 1984, p. 370.
66 Ibid., p. 370.
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indeterminate, but also ipso facto the social and natural
world.

As a consequence of this decentered habitus, this

group uses object reinterpretation to shake the old system
of classification, differentiation, and stratification.
Postmodernistic culture with its decenteredness and antihierarchical stance becomes a prime means of group
identification and differentiation.

It becomes an

instrument for the formation and expression of a new form
of "semiotic power."67
We may conclude that such an organizational and
hierarchial structure produces a cognitive style that is
universalistic, skeptical, and indeterminate.

As Mary

Douglas has pointed out, "Sustained skepticism is a
feasible stance for those who do not expect to command or
unify society, but stand apart from it.”68

The new petit

bourgeoisie is in an ironical societal position.

It is an

emerging group that is becoming more influential in terms
of sheer numbers, yet their access to power is overshadowed
by the financial and cultural capital of the upper echelons
of the new bourgeoisie.

Consequently, their cultural

strategy becomes one of breaking down hierarchical
boundaries and their corresponding cultural forms.
Postmodernism becomes both this group's cultural and

67 Cf. John Fiske, Reading the Popular (Boston: Unwin
Hyman, 1989), p. 132.
68 Douglas, "Pascal's Great Wager," 1985, p. 19.
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political expression.

Conclusion
In this chapter we have tried to show how
postmodernism is socially-produced, promoted, and
maintained.

From the position outlined herein,

postmodernism can be viewed as the outcome of various
social and organizational dynamics and their related
production and consumption patterns.

In regard to the

production of postmodern knowledge, the organization of
knowledge producing communities illustrates how a knowledge
system of this type could be produced.

Skepticism is a

problem, not because it is a natural outcome of "deep
investigation," but because certain disciplines lack the
organization necessary to, in Latour's terms, form black
boxes, i.e., sealed knowledge or "truth."

However, this

does not mean that these fields are immature or worthless.
In fact, politically they may be liberating since they are
more likely to promote a sense of openness, conversation,
and debate.

Like the production of postmodernism, its

consumption also has social origins.

The new,

postindustrial bourgeoisie, particularly the lower
echelons, are more likely to consume and promote
postmodernism due the their decentered habitus.

In short,

we may conclude that postmodernism is a social construct.
It is social through and through.
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One final point.

The treatment presented in the

chapter should in no way suggest that postmodernism is an
"invalid" or "irrational" theoretical or cultural
expression.

Such a stance represents the type of

assymetrical arguement which we have tried to avoid.

Our

treatment simply means that postmodernism, like all forms
of knowledge, must be socially established, maintained, and
disseminated within the confines of social organization.
It is not outside of the social processes that produce and
shape all forms of knowledge.

In this regard, our approach

has been in keeping with the deconstructivist orientation
postmodernism has taken toward modern discourses.

However,

in our case we sought to describe a sociological
deconstruction of its organizational hierarchical
structure.

In our final chapter we will discuss some of

the implications of our analysis of postmodernism.
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CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Readers of this work may conclude that they have been
led full circle.

What began as a description of

postmodernism's undermining of m o d e m culture's search for
epistemological certitude, or in Derridian terms
"presence," has led back to the reestablishment of what
Lyotard referred to as a master narrative of modernity—
only this time the Emperor has sociological clothes.

In

this final chapter, I wish to show why this is not the
impression that should be left or the conclusion that
should be drawn.

Here, I want to restate some of the

central points made and discuss the purpose and possible
objections to the critique of postmodernism rendered in
this dissertation.
issues:

Specifically, I will reemphasize three

(1) The outline of the general postmodern

framework discussed herein;

(2) what a social or

constructivist epistemology can contribute to a rethinking
of postmodernism's collapse of all meaning and leveling of
distinctions between science and literature; and (3) how
social organization structures knowledge production and
culture consumption.

I will discuss each of these three

points below.
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The Postmodern Framework
The first part of this dissertation was concerned with
providing a general postmodern framework.

In other words,

we were concerned with outlining some of the general
assumptions and theoretical positions of postmodernism.
Here, we used postmodernism, not as a unified phenomenon or
as a logical "movement of history," but as a heuristic
device to capture and describe a number of related
practical and theoretical changes occurring in contemporary
culture (e.g., movements such as post-structuralism, neo
pop art, architecture).

We concluded that postmodernism

can be seen as a philosophical and cultural rebellion
against three overlapping modernistic principles;
correspondence referentialitv. subject centered explanatory
and creative models, and the teleoloqical progression of
rationality.
We also emphasized that it is important to resist the
tempting strategy of placing modernism and postmodernism in
exclusive categories.

Each cultural and theoretical

position can perhaps best be seen as a social truth
movement.

Each movement seeks to define what knowledge and

culture are.

They are, and have been, in competition with

one another over defining reality (cf. A. Touriane's
conceptualization of society as being composed of a series
of social movements).

What we call "reality," "knowledge,11

"truth," and "society" are the outcomes of this struggle.
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Certainly, the positions we outlined do not exhaust all the
complexities, idiosyncrasies, and varieties of
postmodernism, but they do, I believe, enable us to
construct an overall vision of the postmodern perspective.
Essentially, the postmodernists argue that language and
power shape our experience of the world to the extent that
no reliable and universalistic knowledge is possible.

It

is no longer possible to adhere to the Enlightenment
principles that language is merely a medium for the
conveyance of the real world, that human subjectivity
provides a pure, uncontaminated realm for knowledge
acquisition or creative expression, or that the progression
of rationality leads to personal and societal emancipation.
Instead, knowledge acquisition is shaped by the dynamics of
power, pre-existing linguistic hierarchies, and cultural
biases.

Revealing that knowledge is shaped by power and

linguistic hierarchies leads postmodernists to level all
meaning (i.e., no interpretation, lay or professional, is
philosophically superior) and collapse all distinctions
between literature and science (i.e., no discourse has a
privileged access to the real).

The outcome for many is to

become, to invoke Nietzsche, "accomplished nihilists"—
joyfully welcoming the end of all meaning (cf. our
discussion of Baudrillard in Chapter 7).
The critique of postmodernism rendered in this work
accepts postmodernism's anti-foundational revelations
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(i.e., its deconstruction of first principles), yet it
rejects the nihilistic conclusions that the postmodernists
reach.

From the perspective outlined herein, levels of

meaning and the distinctions between literature and science
were never grounded in pure ideational differentiations.
They are and have been socially constructed distinctions.
From our position, postmodernism does not go far enough.
It employs an anti-idealistic "methodology." but in the end
it draws idealistic conclusions.

Postmodernism illustrates

how social interests act upon ideational distinctions,
(e.g., Lyotard's language games, Foucault's intrusion of
power, Derrida's biased hierarchies) but in its conclusions
it often abandons this social perspective for an idealistic
"end of meaning" argument.

In other words, when it is

revealed that philosophical or cultural foundations are
biased, postmodernism tends to announce that it is no
longer possible to have any validity claims.

From our

perspective, these issues are best understood from a
constructivist or social epistemological perspective.

This

move leads to our second point, the importance of a social
epistemology in evaluating postmodernism's conclusions.

Social Eplgteaolgqy
When postmodernism is reduced to its finest dimension
it can be seen as a specific answer to the long-standing
epistemological question:

How do we know?
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As discussed

above, for the postmodernists, the traditional
philosophical answers to this question are no longer
plausible.

Reliable knowledge of the world can no longer

be grounded in the Cartesian or Rousseauian subject, the
progression of history, a simplified language, a selfevident hierarchical logic, or any other foundational
position.

Power, language, and culture exert too much of

an influence over knowledge for the question, "how do we
know?," ever to be secured and settled.

This being the

case, it is no longer possible to make philosophical
distinctions between true and false knowledge forms.

In

the words of Lyotard, we can merely "gaze in wonderment at
the diversity of discursive species..." or in NeoNietzschian terms, enjoy the Dionysian ecstasy associated
with the end of meaning.1
The account presented in this dissertation agrees with
the postmodern deconstruction of traditional philosophical
truth, yet it draws very different conclusions as to what
that deconstruction of traditional philosophy means.
Essentially, it can be argued that this deconstruction
leads in three directions.
postmodernists.

One is the path taken by many

They believe that once the act of knowing

has been reduced to a power based-rhetoric, all meaning
effectively ends.

It is no longer possible systematically

1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A
Report of Knowledge, trans. by G. Bennington and B. Massumi
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxv.
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to make the distinction between the correct and the
incorrect or the right and the wrong.

As such, we are

adrift in a cosmos of meaninglessness.

We are no longer

able to legitimize our theoretical differentiations.
Another path is the one taken by neo-rationalists such as
Habermas and Davidson.

This position argues that

Enlightenment rationality may have been mistaken in
grounding rationality in the condition of subjectivity
(i.e., in the Cartesian rational self or the Rousseauian
expressive self), but there are other human or social
conditions that can be used as means for developing a
reconstructed rationality.

For this position, truth (or a

foundation) exists but not in its traditional hiding
places.

Finally, a third position— the one we have

attempted to chart.

This position parallels

postmodernism's linking of rationality and power, yet it
reaches very different conclusions.

Instead of arguing

that all meaning collapses into a sea of confusion and
nihilism, as the postmodernists do, or arguing that
rationality resides in new places, as the neo-rationalists
do, this position argues that meaning is created and
recreated within the confines of social interaction and
organization.

Simply revealing that truth is an outcome of

power or a biased hierarchy or that knowledge is culturally
determined does not disqualify it completely.

From this

position, truth remains a socially contingent and
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constituted ideology that is created by knowledge/culture
producers.
A critic of the constructivist epistemology outlined
in this dissertation is likely to respond that if truth is
merely a social construct existing within a power nexus,
then how can we critigue any knowledge or political system?
How can we say that a position is incorrect or that a
political order is exploitative?
inevitably make might right?

Doesn't our position

This, I believe, is a danger

only if we adhere to the traditional foundational view of
epistemology and politics— that is, that a truth claim and
a political program (e.g., liberalism, conservatism,
socialism) are grounded in some supreme access to the
actual, unmediated workings of the world or in some type of
human essence.

As Marx stated in the "Thesis on

Feuerbach," "The guestion whether objective truth can be
attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory,
but is a practical question...man must prove the truth."2
Marx recognized that truth is a political product.
Political and scientific truth, do not lie hidden waiting
for the proper methodology, political party, or charismatic
personality to uncover and act upon them.

They are forged

and constructed through practical action.

Truth is human,

all too human— it is political.

As Marx recognized,

2 Karl Marx, "Thesis on Feuerbach," in Marx and
Engels, The German Ideology (New York: International
Publishers, 1985), p. 121 (pp. 121-123).
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scientific and political "truth" do not need a philosophy
to ground them or to give then "objective" meaning.

All

the foundation necessary is, and can be, developed through
praxis.

Consequently, we need not languish over having no

theoretically-privileged position from which to critique a
truth claim, war, exploitation, or the political order.

We

must simply realize that any critique must be constructed.
We need not wait for the "truth" to reveal itself to the
those with the proper level of rationality or the
"politically correct" and suddenly to shower down on the
misinformed (i.e., those with "belief" or "false
consciousness").

Social Organization and Postmodern Skepticism
The final central point we sought to develop in this
work is that ideational skepticism, including
postmodernism's, is a problem only for certain forms of
knowledge.

Philosophical skepticism is not a universal or

ahistorical problem that is the outcome of some type of indepth analysis.

It is not inevitable as Nietzsche thought.

The social organization of certain knowledge-producing and
consuming communities influence the degree of skepticism
that is produced.3

For those organizations with a tight

3 Some have also pointed out that the scattering of
meaning and the resulting skepticism may be tied to the
late or multi-national phase of capitalism (cf. Jameson,
1984). Although we have not pursued this line of inquiry,
a connection could be established, specifically with regard
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and rigid group and hierarchical boundaries, skepticism is
not a problem.

As Latour points out, if a position is not

attacked "people know exactly what nature is...," i.e.,
what is right.4

Translating this statement into our

account, we may conclude that if there is an organizational
environment which does not spawn, suppress, or channel
dissenting opinions and if a position has the endorsement
of the power brokers or matrix, that position becomes
"true."

There is literally no "outside" from which to

launch a critique.

On the other hand, those organizations

which have a loose organizational structure are likely to
spawn skepticism, since they have few formalized codes for
determining legitimate and non-legitimate knowledge.
Furthermore, fields of this type lack closed boundaries
between who is and is not a legitimate knowledge producer,
which further complicates the divisions between sureness
and unsureness.

Consequently, the ability of a position to

be attacked and for skepticism or nihilism to develop is
dependent upon the type of organization present.

A similar

type of dynamic also occurs for culture-consuming groups.
Those groups with what was referred to as a "decentered
habitus" (Bourdieu's term) are more likely to promote the
anarchistic style of postmodern culture.
to the issues of style over substance and appearance over
reality in a consumer society.
4 Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1987), p. 206.
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The Durkheimian-based connection of cognitive style
and organizational structure has often been interpreted in
a conservative manner.

In other words, the social-control

school which uses Durkheim as a point of reference, often
interprets this revelation as arguing for stronger, more
rigid form of control to counterbalance the loss of
authority and meaning.

This need not be the case.

As Mary

Douglas points out, when we debate the appropriateness of
knowledge systems for determining the structure of the
world, we are not selecting the true from the false, the
rational from the irrational, or knowledge from belief.5
Essentially, we are debating the type of social
organization we want to have.

Do we want to have a tight-

knit group with a rigid hierarchy or do we want loose
social relations and a pluralistic and indeterminate
hierarchy?

We can have truth and a firm distinctions

between true and false and right and wrong if we are
willing to forgo autonomous social relations and forge a
restrictive group boundary, group code, and mobility
structure (not that this is necessarily an individual
choice).

However, the price for this sureness and

righteousness may be too high.

Perhaps, a loose type of

organizational control is more conducive to the type of
world which we would want to inhabit or the one we believe

5 Cf., Mary Douglas (ed.), Essavs in the Sociology of
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), p. 5.
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we can construct— but again this is a political rather than
purely philosophical decision.

Summary
What we have tried to accomplish in this dissertation
is not a standard sociological critique of a belief or
knowledge system.

I think such a standard realist-based

critique is impossible— if by critique we mean unveiling
some hidden element that is the root cause of postmodern
thought and culture.

It is impossible for the sociologist,

philosopher, or cultural critic to look down from a secure
pedestal of positivistic or realist epistemology and
proclaim that what postmodernism actually reflects is the
crisis of late capitalism (Jameson, 1983), the
differentiation of society (Lash, 1990), or the further
fragmentation of modernist culture (Bell, 1976).

As both

postmodernism and the sociology of knowledge clearly
demonstrate, this type of realist based critique is no
longer possible.
However, one of the critical points argued in this
dissertation is that while a realist epistemology is
unacceptable, we are not left without the ability to
produce any knowledge.

We can argue that postmodernism is

a result of social factors as long as we realize that we
are forming a construct of postmodernism within the
confines of pre-existing social organization.
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We must

dismiss the idea that critiques are launched by "freefloating" intellectuals who miraculously capture an issue
such as postmodernism as it "really exists."

In other

words, our critiques do not reveal the truth of
postmodernism.

It is through our critiques that we

construct the meaning of postmodernism (or any movement,
problem, or issue).

Inevitably some of these constructed

meanings will go further than others.

This perhaps has

little to do with their accurate correspondence with the
real, but with the ability of various positions to
disseminate information and recruit allies within pre
designed organizational confines.
Essentially, what we have done, or attempted to do, is
provide a construction of postmodernism.

This, I believe,

is different from both the realist and interpretative
approaches.

A constructivist account recognizes that it,

like all knowledge, is forged and produced.

This account,

like all accounts, assumes that it has something to
contribute; otherwise, it would be unproductive to point
out that the world has meaning or it does not have meaning.
In this regard, our account has employed the same types of
rhetorical styles and maneuvers that can be found in other
knowledge claims to establish its view of representing
"what is going on."

Yet, from a social epistemological

position this does not discredit it.

It only points to one .

of the means in which all knowledge is produced or
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constructed.
While it would be tempting to argue that sociology
should attempt to hasten the move from an epistemological
to a socio-logical or constructivist way of approaching the
issues of truth and knowledge, this, I believe, would prove
non-useful and contradictory.

The sociology of knowledge

position does not demand that all disciplines "see the
light" and interpret the world as sociologists do:

This

would be in direct contradiction with its position.

As

Mary Hesse has pointed out, the sociology of knowledge does
not "remove the motivation for epistemological studies nor
emasculate philosophical theories....such a consequence
only follow for those who retain a rationalist theory of
knowledge."6

In other words, since we are not saying we

have a privileged position from which to launch accurate
critiques, we abandon the rationalistic premise that one
knowledge form must prove its superior access to truth.
Sociology cannot claim that it has the true narrative about
how knowledge comes about, a narrative that philosophy has
somehow missed.

Sociology can only claim that it has a

certain role to play in the construction of knowledge.
This is achieved not through uncovering a new version of
the real, but through the establishment of the authority to

6 Mary Hesse, "The Strong Thesis of Sociology of
Science," in Revolutions and Reconstructions in Philosophy
of Science, ed. by M. Hesse (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1976), p. 46.
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define "hard knowledge" of the social.

This, of course,

does not make it more "valid," only more socially
"legitimate."
As P. Bourdieu says in his book, Homo Academicus.
sociologists can overcome the dichotomy of objectivistic
explanation and subjectivistic understanding by turning
upon themselves the very tools of objectivism that they
routinely employ upon others.

In other words, sociology

may be an instrument of intervention in the politics of
intellectual life.7
Durkheim and Mauss end Primitive Classification with
the following statement:
As soon as they (philosophical problems) are
posed in sociological terms, all these questions, so
long debated by metaphysicians and psychologists, will
at last be liberated from the tautologies in
which they have languished. At least, this is a new
way which deserves to be tried.8
Our position does not retain Durkheim's and Mauss1
optimistic belief in full disclosure or that a social
epistemology is the answer to old philosophical problems,
but their basic point summarizes what we have tried to
illustrate about a sociological construction of
postmodernism.

Philosophical distinctions may be

ideationally unsupportable, but they remain powerful and
7 Pierre Bourdieu, Homo Academicus (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1988).
8 Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss, Primitive
Classification, trans. by R. Needham (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 88.
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confining social constructs.

God nay be dead but the

church lives on.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Binary Oppositions: A term used by structuralists to refer
to the dual code existing within a language and culture
(e.g., delineations between beautiful/ugly,
knowledge/belief, good/bad, etc.).
Bio-power: A term used by Foucault to refer to the body as
a construct of historically and socially constituted power.
This may be contrasted with a natural conception of the
body which argues that the body is an unchanging and stable
entity.
Correspondence referentiality: A term used to describe the
belief that the mind captures and languages reports
unmediated reality. There are no differences between word
and world (cf. nominalism).
Decentering the subject: For postmodernists the term
refers to the process of removing the Cartesian subject
from the center of knowledge or removing the Rousseauian
subject from the center of expression.
Deconstructionism: A process of reading a text where the
underlying philosophical hierarchy is revealed and shown to
be rhetorically favoring one term over another rather than
being a philosophically "real" distinction.
Habitus: A term used by Bourdiue to describe the social
space and underlying logical or binary code which orients
action and thought within a given social group or class.
Ideal speech: A term used by Habermas to refer to the ideal
conditions of a non-distorted and non-power contamination
discourse.
For Habermas, this is a normative prescription
for contemporary problems.
Langue: A term used by Saussure to refer to an underlying,
pre-conscious linguistical logic which provides the rules
for the construction of everyday speech.
Logocentrism: A term used by Derrida and the
postmodernists to describe the privileging of speech over
writing in Occidental thought.
It illustrates the search
of Western thought for a firm foundation and a final word
on nature and society.
Metanarrative: A term used by Lyotard to refer to the
supporting meta-theoretical positions which have been used
as an underlying rationale or logic in modernity (e.g.,
scientific accumulation, emancipation, creation of wealth).
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Nominalism: A philosophical position which argues that
languages and definitions do not refer to things but deal
with the terms we attach to things.
Parole: A terms used by Saussure to describe everyday
speech patterns which are shaped by an underlying langue.
Performative contradiction: A term used by Habermas to
refer to the inability of Adorno and Horkheimer and the
post-structuralist to account for their rational
denouncement of rationality.
Presence: A term used by Derrida to refer to Western
philosophy's search for unmediated reality. The goal of
traditional philosophy has been to eliminate the
encumbrances for bringing the object under the direct light
of investigation and explanation.
Text: A term used by deconstructionists to refer to
everything (i.e., "there is nothing outside of the text").
Within deconstructionism literal everything can be seen as
a text and investigators/scientists as literary critics.
The Problem of Reflexivity: Within the sociology of
science the term refers to the inability of sociologists to
state how their truth claims are superior to other truth
claims.
Theory of Communicative Action: Habermas's social theory
which argues that the linguistical rules of the life-world
can serve as a foundation for examining all discursive acts
and for launching a critique of power.
Totalizing Discourse: A term used by postmodernists to
describe any position which seeks to give a complete and
all-encompassing explanation of a phenomenon.
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